Error resilient techniques for storage elements of low power design by Yang, Sheng
University of Southampton Research Repository
ePrints Soton
Copyright © and Moral Rights for this thesis are retained by the author and/or other 
copyright owners. A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial 
research or study, without prior permission or charge. This thesis cannot be 
reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining permission in writing 
from the copyright holder/s. The content must not be changed in any way or sold 
commercially in any format or medium without the formal permission of the 
copyright holders.
  
 When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, title, 
awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given e.g.
AUTHOR (year of submission) "Full thesis title", University of Southampton, name 
of the University School or Department, PhD Thesis, pagination
http://eprints.soton.ac.ukUNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON
FACULTY OF PHYSICAL AND APPLIED SCIENCES
Electronics and Computer Science
Error Resilient Techniques for Storage Elements of Low Power Design
by
Sheng Yang
Thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
July 2013UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON
ABSTRACT
FACULTY OF PHYSICAL AND APPLIED SCIENCES
Electronics and Computer Science
Doctor of Philosophy
ERROR RESILIENT TECHNIQUES FOR STORAGE ELEMENTS OF LOW
POWER DESIGN
by Sheng Yang
Over two decades of research has led to numerous low-power design techniques being
reported. Two popular techniques are supply voltage scaling and power gating. This
thesis studies the impact of these two design techniques on the reliability of embedded
processor registers and memory systems in the presence of transient faults; and with the
aim to develop and validate eﬃcient mitigation techniques to improve reliability with
small cost of energy consumption, performance and area overhead.
This thesis presents three original contributions. The ﬁrst contribution presents a tech-
nique for improving the reliability of embedded processors. A key feature of the technique
is low cost, which is achieved through reuse of the scan chain for state monitoring, and
it is eﬀective because it can correct single and multiple bit errors through hardware and
software respectively. To validate the technique, ARM R   Cortex
TM
-M0 embedded mi-
croprocessor is implemented in FPGA and further synthesised using 65-nm technology
to quantify the cost in terms of area, latency and energy. It is shown that the presented
technique has a small area overhead (8.6%) with less than 4% worst-case increase in
critical path. The second contribution demonstrates that state integrity of ﬂip-ﬂops is
sensitive to process, voltage and temperature (PVT) variation through measurements
from 82 test chips. A PVT-aware state protection technique is presented to ensure state
integrity of ﬂip-ﬂops while achieving maximum leakage savings. The technique consists
of characterisation algorithm and employs horizontal and vertical parity for error de-
tection and correction. Silicon results show that ﬂip-ﬂops state integrity is preserved
while achieving up to 17.6% reduction in retention voltage across 82-dies. Embedded
processors memory systems are susceptible to transient errors and blanket protection
of every part of memory system through ECC is not cost eﬀective. The ﬁnal contri-
bution addresses the reliability of embedded processor memory systems and describes
an architectural simulation-based framework for joint optimisation of reliability, energy
consumption and performance. Accurate estimation of memory reliability with targeted
protection is proposed to identify and protect the most vulnerable part of the mem-
ory system to minimise protection cost. Furthermore, L1-cache resizing together with
voltage and frequency scaling is proposed for further energy savings while maintaining
performance and reliability. The contributions presented are supported by detailed anal-
yses using state-of-the-art design automation tools, in-house software tools and validated
using FPGA and silicon implementation of commercial low power embedded processors.ivContents
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Introduction
Since the invention of integrated circuits in 1958, and driven by the demand for cost
reduction and increasing functionality, CMOS transistor technology scaling (including
transistor size scaling and supply voltage scaling) has enabled the IC industry to in-
tegrate more transistors within the same silicon area. Borkar, et al. [1] showed that
each transition to a new generation, reduces transistor size and supply voltage by 30%,
doubles the chip density, reduces gate delay by 30%, reduces overall power by 50% and
increases leakage power by around 5x. The side eﬀect of technology scaling is the re-
duction of system reliability. This is because smaller transistors lead to lower critical
charge and higher integration level increases system complexity. The other side eﬀect
of technology scaling is the increase in power density due to the increase in transistor
density. Historically dynamic power has dominated the power consumption of digital
integrated circuits and has been the main focus of power reduction. As technology
scaling continues, leakage power consumption continues to grow in dominance and leak-
age power reduction also becomes an important part of modern digital circuits. Both
leakage and dynamic power reduction techniques exacerbate reliability problems. This
thesis describes new methods to improve the reliability of modern low power digital cir-
cuits. These methods have been implemented using standard EDA tools and validated
on commercial low power processors.
This chapter gives an overview of reliability and low power design of digital integrated
circuits and provides preliminary information for the subsequent thesis chapters. Tech-
nology scaling and its major impacts are discussed in Section 1.1. Digital circuit power
reduction techniques are discussed in Section 1.2, which includes dynamic power reduc-
tion and leakage power reduction techniques. Digital circuit reliability problems are
discussed in Section 1.3. Error control coding is an eﬀective technique for ensuring data
integrity which can be applied to improve system reliability, which is discussed in Sec-
tion 1.4. The challenges facing low power reliable design are discussed in Section 1.5.
The contribution of each chapter is summarised in Section 1.6 and ﬁnally the list of
publications generated from the research in this thesis is given in Section 1.7
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1.1 Impacts of Technology Scaling
Cost reduction of IC fabrication is the main reason behind technology scaling. For the
past 50 years semiconductor technology scaling has reduced transistor size by 30% and
doubled the performance every two to three years. Transistor performance is inversely
proportional to propagation delay which can be approximated as Equation 1.1 [2]:
Td ∝
CL   Vdd
Vdd − Vth
(1.1)
where CL is load capacitance, Vdd is supply voltage and Vth is threshold voltage. Transis-
tor size scaling reduces load capacitance and leads to shorter propagation delay. However
supply voltage scaling increases propagation delay, so to maintain or further reduce prop-
agation delay the threshold voltage has to be scaled down. Transistor dynamic power
consumption is described using Equation 1.2 [3]:
pdynamic = α   V 2
dd   CL (1.2)
where α is activity factor, CL is load capacitance and Vdd is supply voltage. Dynamic
power is proportional to load capacitance and the square of supply voltage. Both load
capacitance and supply voltage reduce with technology scaling, and dynamic power
reduces with technology scaling. There are two main components of leakage power: gate
leakage and sub-threshold leakage. Gate leakage current increases exponentially with
reduction in gate oxide thickness [4]; however high-k metal gate reduces the leakage
by 2-3 order of magnitude [5, 6]. The most signiﬁcant contributor to leakage power
consumption of current technology generation is sub-threshold leakage current which is
calculated by Equation 1.3 [3]:
Ids ∝ e
Vgs−Vth
n·VT   (1 − e
−
Vds
VT ) (1.3)
where Vgs is gate to source voltage, Vth is transistor threshold voltage, Vds is drain to
source voltage and VT is thermal voltage KT
q . For Vds ≫ VT 1 − e−Vds/VT ≈ 1, which
means that if Vds is larger than 100-mV then sub-threshold leakage is almost independent
of Vds. Sub-threshold leakage can be approximated as:
Ids ∝ e
Vgs−Vth
n·VT (1.4)
Sub-threshold leakage current increases exponentially with the reduction of threshold
voltage Vth. Threshold voltage is reduced in order to maintain the performance ofChapter 1 Introduction 3
the transistor (Equation 1.1). As the result, sub-threshold leakage current increases
exponentially with technology scaling.
Technology scaling also has a number of impacts on system reliability. This is because
small transistor size and high integration density increases system soft error rate [7]. As
transistor size continues to shrink, process variation in transistor channel length, width,
oxide thickness and dopant concentration increases. These variations cause the diﬀerence
in transistor threshold voltage [8, 9] that leads to the uncertainty in circuit delay of
timing paths and performance of fabricated chips. Process variation also exacerbates
the reliability problem by reducing the critical charge and noise margin of the storage
units. The degradation of reliability and the increases in leakage power are becoming
major obstacles for further transistor scaling [10–13].
1.2 Power Reduction Techniques
There are two power consumption components in an digital circuit: dynamic power and
leakage power. Various power reduction techniques are described in this section, which
is divided into dynamic power reduction and leakage power reduction techniques.
1.2.1 Dynamic Power Reduction
Dynamic power has been the dominant part of digital circuit power consumption for
many years. It can be seen from Equation 1.2 that switching activity, load capacitance
and supply voltage are three contributing factors of dynamic power. Load capacitance
is reduced with transistor size scaling inherently. Dynamic power reduction techniques
involve reducing switching activity, reducing supply voltage or both.
In synchronous digital circuits, the clock tree dominates dynamic power consumption
due to the constant switching of clock signals and the large fan-out of clock tree. Clock
gating can reduce clock tree power consumption [14–18]. Registers are used to store data
and states information, whose update is controlled by clock signals. Not all registers
require update in every clock cycle; hence clock gating was introduced to stop the
switching of parts of clock tree where registers do not need updating. This is achieved
by inserting a clock gating cell between clock tree buﬀers and registers, which allows the
clock control signal to enable or disable the register’s clock input. Figure 1.1 shows the
diﬀerence between designs with and without clock gating. Figure 1.1.(a) shows a circuit
without clock gating. To enable or disable the updates of an register, a multiplexer is
inserted which selects the input between updating new data or recirculating old data
stored in the register. Figure 1.1.(b) shows a circuit with clock gating, where a clock
gating cell including a latch and an AND gate is used to stop the toggling of the clock
signal. When multiple registers are controlled by one enable signal, clock gating can4 Chapter 1 Introduction
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Figure 1.1: Clock gating architecture [22].
even reduce the chip area. This is because, without clock gating, each register requires
one multiplexer, whereas with clock gating, a group of registers can share a single clock
gating cell. Various automatic clock gating insertion algorithms [19–21] were developed
to improve the eﬀectiveness of clock gating designs, which are well supported by standard
EDA (Electronic Design Automation) tools such as the Synopsys Power Compiler.
As the dynamic power is proportional to the square of the supply voltage (Equation 1.2),
the most eﬀective way to reduce dynamic power is through supply voltage scaling. When
supply voltage is reduced circuit delay is increased (Equation 1.1); however digital cir-
cuits do not always operate at their maximum frequency due to workload demands [23].
Dynamic Voltage and Frequency Scaling (DVFS) reduces the supply voltage and oper-
ating frequency of circuits under light workload to improve energy eﬃciency. Various
DVFS algorithms [17,24–29] were developed to maximise energy reduction.
1.2.2 Leakage Power Reduction
Leakage power becomes an increasingly signiﬁcant part of overall chip power consump-
tion with CMOS technology scaling [30]. There are three types of leakage current in a
MOSFET transistor: gate leakage, sub-threshold leakage and junction tunnelling leak-
age. Gate leakage current increases exponentially with reduction in the gate oxide
thickness [4]. With silicon dioxide gate thickness approaching scaling limits there is aChapter 1 Introduction 5
rapid increase in gate leakage current [31,32]. When the transistor size is scaled below
40nm, with SiO2 as the gate dielectric, the gate leakage current density would exceed the
current density limit [30]. The threshold voltage of MOSFET transistors is reduced to
increase the performance, but the sub-threshold leakage current increases exponentially
with the reduction of threshold voltage (equation 1.4). Junction tunnelling leakage is
an order of magnitude less than gate leakage and sub-threshold leakage for the recent
technology generation [33], therefore it will not be discussed in detail in this work.
A circuit has two states: an active state where it is doing useful work and an idle state
where it is not doing any work. Numerous approaches have been proposed to minimise
the leakage power, which can be categorised into active circuit leakage power reduction
and idle circuit leakage power reduction. The active circuit leakage reduction technique
includes high-k metal gate [34], dual-threshold standard cells [35]. The high-K metal gate
was proposed [34] to reduce the gate leakage, which has been implemented in technology
nodes of 45nm and below [36]. To reduce the sub-threshold leakage while maintaining
the performance, dual threshold standard cell synthesis was proposed [35] to reduce
the sub-threshold leakage of the gates in the non-critical path by replacing low-Vt high
performance transistors with the high-Vt less leaky transistors. These slower high-Vt
transistors are not in the critical path so they will not aﬀect the performance of the
circuit.
A circuit’s leakage power can be further reduced by cutting oﬀ or scaling its power
supply when the circuit is in an idle state. There are three leakage reduction techniques
involved powering oﬀ/down a idle circuit. If a chip is idle for a long time and there
is no constraint on the wake-up delay, then its external power supply can be turned
oﬀ completely during sleep mode; in this way the maximum leakage reduction can be
achieved. However, the switching of the external power supply takes relatively long
time, and some energy and time are wasted in initializing the circuit when it wakes
up. If a device has a relatively short idle time and requires fast wake-up, cutting oﬀ
the chip power supply will reduce its reaction speed. Therefore power gating [37] was
proposed to reduce the leakage power of a circuit in sleep mode but maintain a fairly
short wake-up latency. In a power-gated circuit, the logic blocks are connected to power
supply through high-Vt power transistors shown in Figure 1.2. When the circuit is idle
the power transistors are turned oﬀ and the leakage power of the logic blocks is limited
by those power transistors, it was reported that power gating achieves 95% of leakage
power reduction for ARM926EJTM [38].
Power gating turns oﬀ logic and registers, so the states of registers are lost. For energy
eﬃciency the state of registers can be preserved while logic is powered down so-called
State Retention Power Gating (SRPG). To support this, a state retention latch [39] can
be added which is kept powered during power gating of the rest of the circuit. Figure 1.3
shows a specially designed ﬂip-ﬂop incorporating state retention latch. The master ﬂip-
ﬂop is connected to Vdd through a power transistor and the slave retention latch is kept6 Chapter 1 Introduction
Figure 1.2: Power gating design architecture
Figure 1.3: State Retention Flip-Flop
always-on. The master ﬂip-ﬂop consists of low-Vt transistors for fast switching during
active mode. The slave retention latch consists of high-Vt transistors for low leakage
during sleep mode. In addition to the data and clock input the state retention ﬂip-ﬂop
has a control signal, RETAIN. When the power-gated circuit is switched to sleep mode,
RETAIN is set to ‘1’ to transfer data from the master ﬂip-ﬂop to the slave retention
latch, and before the power-gated circuit is switched to active mode, RETAIN is set to
‘0’ to restore data back to the master ﬂip-ﬂop.
The other idle circuit leakage power reduction technique is voltage scaling. The supply
voltage of idle circuit can be scaled down aggressively to the point where the storage
cells still retain their data [40–42]. The architecture of scaled voltage state retention is
shown in Figure 1.4. In active mode signal ‘Sleep’ is 0, sleep transistor M1 is on and M2
is oﬀ, and the logic block is connected to nominal Vdd and clocked with full speed. In
sleep mode signal ‘Sleep’ is 1, sleep transistor M1 is oﬀ and M2 is on, and the logic block
is connected to scaled Vdd to achieve leakage saving. This technique does not requireChapter 1 Introduction 7
Gnd
V-Vdd
Vdd=1V
Logic block
Vdd_drowsy=0.3V
Sleep Sleep M1 M2
Figure 1.4: Scaled voltage leakage reduction
additional state retention latches and has a smaller wake-up delay; however, the leakage
power saving is less than power gating.
Figure 1.5 demonstrates the eﬀect of supply voltage scaling on leakage power, where
the x-axis represents the supply voltage and the y-axis represents the leakage power
in log-scale. The result covers 3 process corners: the slow(NMOS)-slow(PMOS) corner
is represented using cross markers, the fast-fast corner is represented using diamond
markers and the typical-typical corner is represented using square markers. The power
is measured during idle mode where no switching activities are present, and is measured
for a range of supply voltages ranging from 0.5V to 1.1V. It can be seen that the leakage
power reduces exponentially with the reduction in supply voltage, and 15% reduction of
supply voltage results in 50% reduction in leakage power.
Leakage power reduction techniques are summarised in Figure 1.6. The left column
shows active circuit leakage reduction techniques, where gate leakage can be reduced
by using high-k metal gate transistors, and sub-threshold leakage can be addressed by
using dual threshold standard cell design. The right column shows the idle circuit leakage
reduction techniques: turning oﬀ the power supply, power gating and voltage scaling.
Turning oﬀ the power supply has the lowest leakage but longer wake-up latency, while
voltage scaling has the highest leakage and shortest wake-up latency.
1.3 Reliability of Digital Designs
There are diﬀerent types of faults aﬀecting the reliability of integrated circuits that
can be classiﬁed into two categories: permanent faults which have lasting eﬀects on the
system reliability and transient errors which just aﬀect the system reliability temporarily.8 Chapter 1 Introduction
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1.3.1 Permanent Faults
All permanent faults can be either related to a manufacturing defect where the devices
are damaged during the manufacturing process, or related to ageing eﬀects where the
devices degrade gradually during their lifetime. The fabrication of integrated circuit is
very complex. Imperfect process manufacturing such as foreign particles or impurities in
the silicon wafer may cause bridged connections or missing features [43,44]. In modern
ICs, the most common defects are bridges “shorts” where unintended connections form
between circuit nodes, and “opens” where intended connections between circuit nodes
are missing. For resistive bridge and open defects, the unintended connections areChapter 1 Introduction 9
not fully short-circuit, and for resistive-opens the broken connection is not fully open-
circuit. Fault models have been developed to emulate how defects aﬀect the operation of
a circuit: the popular fault models are gate level “stuck-at” fault model [45], transistor
level “stuck-at” fault model [46], bridging fault models [47] and delay fault models [48].
Automatic test pattern generation (ATPG) [44,46] algorithms are used to generate the
test patterns, and the fault coverage statistics are collected by using fault simulation.
Scan chains can be used to shift the test pattern into the registers of a digital circuit.
Internal scan design is the most popular design-for-test (DFT) technique which can
achieve high fault coverage by isolating the combinational logic block for a complex
sequential design [46].
An IC degrades gradually during its lifetime due to the various stresses it experiences in
normal operations. Technology scaling reduces the feature sizes but increases the power
densities and accelerates the wear-out based failures [10]. Various wear-out eﬀects have
been reported: Negative bias temperature instability (NBTI) is due to the positive
charge created at the SiO2/Si interface and in the oxide under negative bias stressing,
thereby causing the threshold voltage to shift and decrease the channel mobility which
leads to an increase in transistor delay [49]. Gate oxide breakdown is caused by the
traps formed in the gate oxide under the inﬂuence of gate-to-channel electric ﬁeld. The
traps accumulates and forms a resistive conduction path from gate to channel and the
phenomenon is soft oxide breakdown (SBD). Once the conductive path is formed, more
traps appear at an increasing pace and ﬁnally lead to hard oxide breakdown (HBD),
which will increase gate leakage, delay and energy, and lower critical charge [12, 50].
Electro-migration is caused by the momentum transfer from collisions between conduct-
ing electrons and diﬀusing metal atoms leading to biased transport of metal atoms,
which creates voids in the metal wires. It results in increased resistance which creates
resistive shorts or opens in wires [51,52]. Stress migration is due to the diﬀerence in
thermal expansion coeﬃcient between metal, silicon and oxide. When cooled from high
temperatures, metal shrinks more than the surrounding medium. Therefore metal is
left in a state of very high tensile stress. Coupled with electro-migration, it accelerates
void creation [53]. Thermal cycling is the name given to the cyclic thermal strains due
to power cycling, which can lead to the thermal fatigue failure in packaging such as
short-circuit in the bonding and solder joints [54,55].
1.3.2 Transient Errors
Transient errors are caused by electrical noise or external radiation rather than design
or manufacturing defects [56]. The eﬀects of transient errors are temporary. Inductive
eﬀects have long been known to cause problems at various levels of the system such as
chip package and board level. In modern IC technology generation the inductive noise
becomes an increasing concern due to the faster switching speed and higher levels of10 Chapter 1 Introduction
integration [57]. Inductive noise is generated from the switching current in neighbouring
circuits, it starts to cause problems in the 0.25 m technology node [58], and the problem
has increased for more advanced technology nodes [59,60]. Inductive noise also occurs
in the power supply lines due to simultaneous switching noise generated by core logic
and input/output circuitry, that can also impact the performance and data integrity of
the electronic circuit [61].
The other source of transient errors is “soft errors” or Single Event Upset (SEU) induced
by particles strikes. Most modern digital systems use synchronised designs consisting of
sequential logics and combinational logics. Sequential logics are used to store the current
state of the system while combinational logics are used to evaluate the next state of the
system in each clock cycle. Due to the fundamental diﬀerence in their functionality the
radiation event will have diﬀerent eﬀects on them.
When an ionised particle strikes a combinational logic node it generates a current pulse.
The current pulse may propagate through the combinational logic tree and ﬁnally be
captured by the sequential logic, which leads to state corruption. However the current
pulse may not always be captured by sequential logic. There are three types of masking
eﬀects [56]: ﬁrstly, if the current pulse is small it will be attenuated by the logic tree and
the pulse seen in the output will be too small to be captured by sequential logic; this is
called electrical masking. Secondly, when a particle strikes a combinational logic in the
early phase of the clock cycle, by the time sequential logic is clocked and the next state
recorded at the output of the combinational logic tree, the current pulse generated may
already faded away; this is called latching window masking. Lastly some logic gates can
also mask the current pulse at one of its inputs because the output is determined by its
other input values; for example if one input of an NAND gate is connected to logic ‘0’
then the output of the gate will still be logic ‘1’ despite the particle strike aﬀecting the
other input. In this case the particle strike has no eﬀect on the output; this is called
logic masking.
The sequential logic consists of many storage nodes; each storage node is comprised of a
feedback circuit for holding the last state. When a storage node is struck by an ionised
particle a current pulse is generated. If this current pulse overcomes the feedback current
and exceeds the stored charge of the node, the state of this storage node is ﬂipped so
the data is corrupted. The sensitivity of a transistor to radiation-induced soft errors is
dependant on its node capacitance and the supply voltage [13], both of which decrease
with technology scaling. The reduction of supply voltage reduces the noise margin; the
noise in the power supply rails may also impact device reliability. The failure rate of a
system is the accumulation of each component’s failure rate, and the increasing scale of
system integration exacerbates the system reliability problem [11]. In addition, power
reduction techniques such as dynamic voltage frequency scaling and power gating [37]
also tend to impact the system reliability.Chapter 1 Introduction 11
In this work the state integrity of digital circuit storage elements such as ﬂip-ﬂops or
memory cells is studied. State integrity is referred as the capability of retaining the
storage elements’ original logic value.
1.4 Error Control Coding
Error Control Coding (ECC) is concerned with methods for delivering information from
a source to a destination with minimum errors [62]. ECC provides forms of protec-
tion by introducing redundancy, in theory error rate can be reduced to a desired level
with enough redundancy. ECC is also widely used for the protection of data storage
elements in processors. High performance coding schemes have been developed to pro-
tect noisy communication channels; these coding schemes may need complex encoding
and decoding which is not suitable for protecting an embedded processor. Hamming
code and CRC code are used in this work (Chapter 3) due to the simplicity of their
encoder and decoder which means smaller area, power and latency overheads. Ham-
ming code and CRC code are both systematic codes where the original message is part
of the codeword. In this section, all addition, subtraction, multiplication and division
operations are GF(2) arithmetic or modulo 2 arithmetic. In GF(2) arithmetic, addi-
tion and subtraction are identical which can be implemented using an XOR gate. The
implementation of multiplication uses an AND gate.
1.4.1 Hamming Code
Hamming code is a single error correcting and double error detecting code which is
capable of correcting one error and detecting two errors in a codeword. For any positive
integer m >= 3 there exists a Hamming code with the following parameters [63]:
• Code length: n = 2m − 1
• Information bits: k = 2m − m − 1
• Check bits: n − k = m
Hamming code is commonly expressed as Hamming (n, k). The encoding and decoding
can be represented by generator matrix and parity check matrix. The parity check
matrix H is arranged as:
H = [Im Q] (1.5)12 Chapter 1 Introduction
where Im is an identity matrix of size m. Q consist of k columns; each column is size m
with Hamming weight 2 or more. For example, the parity check matrix for Hamming(7,4)
is:
H =



1 0 0 1 0 1 1
0 1 0 1 1 1 0
0 0 1 0 1 1 1


 (1.6)
The columns of Q can be arranged in any order without aﬀecting the property of the
code. The parity generation matrix G is arranged as:
G = [QTIk] (1.7)
where QT is the transpose of Q and Ik is an identity matrix of size k. The process of
encoding can be represented by:
v = u   G (1.8)
where u is the information vector, v is the generated codeword vector, and G is the
generation matrix. The process of decoding can be represented by:
s = (v + e)   HT (1.9)
where s is the syndrome vector which indicates the error location, e is the error added
to the original codeword v, and H is the parity check matrix. If there is no error, the
syndrome vector s will be all zeros.
1.4.2 CRC Code
Cyclic Redundancy Code (CRC) is a linear block code with high error detection capa-
bility and low redundancy. If the information vector is interpreted as polynomial m(x),
the encoding can be explained as:
r(x) = m(x) mod g(x) (1.10)
where g(x) is the generator polynomial, and r(x) is the CRC check bits which is the
remainder of m(x) divided by g(x). The decoding is the same as encoding where another
set of CRC check bits r′(x) is generated. Both sets of CRC check bits are compared;Chapter 1 Introduction 13
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Figure 1.7: CRC generation using Linear Feedback Shift Register (LFSR) [64].
if r(x)  = r′(x), then an error is detected. The implementation can be done using an
Linear Feedback Shift Register LFSR as shown in Figure 1.7. At every clock cycle, the
input data is shifted into the registers; when all input bits have been processed the data
remain in the registers are the CRC check bits.
1.5 Low Power Reliable Design Challenges
Figure 1.8 shows how CMOS technology scaling aﬀects the performance, power and reli-
ability of integrated circuits. The solid arrows represent the positive inﬂuences and the
hollow arrows represent the negative inﬂuences. As can be seen, three factors are scaled
with each technology generation: transistor size, supply voltage and threshold voltage.
Transistor size scaling increases the performance and reduces dynamic power; at the
same time it increases the static power consumption and power density and reduces the
reliability. Supply voltage scaling is used to further reduce the dynamic power; how-
ever it decreases the performance and reliability. Threshold voltage reduction is used
to improve the device performance but increases the static power at the same time.
The power density of the chip increases with the reduction of transistor size, and it
also increases with device dynamic and static power. The increase of the power density
leads to higher temperature, which will further increase the power consumption [38]. To
summarise, the transistor performance and dynamic power consumption beneﬁt from
technology scaling while static power consumption and system reliability are aﬀected
negatively. These technology scaling associated problems such as increase in leakage
power, worsened process variation, and resulting in degradation in reliability and in-
creasing levels of complexity need to be addressed. Power reduction techniques have
been extensively used to address the increasing power density problem; however they
have detrimental eﬀects on reliability. Therefore maintaining reliability while reducing
power consumption with minimum cost is the aim of this research.14 Chapter 1 Introduction
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1.6 Thesis Organisation
This thesis presents three complimentary but orthogonal contributions. Chapter 3
presents the ﬁrst contribution that deals with improving reliability of states stored in
state retention registers, which are aﬀected by ﬂuctuations in the supply rail due to rush
current in the power supply network when power gating logic is turned on from sleep
mode. It is shown that this problem is further exacerbated because the critical charge
of a storage node is aﬀected by the combined eﬀect of process variation and supply
voltage scaling. To improve state protection, a combination of hardware and software
based error monitoring and recovery method is proposed for single and multi-bit error
recovery. Through two case studies, including implementation of a commercial embed-
ded processor (ARM CortexTM-M0), it is shown that it is possible to achieve more than
2 orders of magnitude improvement in system reliability compared to a design without
error protection, when considering maximum soft error rate observed at normal operat-
ing conditions. Area overhead is minimised through reuse of the scan chains for state
encoding using ECC codes.
Chapter 4 presents the second contribution that uses measured results from 82 test
chips to characterise state integrity challenges of voltage scaled ﬂip-ﬂops in the presence
of process, voltage and temperature (PVT) variations. Measured results show that
the minimum retention voltage of a design varies across dies and therefore a single
retention voltage for all dies lead to overall higher leakage power consumption during
sleep mode. A novel solution is presented to address this state integrity challenge, while
minimizing leakage power of ﬂip-ﬂops during sleep mode. The proposed solution uses
a characterisation algorithm to minimise data retention voltage for each die thereby
reducing leakage power and uses a control ﬂow for error detection and single bit error
recovery. Silicon results show that at characterised data retention voltage, state integrity
is preserved, while achieving up to 17.6% reduction in retention voltage across the 82
dies, thereby saving leakage power.Chapter 1 Introduction 15
Chapter 5 presents the last contribution that deals with the reliability of the complete
memory system and describes an architectural simulation-based framework for joint op-
timisation of reliability, energy consumption and performance. Memory systems are
highly susceptible to soft errors and blanket protection of every part of memory sys-
tem through ECC is not cost eﬀective. Therefore, an accurate estimation of memory
reliability with targeted protection is proposed. The proposed solution identiﬁes and
protects the most vulnerable part of the memory system to minimise protection cost.
Furthermore, local level-1, L1 resizing together with voltage and frequency scaling is
proposed for further energy savings while maintaining performance and reliability of an
embedded processor system. Detailed evaluation shows that energy reduction is possible
for most applications in a reliability constrained design.
These three contributions presented in this thesis are supported by detailed analysis
using state-of-the-art design automation tools, and in-house software tools and, where
necessary, are validated through FPGA implementation of commercial low power em-
bedded processors and measured results from fabricated designs.
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2. Sheng Yang, Saqib Khursheed, Bashir M. Al-Hashimi, David Flynn and Geoﬀ
V. Merrett, “Improved State Integrity of Flip-Flops for Voltage Scaled Retention
under PVT Variation”, Circuit and Systems-I, IEEE Transaction on (In press)
3. Sheng Yang, Saqib Khursheed, Bashir M. Al-Hashimi, David Flynn, “Modeling
Framework to Optimise Memory System Reliability”, ACM Transactions on Em-
bedded Computing Systems (Under preparation)
1.7.2 Conference Publication
1. Sheng Yang, Saqib Khursheed, Bashir M. Al-Hashimi and David Flynn, “Scan
Based Methodology for Reliable State Retention Power Gating Designs”, Design,
Automation & Test in Europe Conference & Exhibition (DATE), pp.69-74, 8-12
March 2010Chapter 2
Literature Review
This chapter provides a broad overview of the state-of-the-art research that is related
to this thesis research topic. To complement this literature review, each of Chap-
ters 3, 4 and 5 has its own literature review, placing the contributions described in
these chapters in the context of the relevant research. Section 2.1 reviews the unre-
liability source of power-gated designs and discusses the principles of some of the key
reported techniques in addressing this reliability issue. Section 2.2 reviews the reliabil-
ity in supply voltage scaled designs and outlines brieﬂy the main techniques reported in
improving the reliability of such designs. Analysing the reliability of processors requires
the availability of metrics that quantify their susceptibility to failure. Recent research
eﬀorts indicate that process, voltage and temperature (PVT) variation is aﬀecting the re-
liability of digital designs, Section 2.3 discusses brieﬂy why this is the case and describes
some of the reported techniques in mitigating theses variation. Part of transient errors
referred to as soft error is induced by particle strike, Section 2.4 describes the source
of soft errors, its impact on digital circuit reliability and existing mitigation techniques.
Section 2.5 reviews the metrics proposed and some of the architectural innovations re-
ported to improve the reliability of embedded processors. Finally, this chapter includes
the objectives for the research described in subsequent chapters in light of the reviewed
research.
2.1 Reliability of Power-gated Designs
In Chapter 1 Section 1.2.2 various leakage reduction techniques were described. Power
gating is eﬀective in reducing leakage power, but switching on/oﬀ the power supply of a
logic block can cause voltage ﬂuctuation in the supply and ground rail; this phenomenon
is also called ground bounce. The power supply rails of an integrated circuit are not
ideal, as wires have resistance and there are capacitance and inductance between the
wires. Figure 2.1 shows a simpliﬁed model of power supply rails in a power-gated design.
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Figure 2.1: Ground bounce in power-gated design [65].
In sleep mode, when the power gating transistors (power switches) are oﬀ, the internal
capacitance of the power-gated logic blocks are discharged near ground level and the
leakage currents is limited by the power switches. When the power-gated logic blocks
are reactivated, the power switches are turned on, the internal capacitance of these
logic blocks are rapidly charged up. The rapid charge of the logic block causes a large
in-rush current, and the sudden change of current induces a voltage across the wires’
inductance, which can be modelled as step response of an RLC circuit [65,66]. The
voltage ﬂuctuation at the power supply rails may corrupt the state retention elements
that hold the circuit states during sleep mode, which leads to a potential reliability
problem.
Several techniques were used to reduce the amount of ground bounce cause by power
switches [65]. Figure 2.2.(a) is the conventional power switches arrangement, where a
control signal TURN ON is connected to an array of power switches. In this arrangement
all power switches are turned on at the same time, causing a large in-rush current.
To reduce this in-rush current, Figure 2.2.(b) shows the voltage level of control signal
TURN ON increases over time in a step wise manner. Figure 2.2.(c) shows that the
control signals of power switches are connected in a buﬀer chain; the power switch at
the beginning of the buﬀer chain is turned on ﬁrst and the subsequent switches areChapter 2 Literature Review 19
(a) Conventional power switches arrangement
(b) Power switches with step wise control
(c) Power switches with delayed control signals
Figure 2.2: Change power switches arrangement for ground bounce reduc-
tion [65].
then turned on one by one. The interval is controlled by the delay of the buﬀers. This
method has been incorporated by foundries into standard cell libraries where the power
switches’ control can be connected in a daisy chain. Pump capacitors was proposed
to slowly turn on the power switches and use a voltage monitor circuit to detect the
end of the activation process [67]. Other techniques are stacking power switches [68],
raising voltage level of virtual ground and virtual supply [69,70], and controlling the
input vector of logic block [71]. These works protect the power-gated design by reducing
the ground bounce through in-rush current reduction.20 Chapter 2 Literature Review
Figure 2.3: Energy dissipation under diﬀerent supply voltage [74].
2.2 Reliability of Voltage Scaled Designs
As discussed in Chapter 1 Section 1.2, supply voltage scaling is an eﬀective power re-
duction technique for both dynamic power and leakage power. Recent studies have seen
dynamic power reduction of 20% [72] and 32% [73] using DVFS. For low performance
applications requiring energy minimization, a CMOS circuit can be designed to operate
in the sub-threshold region [74]. Figure 2.3 shows the energy dissipation under voltage
and frequency scaling. It can be seen that the minimum energy point is under 350-mV
supply voltage, at which point the energy eﬃciency is 4x better compared to 0.9-V sup-
ply voltage. However, to operate under sub-threshold voltage, specially designed gate
libraries are required [74]. Sub-threshold operation exacerbates the impact of process
variations on gate delay which is as high as 300% [75].
Supply voltage scaling is also an eﬀective technique for leakage power reduction. Power
minimisation through supply voltage scaling during sleep state has been proposed in [41,
76], where voltage scaling is implemented by using IR-drop of diode to reduce power sup-
ply. Recent studies have shown that voltage scaling eﬀectively reduces sub-threshold and
gate-leakage power in Deep Sub-Micron (DSM) designs [38,77]. This is because of the
negative exponential relationship of leakage power and supply voltage (Chapter 1, Sec-
tion 1.1, Equation 1.4). Unlike sub-threshold designs, when voltage scaling is used for
leakage reduction, the most energy eﬃcient point is the minimum supply voltage re-
quired to hold the data in storage elements of a circuit. Data Retention Voltage (DRV)
is the voltage point at which a SRAM cell can still hold its original value [78,79]. A
recent study using Monte-Carlo simulations showed that within-die process variation
causes the distribution of DRV for 90nm and 45nm SRAM cells [78]; and the studies on
cache showed the same trend [80–82]. For correct operation the supply voltage should beChapter 2 Literature Review 21
Figure 2.4: Archiecture of the Canary-based feedback loop for SRAM standby
VDD scaling [79].
kept above the highest DRV of all SRAM cells, which is 150-mV for 90-nm and 320-mV
for 45-nm (Figure ??).
Canary cells were proposed to provide a safety margin for voltage scaling [78,79,83,84].
Canary cells are an array of specially designed storage cells which fail at higher supply
voltage than the protected design. Figure 2.4 shows the architecture of a canary-based
design. The voltage regulator is used to control the supply voltage of the core cells which
can be lowered to reduce leakage power. Banks of canary cells are designed to fail across a
range of voltages which is above the highest DRV of the core cells. The failure of Canary
cells is monitored by the failure detector which is compared to the failure threshold. If
the failure voltage exceeds the pre-set margin, the controller raises the supply voltage
to the last working value. Figure 2.5 shows the schematic of Canary cells, which must
fail before the core cells to prevent the loss of data; so a PMOS transistor M8 is inserted
between the supply rail and Canary cell to provide additional IR drop, the resistance of
M8 can be controlled by signal VCTRL. Canary design provides 11x leakage power saving
compared to nominal supply voltage. Other techniques using supply voltage scaling for
leakage reduction are post silicon characterisation method for ﬁne-grain cache line supply
voltage control [80] and for SRAM retention voltage adjustment in individual die [81,82].
2.3 Impacts of Process Variation on Reliability
In DSM technology, the gate oxide is only a few atoms thick, channels contain countable
dopant atoms [85], and the size of transistor is an order of magnitude smaller than the
wavelength of the light used in lithography to create these devices [86]. The uneven22 Chapter 2 Literature Review
Figure 2.5: Schematic of Canary cell (a) for storing ‘1’ and (b) for storing
‘0’ [79].
distribution of dopant atoms or the uneven surface of gate oxide will cause a signiﬁcant
diﬀerence in the electrical property of a transistor. The diﬀerence between geometries
drawn in CAD systems and the implemented devices will cause uncertainty in terms of
performance, power and reliability. This uncertainty will continue to grow as the scaling
trend continues [30].
The main causes of process variation are random dopant distribution, sub-wavelength
lithography and line edge roughness [87]. The result is the variation in the transistor’s
oxide thickness, carrier mobility, channel length and threshold voltage [88–91]. The num-
ber of dopants in the depletion region of a DSM technology is in the order of hundreds;
therefore the microscopic dopant distribution in the MOSFET channel will inﬂuence
the device electrical performance [92]. The eﬀect of random dopant distribution on
threshold voltage can be tens of millivolts when the supply voltage and threshold volt-
age of DSM are about 1.2-V and 400-mV respectively [93]. Lithography is the process
of printing circuits by shining light through photomask to the surface of silicon wafer
coated with a photosensitive material (resist); therefore it transfers the mask pattern
into the wafer [86]. The main problem in sub-wavelength lithography is diﬀraction and
interference, which makes lines printed on the wafer shorter or wider than those on
the mask [94]. Line edge roughness is roughness along the transistor channel caused
by number of statistically ﬂuctuating eﬀects in the lithography and chemical etching
processes such as photon ﬂux variations, distribution of chemical species in the resist,
random walk nature of acid diﬀusion and resist polymers being dissolved during de-
velopment [95]. Line edge roughness reduces transistor channel length by about 5-nm
when technology scaled below 100-nm [96], which can lead to threshold variation of up
to 20-mV [97,98]. From measurement results of 65-nm test chip, a recent study has
shown that threshold voltage (Vth), eﬀective gate length (Leff) and carrier mobility ( )
are the main parameters aﬀecting the performance of CMOS transistors. The results
are shown in Figure 2.6; the variation of Vth, Leff and   follows Gaussian distribution
with standard distribution (σ) of 5%, 4% and 21% respectively.Chapter 2 Literature Review 23
Figure 2.6: Variations of threshold voltage, eﬀective channel length and carrier
mobility for 65nm CMOS [90].24 Chapter 2 Literature Review
Figure 2.7: Charge collection in a silicon junction (a) after an ion strike, (b)
during drift collection, (c) during diﬀusion collection, and (d) junction current
induced as function of time [13].
2.4 Impacts of Soft Errors on Reliability
Ionised particles can cause temporary data corruption in digital ICs [13]. Ionised particle
strike leaves a track of electron-hole pairs with high carrier concentration as shown in
Figure 2.7.(a). After the strike the electric ﬁeld in the depletion region quickly (within
tens of picoseconds) collects carriers creating large drift current at the node as shown in
Figure 2.7.(b). Lastly, the remaining carriers will diﬀuse into the depletion region over a
longer time period (hundreds of nanoseconds) as shown in Figure 2.7.(c). Figure 2.7.(d)
shows the junction current pulse as the result of the particle strike as the function of
time, and the x-axis is in log-scale. The short current pulse with large magnitude is cre-
ated by the drift current and the following long current pulse is the result of the carrier
diﬀusion. There are three radiation sources [13,99] that produce ionised particles: Al-
pha particles emitted by trace uranium and thorium impurities in packaging materials;
high-energy neutrons from cosmic radiation which react with silicon nuclei producing
ionised particle, and low-energy neutrons from cosmic radiation which interact with iso-
tope boron-10 in IC materials, speciﬁcally in borophosphosilicate glass (BPSG). Alpha
particle radiation has been reduced by using high purity materials and by physically
separating and shielding the sensitive circuit components from the alpha particle emit-
ting material. The BPSG insulator layers have been replaced with dielectric material
free of boron-10, which eliminates the problem caused by low-energy neutrons. The
ionised particle produced by the high-energy neutron is the major contributor to soft
errors in modern digital IC technology. A recent study has shown that soft error can be
1000 times more likely to happen than hard failures in modern electronics systems [13].
The reduction of transistor size and the ever-increasing integration scale exacerbate the
problem.Chapter 2 Literature Review 25
When a storage node is struck by an ionised particle, a current pulse is generated; if
this current pulse overcomes the feedback current and exceeds the stored charge of the
node, the state of this storage node is ﬂipped so the data is corrupted. The amount of
the charge required by the current pulse to ﬂip a storage node is known as its critical
charge [100]. Therefore the reliability of sequential logics can be obtained through the
study of its critical charge. This transient error that is induced by particle strike is also
call soft error. For an individual device, Soft Error Rate (SER) is usually represented
by λ with the unit of failures/s   bit. A method for estimating Soft Error Rate (SER)
in CMOS SRAM cell was proposed [101]:
λ ∝ F × A × exp(−
Qcrit
Qs
) (2.1)
where F is the high energy (> 1MeV ) neutron ﬂux, A is the area of the circuit sensitive
to particle strikes, Qs is the charge collection eﬃciency of the device, and critical charge
(Qcrit) is the amount of charge required to change the original value in a storage element
resulting a transient error called soft error or single event upset (SEU) [102]. Therefore
the critical charge of a storage node determines its sensitivity to environmental noises.
In recent studies [103,104], critical charge has been modelled as:
Qcrit = CN   VDD + IDP   TF (2.2)
where CN is the storage node capacitance, VDD is the supply voltage, IDP is the maxi-
mum current of the on PMOS transistor and TF is the cell ﬂipping time. Clearly, critical
charge of a storage node reduces linearly with supply voltage and node capacitance. Crit-
ical charge also reduces with the advance in technology scaling; a ﬂip-ﬂop designed using
45-nm technology showed lower critical charge than the one designed with 65-nm tech-
nology when comparing them at their respective nominal operating voltages [12]. In
Section 2.3, it was shown that process variation has signiﬁcant impacts on Deep Sub-
Micron (DSM) designs. The eﬀect of supply voltage scaling and process variation on
critical charge of a ﬂip-ﬂop was investigated using 40-nm CMOS technology. The results
are shown in Figure 2.8. Two observations can be made: ﬁrstly, the critical charge of
a ﬂip-ﬂop reduces with the reduction in supply voltage; and secondly, the graph also
shows the worst-case critical charge of a ﬂip-ﬂop reduces further under 1σ, 2σ and 3σ
process variations. These results demonstrate that the critical charge of a ﬂip-ﬂop is not
only reduced by supply voltage reduction but also by process variation. The reduction
in critical charge can lead to the increase in soft error rate [105], therefore aﬀecting the
reliability of digital designs.
Soft error mitigation techniques for storage elements can be classiﬁed into circuit level
hardening, hardware redundancy and time redundancy [11]. Circuit level hardening
involves adding resistance [106], capacitance [107] or feedback loop [108] to the storage26 Chapter 2 Literature Review
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Figure 2.8: Critical charge and supply voltage in the presence of process varia-
tion.
node or combining the above techniques [109]. Hardware redundancy either duplicates
the storage elements [11] or uses error control coding [110]. Time redundancy is achieved
through re-execution of software programs [111,112].
2.5 Embedded Processor Reliability
There are two ways to analyse the reliability of a system: Statistical fault-injection injects
faults into random part of the system and analyses the output of the system [113–116],
and a Architectural vulnerability analysis calculates the probability that a fault in the
system will result in an erroneous output [117–119]. Fault-injection models the be-
haviour of faults and emulates the problems a system will experience when faults occur.
It is a useful tool to study how a system behaves under faulty conditions and to evaluate
its fault tolerance capability. The limitation of faults injection is very long simulation
time if the fault rate is low, which is the case for most systems under normal operat-
ing conditions. To address this problem, Architectural Vulnerability Factors (AVF) is
proposed [117] to indicate the probability that an bit-ﬂip of a storage cell will result
in an visible external error. The system error rate can be estimated by the product of
its raw fault rate and its AVF. There are some limitations: ﬁrstly, to undertake AVF
analysis of a underlining system, knowledge of its architecture is required; secondly, it
can estimate the probability of erroneous output but cannot predict the impacts of these
faults. Therefore fault-injection and AVF analysis are two complementary techniques in
system reliability analysis.
In a processor system, storage elements hold circuit states and program data. Micro-
architectural registers, register ﬁles and memory system including caches and main mem-
ory are some examples. Logic faults in storage elements may lead to unpredictable sys-
tem behaviour. Using AVF analysis, the reliability of processor core was investigatedChapter 2 Literature Review 27
in a number of studies [117–120]; and the reliability of caches was examined in other
studies [121–124]. To protect register ﬁles, inherent redundant resource of a proces-
sor is commonly utilised. In [125], the values in active used registers are duplicated in
the unused registers; whereas in another study [126], when 64-bit registers are used to
store 32-bit values, the 32-bit values are duplicated and stored in both halves of the
64-bit registers. Two redundancy techniques are combined in a further study [127].
In modern processors, multi-threading and out-of-order execution are commonly used.
Multi-threading is used to improve processor reliability by duplicating process and thread
execution [128–132]. Multiple execution units in an out-of-order processor are used for
instruction level redundant execution [133–137]. In cache memory, parity caching was
proposed to protect the most used cache lines [138]. Diﬀerent coding schemes are used
to protect clean and dirty cache lines [139]. Two dimensional error coding was proposed
to provide multi-bit error tolerance in cache memory [140]. Inactive cache block is used
to provide redundancy for active cache block [141].
2.6 Research Objectives
There is little doubt from this literature review that performance, power and reliability
are tightly coupled particularly for Deep Sub-Micron (DSM) technology nodes. For
DSM technology nodes, power density is a constricting factor limiting the performance
and future scaling. In the past decade, digital circuit power reduction has attracted
a large amount of research eﬀorts targeting both dynamic power and leakage power.
For dynamic power reduction, reducing switching activity and supply voltage scaling
are the main focus. For leakage power reduction, tuning transistor threshold voltage,
cutting oﬀ power supply and supply voltage scaling are popular tools. The manipulation
of supply voltage is very eﬀective in power reduction; at the same time it aﬀects the
state integrity of storage elements. Process variation has been kept under suﬃcient
control for 40 years until silicon manufacturing was scaled down to DSM such as 65nm
node [85]. Process variation is also aﬀecting the reliability of digital circuit due to the
mismatching of electrical property between the ﬁnal product and the intended design,
and the diﬀerence grows with the reduction in transistor size. This means that, in future
technology generations, process variation can only get worse and the behaviour of digital
circuits is becoming less predictable. The combination of process variation and power
reduction techniques has detrimental eﬀects on the reliability of digital circuits.
The main focus of this thesis is to investigate the impact of power reduction techniques
on digital circuit reliability in the presence of PVT variation, and to develop low-cost
and eﬀective protection techniques to improve reliability. EDA tools are heavily used
in modern digital circuit designs, because of the increased complexity which makes
automation an essential component of design ﬂow. The developed techniques should
be compatible with commercially available EDA tools and should avoid the manual28 Chapter 2 Literature Review
insertion of protection circuitry. This is vitally important to minimise design eﬀort
which helps to reduce time to market, risk and cost associated with development and
implementation. To study the eﬀectiveness and the cost of the proposed techniques,
FPGA implementation and test chip fabrication are needed.
The objectives of the research reported in this thesis are summarised as follows:
• Investigate the impact of power reduction techniques on the reliability of embedded
processors in the presence of soft error and PVT variation.
• Develop eﬀective mitigation techniques to improve the reliability of low-power
embedded processors registers and memory systems, including the development of
modelling framework for joint optimisation of reliability, energy and performance.
• Validate the developed techniques using simulations and experiments through
FPGA implementation and chip fabrication based on commercial processors.
• Incorporate the developed techniques into industry standard EDA design ﬂows
with the aim to produce automated design ﬂow for reliable and low-power processor
designs.Chapter 3
Improving The Reliability of
State Retention Designs
In Chapter 1 Section 1.1, the impact of technology scaling was discussed such as the fact
that transistor size scaling reduces node capacitance which in turn reduces critical charge
making it more sensitive to external noise sources. In embedded applications, idle time
power reduction is frequently exploited to minimise energy consumption [142,143], which
is referred to as sleep mode in this work. In Chapter 1 Section 1.2.2, it was shown that
state retention power gating [37] and supply voltage scaling [41] are two state retention
design techniques for eﬀective idle circuit leakage power reduction. During sleep mode,
circuit states are stored in a retention latch structure (referred to as balloon circuit [144]
in the case of power gating; circuit states are stored in ﬂip-ﬂops but with reduced supply
voltage in the case of supply voltage scaling. Circuit states may be corrupted due to
supply voltage ﬂuctuation in the case of power gating, or critical charge reduction in the
case of supply voltage scaling. A number of techniques exist to reduce voltage ﬂuctuation
of power gating design in order to reduce the impact on circuit reliability as discussed in
Chapter 2, Section 2.1. However, voltage ﬂuctuation cannot be eliminated completely
and circuit states are essential for correct operations. Furthermore, some applications
may have low duty cycle [145], where the processor spends most of its time in sleep mode.
For these applications power-gated circuit states are more vulnerable than active circuit
states because the error rate is proportional to the exposure time. Concurrent ECC
protection on unstructured ﬂip-ﬂops such as control registers and ﬁnite state machines
has high area and power overheads particulary for error correcting code [146,147]. This
motivates the need to develop cost-eﬀective techniques to ensure power-gated circuit
state integrity.
The key objective of this research is to develop eﬀective mitigation techniques to improve
the reliability of embedded process registers. This chapter proposes a novel method for
improving reliability of state retention registers in low power designs that is compatible
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with standard EDA tools, and uses two case studies to show the eﬀectiveness and the
cost of the proposed method. The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: Section 3.1
proposes scan-based state monitoring and recovery method for state retention designs,
including state monitoring and recovery architecture, inserting state monitoring control
into conventional state retention ﬂow and integrating the protection circuitry using con-
ventional synthesis ﬂow. Section 3.2 and Section 3.3 describe two case studies to improve
the reliability of a FIFO circuit and an embedded processor (ARM CortexTM-M0) using
the proposed method. Both design are validated using FPGA and synthesised using ST
65nm technology library for implementation trade-oﬀs analysis. Section 3.4 concludes
this chapter.
3.1 Proposed Method
Error detection and correction codes have been used extensively to improve the reliability
of memory circuits [148]. This is achieved by generating parity bits when writing data
into memory and checking the data against saved parity bits when they are read out
of memory. For a given design, ﬂip-ﬂops are not as structured as memory blocks; they
are scattered physically. These ﬂip-ﬂops do not have a uniﬁed input and output channel
which is required to access their data and generate parity bits like memories. Scan
chains [46] which connect ﬂip-ﬂops into long shift registers for performing manufacturing
test provide the channel for parity bits generation. Scan chains insertion is normally
automated by EDA tools, and involves replacing the system ﬂip-ﬂops with scan-enabled
ﬂip-ﬂops and creating scan-in, scan-out ports and a scan-enable signal without aﬀecting
the functionality of the original design. Only when the scan-enable signal is active are
the ﬂip-ﬂops reconﬁgured into a daisy chain and the scan-in and scan-out ports are the
input and output of these chains.
The scan chains of a design are exploited for the purpose of protecting its state integrity.
This is achieved by monitoring the states through scan chain encoding and decoding.
The method consists of three main steps. Firstly, the state monitoring and recovery ar-
chitecture is described (Section 3.1.1). Secondly, a controller is designed to generate the
control signals for state monitoring and recovery (Section 3.1.2), Finally a synthesis ﬂow
is developed to incorporate the ﬁrst two steps into conventional state retention designs
by automatic generation of protection circuitry and control signals (Section 3.1.3).
3.1.1 Step 1: Architecture
The architecture of a circuit under protection (CUP) with state monitoring and recovery
block (SMRB) is shown in Figure 3.1, which consists of a state monitoring block and a
error correction block. The scan chain inputs to the CUP are controlled by a multiplexerChapter 3 Improving The Reliability of State Retention Designs 31
Test 
Scan In
T
e
s
t
 
S
c
a
n
 
O
u
t
Circuit Under Protection 
(CUP) in scan mode
State 
Monitoring 
Block
Error 
Correction 
Block
Error Location
sel
C
o
r
r
e
c
t
i
o
n
 
F
e
e
d
b
a
c
k
S
c
a
n
 
O
u
t
Scan In 
ports
Scan Out 
ports
0
1
2
se=1
Figure 3.1: Architecture of State Monitoring and Recovery Block (SMRB).
with a ‘sel’ signal, which allows the scan chains to be recirculated or conditionally cor-
rected (inverted), or used as conventional manufacturing scan inputs. The scan enable,
‘se’, to the CUP is asserted to conﬁgure all the registers into scan-shift mode rather than
functional mode. Before switching to sleep mode, the state monitoring block encodes
the CUP states, where signal ‘sel’ is set to ‘0’ and ‘se’ is set to ‘1’. The CUP is put
into scan mode, and its scan-out ports are connected to its scan-in ports and the state
monitoring block. Assuming that each scan chain contains ‘l’ ﬂip-ﬂops, by circulating
the scan chains for ‘l’ clock cycles, the state monitoring block generates and stores the
parity bits of the CUP states. After switching to active mode, the state monitor de-
codes the states, where signal ‘sel’ is ‘1’ and ‘se’ is ‘1’. The CUP is put into scan mode,
and its scan-in ports are connected to the error correction block, its scan-out ports are
connected to the state monitoring block and the error correction block. The state mon-
itoring block checks the states of the CUP against the stored parity bits. When errors
are detected, the state monitoring block sends the error locations to the error correction
block which corrects the corrupted states and feeds back to the circuit. In manufac-
turing test mode, the control signal ’sel’ is set to ‘2’, and the scan enable signal ‘se’ is
controlled by the tester; the CUP’s scan-in ports are connected to the test scan-in ports
and its scan-out ports are connected to the test scan-out ports. The proposed approach
beneﬁts from reusing the manufacturing scan chains for system state monitoring and
recovery as demonstrated next.
State monitoring is done using hardware error detection code (CRC or Hamming) [63]
and state recovery is done using either hardware error correction code (Hamming) or
software state recovery. The method has no impact on the design’s timing (critical
path) in normal mode. This is because all state monitoring is done in scan mode and
the scan path is not part of the critical path. However it has a cost in terms of area
overhead, wake-up latency and energy consumption (details are shown in Section 3.2.3
and Section 3.3.4). In terms of power consumption, the main contributor is the scan32 Chapter 3 Improving The Reliability of State Retention Designs
chain switching power, which is CPU-state pattern dependent and in the worst case
can result in every ﬂip-ﬂop toggling in every clock cycle. The scan power needs to be
analysed and scan power reduction techniques for toggle suppression [149] can also be
used to reduce the state monitoring power dissipation to avoid exceeding the power
distribution integrity for the CUP. For the state monitoring block to generate parity
bits, the circuit’s states need to be circulated through the scan chains. If the number of
registers in each scan chain is ‘l’ and the clock period is ‘T’, the encoding and decoding
time will be ‘l×T’. If ‘l’ is large, each encoding and decoding cycle can take a long time
and therefore consume a signiﬁcant amount of energy.
The scan chains can be conﬁgured to reduce encoding and decoding time but also can be
reconﬁgured for the standard manufacturing test. An example is shown in Figure 3.2,
where a long serial manufacturing test scan chain can be partitioned into 4 parallel scan
chains using 4 multiplexers. Signals ‘SI’ and ‘SO’ are connected to manufacturing test
scan-in and scan-out port; manufacturing test is enabled by setting ‘TE’ to ‘1’. When
‘TE’ is set to ‘0’, the scan chains are reused for state monitoring and recovery. In another
example, assuming the test scan width (I/O width for manufacturing test) is 4-bits, and
the state monitoring block employs Hamming (7,4) code to monitor circuit’s states with
input width of 4-bits per state monitoring block; originally, a circuit had 128 ﬂip-ﬂops
connected in 4-scan chains, and since state monitoring block’s width is 4-bits, it will
take (128 ÷ 4) = 32 clock cycles for encoding and decoding the data. Next, consider
that 128 ﬂip-ﬂops are re-ordered into 16 scan chains allowing 4 state monitoring blocks
to work in parallel. The number of encoding and decoding clock cycles will then be (128
÷ 16) = 8, resulting in 4x speed-up. The latter 16 scan chain conﬁguration is shown
in Figure 3.3 (a); as can be seen, 4 state monitoring blocks are operating in parallel
taking data from 128 ﬂip-ﬂops conﬁgured in 16 scan chains. Figure 3.3 (b) shows how
this conﬁguration can be re-used for 4-bit scan chain operation during manufacturing
test: the output of So[3:0] is fed back to Si[7:4] and so on, until test data is scanned
out through So[15:12]. To reduce latency and energy consumption, shorter scan chains
are needed; but at the same time, this will increase the area overhead due to additional
state monitoring blocks. To make each scan chain shorter, the number of scan chains
can be increased. The detailed area, energy and latency trade-oﬀs related to scan chain
conﬁguration are discussed in Section 3.2.3.
3.1.2 Step 2: Controller
A state monitoring and recovery controller is designed to provide the controls for the
scan enable signal ‘se’ and the input multiplexer selection signals ‘sel’ (Figure 3.1) for
encoding where ‘se’ is set to ‘1’ and ‘sel’ is set to ‘0’, and for decoding where ‘se’ is
set to ‘1’ and ‘sel’ is set to ‘1’. The method targets state retention designs with two
diﬀerent operation modes: active mode and sleep mode. Active mode (normal mode ofChapter 3 Improving The Reliability of State Retention Designs 33
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operation) is the same for both power gating and supply voltage scaling. For sleep mode,
in the case of power-gating, the state is saved in retention registers and power supply of
the design is turned oﬀ, in the case of supply voltage scaling the supply voltage of the
design is reduced aggressively to the retention voltage where the registers of the design
can still hold their states. The sleep-active mode transition control is similar for both
power gating and supply voltage scaling, except that power gating requires additional
control for saving and restoring circuit states. In this implementation power gating is
demonstrated.
The state monitoring and recovery control can be integrated into a conventional sleep-
active mode transition control ﬂow which is illustrated in Figure 3.4. Figure 3.4 (a)
shows the conventional sleep control ﬂow. Assume a circuit starts from active mode.
When signal ‘sleep’ is ‘1’, the sleep controller starts the sleep sequence, for power gating
design it includes saving the circuit’s states and turning oﬀ the sleep transistors while34 Chapter 3 Improving The Reliability of State Retention Designs
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Figure 3.4: Control sequence (a) conventional (b) proposed Power and State
Monitoring Controller (PSMC)
for drowsy logic the supply voltage is scaled down, then the circuit enters the sleep
mode. When signal ‘sleep’ is ‘0’ it starts the wake-up sequence, for power gating design
it includes turning on the power transistors and restoring the circuit’s states when the
power supply become stable while for drowsy logic the power supply is restored and the
circuit enters active mode. Figure 3.4 (b) shows the power and state monitoring control
(PSMC) that is integrated into the conventional sleep control ﬂow, where parity bits
are generated and stored before the sleep sequence, and the circuit’s states are checked
against the stored parity bits after the wake-up sequence.
Figure 3.5 shows the timing diagram of the power and state monitoring controller, where
‘sleep’ is the external active high signal that triggers the sleep and wake-up sequence:
when ‘sleep’ is set high, the controller isolates the outputs of the power-gated circuit;
signal ‘encode’ is set high for a number of clock cycles depending on the length of the
scan chains to enable the generation of parity bits; clock is stopped when encoding is
ﬁnished; Signal ‘retain’ is set to low to transfer data from the ﬂip-ﬂop’s slave latch to
its retention latch and active low signal ‘reset’ is set to ‘0’ to clear the content of the
slave latch before powering oﬀ. The wake-up sequence is: when external signal ‘sleep’ is
set low, the power controller ﬁrst turns on the power then de-asserts ‘reset’; retain is setChapter 3 Improving The Reliability of State Retention Designs 35
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high to transfer data back from the retention latch to the ﬂip-ﬂop’s slave latch; the clock
is enabled and the signal ‘decode’ is set high for number of clock cycles depending on the
length of the scan chains to check the parity bits; at the end, output isolation is lifted
and circuit returns to functional mode. The schematic of power and state monitoring
controller is shown in Figure 3.6: the power-gating controller controls clock, reset, output
isolation and saving/restoring circuit states; the power switch controller controls power
switches; and the error coding controller is in charge of state monitoring and recovery.
These controllers communicate using handshaking signals, so diﬀerent coding schemes
can be used without changing the power gating controller.
Figure 3.7 shows example implementations of state machine transition for (a) power
gating control and (b) scan-based ECC control using Verilog. There are six main stages
in power-gating control ﬂow as shown in Figure 3.7.(a):36 Chapter 3 Improving The Reliability of State Retention Designs
1. In active mode, the controller waits for sleep request. Right after sleep request is
received, it then sends ECC generation request to ECC controller and waits for
the acknowledge signal.
2. The standard sleep sequences before turning oﬀ power switches.
3. It sends power-down request and waits for the circuit to be powered oﬀ.
4. It powers up the circuit when receiving wake-up request.
5. The standard wake-up sequences after turning on power switches.
6. Error detecting and correcting using stored ECC code.
Only stage 1 and stage 6 are created for state monitoring and recovery; the rest of stages
are identical to standard state retention power gating design.
3.1.3 Step 3: Synthesis Flow
Figure 3.8 shows the design synthesis ﬂow for incorporating the proposed state moni-
toring and recovery method using a conventional design ﬂow. It has three inputs, which
includes the original design, the scan chain conﬁguration ﬁle, and templates for SMRB
(Figure 3.1) and PSMC (Figure 3.4). The synthesis ﬂow consists of four main steps:
it ﬁrst inserts scan chains into the design through Design For Test (DFT) tool; it then
instantiates the SMRB and PSMC through the template and the conﬁguration ﬁle, and
ﬁnally the design is synthesised using the RTL synthesis tool. Synopsys DFT Compiler
and Design Compiler are used in this case study.
3.2 Case Study 1: FIFO
In this case study, the proposed method is used to improve the reliability of an FIFO
circuit. The design is functionally validated using the Xilinx Virtex-5 FPGA on Xilinx
ML505 evaluation board shown in Figure 3.9. Although there is no power switching
and scan chains insertion in FPGAs, the reliable power control sequence (Figure 3.4) is
emulated and the scan chains insertion is done in RTL level using a Perl script. To verify
the proposed method a 32x32 bit FIFO circuit is created as a case study because it has a
high density of ﬂip-ﬂops. 80 scan chains (selected for demonstration purpose) are created
in the FIFO with 13 ﬂip-ﬂops in each scan chain. The state monitoring block (Figure 3.1)
uses both Hamming code and CRC code; these are chosen because of their eﬀectiveness
in error detection and correction and simple encoding and decoding circuitry (small
circuit area overhead). The testbench setup is shown in Figure 3.10. There are ﬁve
components: FIFO A consists of a FIFO module using proposed reliable power-gatedChapter 3 Improving The Reliability of State Retention Designs 37
//pg_ecc_ctrl.v
always @ (posedge clk, negedge n_rst) begin
if(!n_rst) state <= AWAKE;
else begin
case (state)
AWAKE: begin
if (!n_ecc_req) state <= CLEAR_CHECKSUM;
else state <= AWAKE;
end
CLEAR_CHECKSUM: state <= ENCODING;
ENCODING: begin
if (cnt >= ECC_CODE_ST_DEPTH-1) 
state <= ASLEEP;
else state <= ENCODING;
end
ASLEEP: begin
if (n_ecc_req) state <= DECODING;
else state <= ASLEEP;
end
DECODING: begin
if(cnt >= ECC_CODE_ST_DEPTH-1) 
state <= AWAKE;
else state <= DECODING;
end
endcase // case (state)
end
end
(b) Scan based ECC control
//pg_ctrl.v
always @ (posedge clk, negedge n_rst) begin
if(!n_rst) begin
state <= INITIALIZATION;
end
else begin
case (state)
INITIALIZATION: state <= INITIALIZATION2;
INITIALIZATION2: state <= AWAKE;
AWAKE: begin
if (sleep_req) state <= ECC_GEN;
else state <= AWAKE;
end
ECC_GEN: begin
if (!n_ecc_ack) state <= STOP_CLK;
else state <= ECC_GEN;
end
STOP_CLK: state <= ISOLATE;
ISOLATE: state <= SAVE_STATE1;
SAVE_STATE1: state <= SAVE_STATE2;
SAVE_STATE2: state <= N_RST_ON;
N_RST_ON: state <= PWR_DOWN_REQ;
PWR_DOWN_REQ: begin
if(!n_pwr_ack) state <= ASLEEP;
else state <= PWR_DOWN_REQ;
end
ASLEEP: begin
if (!sleep_req) state <= PWR_UP_REQ;
else state <= ASLEEP;
end
PWR_UP_REQ: begin
if(n_pwr_ack) state <= N_RST_OFF;
else state <= PWR_UP_REQ;
end
N_RST_OFF: state <= RESTORE1;
RESTORE1: state <= RESTORE2;
RESTORE2: state <= DE_ISOLATE;
DE_ISOLATE: state <= START_CLK;
START_CLK:  state <= ECC_CHECK;
ECC_CHECK: begin
if (n_ecc_ack) state <= AWAKE;
else state <= ECC_CHECK;
end
default: state <= AWAKE;
endcase // case (state)
end // else: !if(n_rst)
end
(a) power gating control
Waiting 
for sleep 
request
Waiting for 
ECC 
generation
Sleep 
sequences
Waiting for 
waik-up 
request
Wake-up 
sequences
Waiting for 
ECC checks
Waiting 
for ECC 
request
ECC 
generation
Waiting for 
ECC check 
request
ECC 
checks
Figure 3.7: Example code snippet for (a) power gating control and (b) scan
based ECC control
design and an error injection circuit; FIFO B is the error-free reference FIFO module;
Stimulus generates and writes random data to both FIFO A and FIFO B; Comparator
reads the data from both FIFO A and FIFO B and compares them. Counters record
each event when the errors are reported by FIFO A and when the mismatches are
reported by comparator. The test bench test sequence has ﬁve stages:
1. Reset both FIFO A and FIFO B to ensure they start in the same state.
2. Write to both FIFO A and FIFO B with the same random data.
3. Send sleep signal to FIFO A and stop the clock to FIFO B
4. Wait until FIFO A is in sleep mode, then send wake-up signal to FIFO A.
5. Read both FIFO A and FIFO B and compare the outputs.38 Chapter 3 Improving The Reliability of State Retention Designs
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Figure 3.8: Proposed design ﬂow for reliable state retention power gating design
Repeat the test sequence for a required number of times before sending the result to PC
through RS-232 serial port.
3.2.1 Error Generation and Injection
Figure 3.11 shows a hardware error injection circuit used for injecting random errors.
The error injection circuit consist of a column error injector and a row error injector,
which target the error injection location. Each fault injection cycle consist of two stages:
It ﬁrst generates random errors by setting the column and row injector using linear
feedback shift registers; then the injection circuit injects errors through scan chains by
ﬂipping the scan-out data and feed back into the scan-in ports. For example to inject a
single error into the ﬂip-ﬂop in the 3rd row and 4th column shown in Figure 3.11, the
row injector is set to ‘0010000’ (top → down). Then set the column injector to ‘0001000’
(left → right) and set the circuit in scan mode. The column fault injector shifts in the
same direction (to the right) as the scan chains. When the column injector’s output is
‘0’ the fault injection is disabled by the ‘AND’ gates. After three clock cycles the column
injector’s output is shifted to ‘1’, which enables the fault injection of the 4th column.
Then the row injector will ﬂip the 3rd bit of the column using ‘XOR’ gates. In the 4th
clock cycle the error is latched into the circuit.
The error injection location can be described with the following equation:
Error location =
m  
i=1
xi  
n  
j=1
yj (3.1)Chapter 3 Improving The Reliability of State Retention Designs 39
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Figure 3.10: FPGA test bench for functional veriﬁcation of the method
where xi is the value of the bits in the column injector and m is the total number of
bits in the column injector, yi is the bits in the row injector and n is the total number
of bits in the row injector. The error location is the n × m bit map produced by the
bitwise multiplication of xi and yi, for each bit on the bit map 1 indicates an error and
0 indicates an error-free state.40 Chapter 3 Improving The Reliability of State Retention Designs
Figure 3.11: Error injection architecture.
Figure 3.12 shows four diﬀerent error patterns that are generated for each test run of
the experiment:
a) One error location is generated in the row(y) and column(x) injector; a single error
is injected at location (x,y).
b) Set all column injectors to ‘1’s and set the 1st bit of row injector to ‘1’. In each
clock cycle shift the row injectors downwards, so that one error per scan slice is
injected in each row.
c) The beginning and the end of error location are generated in both row(y1 to y2)
and column(x1 to x2) injector, so that errors are injected in the area of (x1,y1 to
x2,y2).
d) Random bit patterns are generated in each row(y1,y2,y2...,yn) and column(x1,x2,x3...,xm),
so that errors are injected in the location (
 m
i=1 xi  
 n
j=1yj).
Figure. 3.13 shows Linear Feedback Shift Registers (LFSR) of length ‘n’ are used to
generate random locations for the error injector. For the error pattern shown in Fig-
ure 3.12.(a) the single error location in both column and row injector is indicated by the
value of the column and row LFSR respectively; if the length of column injector is ‘m’,
then the length of column LFSR is n = log2(m). Similarly the length of row LFSR can
be decided. LFSR is not needed for the error pattern shown in Figure 3.12.(b), because
this pattern is not random. For the error pattern shown in Figure 3.12.(c) the beginning
and the end of error location in column injector are indicated by the value of 2 LFSRs,
same rule applies for the row injector. For error pattern shown in Figure 3.12.(d) the
bit locations on both column and row injector are mapped from the column and row
LFSR, and the length of LFSR is equal to the corresponding injector.Chapter 3 Improving The Reliability of State Retention Designs 41
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Figure 3.13: Linear Feedback Shift Registers
3.2.2 Experimental Results
To evaluate the eﬀectiveness of the proposed method in improving the reliability of
FIFO design, four experiments were performed using 1×106 test sequences, where each
test sequence performs fault injection. In each experiment, one error pattern (from
Figure 3.12) is used for fault injection. The result is shown in Table. 3.1, where the
ﬁrst column shows the number of injection runs for each experiment, the second column
shows the number of test runs in which all injected errors are corrected using Hamming42 Chapter 3 Improving The Reliability of State Retention Designs
code, the third column shows the number of test runs where not all errors are corrected
by Hamming code but are detected using CRC and the fourth column shows the number
of test runs where the output of FIFO A is diﬀerent from the output of reference design
FIFO B. There are four key observations:
1. The result of the ﬁrst experiment (Figure 3.12.(a)) is shown in the ﬁrst row of
Table 3.1; the error correction circuitry detected and corrected all single errors per
test sequence and therefore no error was reported by FIFO A. This was further
veriﬁed by comparing the outputs of FIFO A and FIFO B using a comparator.
2. The result of the second experiment (Figure 3.12.(b)) is shown in the second row
of Table 3.1; the error correction circuitry detected and corrected all errors per
test sequence. This is because there is only one error in each column, each column
contains one or more code word which mean there is no more than one error in each
codeword, and Hamming code is capable of correcting one error per code word.
Therefore no error was reported by FIFO A which was veriﬁed by comparing the
outputs of FIFO A and FIFO B.
3. The result of the third experiment (Figure 3.12.(c)) is shown in the third row of
Table 3.1; injected errors are corrected in some test runs where only one error per
column is injected due to the upper bound and lower bound of error locations in
the row injector are the same. The uncorrectable errors are all detected by the
CRC error detection circuitry, which was veriﬁed by comparing the outputs of
FIFO A and FIFO B using a comparator.
4. The result of the last experiment (Figure 3.12.(d)) is shown in the fourth row
of Table 3.1; injected errors are corrected in some test runs where only one er-
ror per column is injected due to single error location in the row injector. The
uncorrectable errors are all detected by the CRC error detection circuitry.
To summarise, errors can be corrected using Hamming code if there is only one error
per column and all uncorrectable errors are accurately detected due to the fact that the
high error coverage of CRC-16 code. Only certain error patterns can escape CRC-16
error detection and the fault injection method used in this experiment does not cover
those pathological error patterns, so that CRC error correction can correctly detect all
injected errors. More rigorous experimental coverage of error injection to cover the full
state space is described in Section 3.3.2.
3.2.3 Trade-oﬀ Analysis
In this section the trade-oﬀs are studied in terms of the area overhead of state monitoring
circuitry, encoding/decoding time and power related to the implementation of two typesChapter 3 Improving The Reliability of State Retention Designs 43
Table 3.1: FPGA fault injection, error detection and correction result
Injection pattern Injection run Corrected Detected Comparator output
single error 1000000 1000000 0 0
correctable error 1000000 1000000 0 0
burst error 1000000 55552 944448 944448
multiple error 1000000 3626 996374 996374
of coding (Hamming code and CRC code) with diﬀerent scan chain conﬁgurations. In
this section the terms ‘latency’ and ‘encoding/decoding times’ are used interchangeably.
The design is synthesised using 120nm CMOS technology. The area overhead is gener-
ated from Synopsys Design Compiler. The gate level netlist of the power-gated design is
simulated in the Cadence simulator, and the encoding/decoding power is calculated by
Synopsys Prime Time PX. The circuit is clocked at 100MHz for demonstration purposes.
Table 3.2: Encoding and decoding circuit area overhead, power, latency and
energy consumption for CRC-16 code with diﬀerent scan chain conﬁgurations
32x32 FIFO, CRC-16 code, 120nm CMOS, clock=100MHz
Width Length Area Power(mW) Time(ns) Energy(nJ)
 m2 % encode decode encode decode
4 260 73658 2.8 4.99 4.99 2600 12.97 12.97
8 130 73928 3.2 4.96 4.97 1300 6.45 6.46
16 65 74614 4.2 4.96 4.98 650 3.22 3.24
40 26 75762 5.8 5.13 5.17 260 1.33 1.34
80 13 78208 9.2 5.14 5.25 130 0.67 0.68
Table 3.2 shows the area, power, latency and energy when implementing the reliable
power-gated FIFO using CRC-16 code. The ﬁrst column shows the number of scan
chains created, the second column shows the length of each scan chain, followed by the
area of FIFO circuit, the 4th column shows the power consumption, the 5th column
shows the timing performance, and the last column shows energy consumption. As the
number of scan chains increases (from 4 to 80), the length of scan chains decreases from
260 to 13, and the encoding/decoding time decreases from 2600 ns to 130 ns. This
is because encoding/decoding time is equal to the product of the length of scan chain
and clock period, and longer scan chains lead to longer encoding/decoding time. This
increase in the number of scan chains (from 4 to 80) results in area overhead (from
2.8% to 9.2%). This is because a higher number of scan chains requires additional
state monitoring blocks (Figure 3.3 (a)) for encoding/decoding. Power consumption
slightly increases (from 4.99 mW to 5.14 mW) with an increase in area; this is due to
additional state monitoring blocks that consume extra power. The encoding/decoding
energy decreases (from 12.97 nJ to 0.67 nJ) with the increase in the number of scan
chains, because energy is the product of power and time; the number of scan chains
increase the power by only 3% (relative diﬀerence from 4 to 80 scan chains) while latency44 Chapter 3 Improving The Reliability of State Retention Designs
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Figure 3.14: FIFO case study: CRC code implementation trades oﬀs
decreases by 95%, which results in overall reduction in energy consumption. The CRC
code implementation trade-oﬀs are shown graphically in Figure 3.14.
Table 3.3: Encoding and decoding circuit area overhead, power, latency and
energy consumption for Hamming (7,4) code with diﬀerent scan chain conﬁgu-
rations
32x32 FIFO, Hamming (7,4) code, 120nm CMOS, clock=100MHz
Width Length Area Power(mW) Time(ns) E(nJ)
 m2 % encode decode encode decode
4 260 120594 68.4 6.76 6.72 2600 17.58 17.47
8 130 121552 69.7 6.91 6.86 1300 8.98 8.92
16 65 123303 72.1 7.11 7.00 650 4.62 4.55
40 26 126811 77.0 7.72 7.45 260 2.00 1.94
80 13 134141 87.3 8.43 8.05 130 1.08 1.05
Similarly Table.3.3 shows the area, power, latency and energy performance by using
Hamming (7,4) code on reliable power gated FIFO. It shows a similar trend in terms of
diﬀerent scan chains conﬁgurations. When increasing the number of scan chains (from 4
to 80), the area overhead and encoding/decoding power increases (from 68% to 87% and
from 6.76 mW to 8.43 mW respectively), but the encoding/decoding time and energy
is reduced (from 2600 ns to 130 ns and from 17.58 nJ to 1.08 nJ respectively). The
Hamming code implementation trade-oﬀs are also shown in Figure 3.15.Chapter 3 Improving The Reliability of State Retention Designs 45
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Figure 3.15: FIFO case study: Hamming code implementation trades oﬀs
The area overhead of Hamming (7,4) code is signiﬁcantly higher, at around 10 times more
than the CRC-16 code (68% and 2.8% with 4 scan chains and 87% against 9.2% with 80
scan chains) as can be seen in Tables 3.2 and 3.3. This is because Hamming (7,4) code
requires much larger parity bits storage than the CRC-16 code. The encoding/decoding
power of Hamming (7,4) code is around 20% to 40% higher than CRC-16 code. The
diﬀerence between power is not as signiﬁcant as the area overhead because the majority
of encoding/decoding power is due to the switching of scan chains, which is common in
both implementations. The encoding and decoding time for both schemes are the same
because latency is only aﬀected by the scan chains length. The encoding and decoding of
Hamming (7,4) code consumes around 20% to 40% more energy than the CRC-16 code
due to Hamming (7,4) code’s higher encoding/decoding power. For both the CRC-16
code and Hamming code, the encoding/decoding time and energy reduces signiﬁcantly
by increasing the number of scan chains at the cost of a relatively small increase in area
and power.
Power-gated FIFOs using diﬀerent Hamming codes are also implemented. Table 3.4
shows the area overhead and power consumption of diﬀerent Hamming codes. The ﬁrst
column speciﬁes implemented Hamming code, the 2nd column shows the number of
scan chains inserted, the 3rd column shows the area overhead, the 4th column shows the
power consumption, and the last column shows the maximum error correction ability
of each implementation. As can be seen, the area overhead is minimum with Hamming
(63,57) code but has least error correcting ability (1.59%). In general, area overhead can46 Chapter 3 Improving The Reliability of State Retention Designs
Table 3.4: Encoding and decoding circuit area overhead, power, latency and
correction capability of code to protect state for diﬀerent Hamming codes
32x32 FIFO, Hamming code, 120nm CMOS, clock=100MHz
code Width Area( m2) Power(mW) Correction
FIFO total % enc dec capability(%)
(7,4) 56 71628 132338 84.8% 8.21 7.84 14.3%
(15,11) 55 71628 101681 42.0% 6.52 6.34 6.67%
(31,26) 52 71628 88311 23.2% 5.89 5.82 3.23%
(63,57) 57 71628 82987 15.9% 5.64 5.62 1.59%
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Figure 3.16: The probability of erroneous test sequence after error correction
when multiple errors injected in each test sequence of 1000 ﬂip-ﬂops
be reduced (from 84.8% to 15.9%) using diﬀerent Hamming codes at the cost of error
correction ability that decreases from 14.3% to 1.59%.
The eﬀectiveness of four types of Hamming codes used in this work were investigated.
For this study, errors are randomly injected with even distribution in a test sequence
of 1000-bits emulating 1000 ﬂip-ﬂops, up to 10 errors are injected in each test sequence
and one million test sequences are simulated in total. The test sequence is then passed
through four types of Hamming code implementation separately and the outcome is
shown in Figure 3.16. As can be seen, Hamming (7,4) code has best error correction
capability; it corrects all errors in 75.89% of test sequences when each test sequence
contains 10 errors. Hamming (63,57) code has least error correction capability; it corrects
all errors in only 3.9% of test sequences when each test sequence contains 10 errors.Chapter 3 Improving The Reliability of State Retention Designs 47
3.3 Case Study 2: ARM Cortex-M0
For the second case study, an embedded microprocessor is chosen as a more complex test
case, due to the need to support an additional software state recovery approach. ARM
Cortex-M0 is an energy eﬃcient and low cost 32-bit micro-controller [150], whose details
are described in Appendix A. This section demonstrates how the proposed method can
be incorporated in the embedded processor. A Cortex-M0 based processor platform is
built and implemented in FGPA for this experiment, whose architecture is shown in
Figure 3.17. Processor core Cortex-M0 is connected to AHB Lite bus as bus master,
SRAM controller and ROM controller are connected to AHB Lite bus directly as bus
slaves. GPIO (General Purpose Input and Output) and UART (Universal Asynchronous
Receiver and Transmitter) are connected to APB bus which is connected to AHB bus
as a bus slave. The UART is used for communication between the processor and the
workstation. The programmer retrieves programs from the workstation through UART
and writing them to the ROM. The interrupt controller senses the input buﬀer of UART
and sends out interrupts to the processor core and notiﬁes sleep controller when the
input buﬀer is not empty. The sleep controller monitors the processor’s operating mode
(active or sleeping) using the “Sleeping” signal from the processor core and the “wake-
up” signal from the interrupt controller. The processor core uses an Wait-For-interrupt
(WFI) instruction as the software mechanism to request entry to sleep mode, while
hardware interrupts wake up the processor.
Figure 3.18 shows the modiﬁed architecture for the ECC-protected Cortex-M0 based
processor platform. Compared to the original system shown in Figure 3.17, three new
components are created: State Monitoring and Recovery Block (SMRB), Power and
State Monitoring Controller (PSMC), and error register. The State Monitoring and
Recovery Block (SMRB) is connected to the scan chain of the processor core. The fault
injection circuitry which is connected in the scan chains is used to validate the error
detection and correction capability. The power controller is modiﬁed slightly to accom-
modate the state monitoring and recovery, referred to as Power and State Monitoring
Controller (PSMC). The error register is inserted in the memory map to give the user
program the access to the error information. Parity bits are generated by SMRB before
the power down of the processor core and error detection and correction is undertaken
after the power up of the processor core. The processor platform is implemented in
several power domains to minimise the power consumption.
Figure 3.19 shows that the components of the embedded system are divided into three
main power domains (PD). PD-1 is associated with functional blocks that are always-
ON, which includes SRAM, error register, data bus, I/O peripherals, power and state
monitoring controller (PSMC) and interrupt controller. PSMC and interrupt controller
are required to be active during sleep mode to respond to external interrupt requests.
In the case study SRAM, error register, data bus and I/O peripherals are not protected4
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Figure 3.19: Block diagram of the proposed state monitoring and recovery tech-
nique using ARM Cortex-M0 as a case study.
by the SMRB. To guarantee their correct operation, they are placed in the always-on
power domain (PD-1). PD-2 is associated with functional blocks that are powered-
up only during active mode, which applies to the processor core. Finally, PD-3 is
associated with the state monitoring and recovery block (SMRB), which is active only
during encoding and decoding to ensure the processor’s state integrity. PSMC controls
the power up and power down sequence of the whole embedded system (Figure 3.19).
It also controls the SMRB, which monitors the processor states during sleep mode and
recovers the faulty states when an error is detected. All errors detected by the state
monitoring block, but which are not correctable using hardware are recorded in the
memory-mapped error register, so the processor has access to it through the data bus.
The power domains are annotated onto the structrual RTL design and are described in
detail using Uniﬁed Power Format (UPF) in Appendix. B.
In addition to the generic state monitoring and recovery control ﬂow shown in Fig-
ure 3.4.(b), There are additional steps for incorporating software state recovery in the
embedded processor, which are saving architectural states before encoding and restoring
architectural states if hardware correction failed. Figure 3.20 shows the detailed control
ﬂow, the wake-up sequence is initiated by the “Peripherals” which sends an interrupt
request through the “Interrupt Controller” to the PSMC. The PSMC ﬁrst turns on the
power supply of PD-2 and PD-3, and then initiates the state “Decoding” through the
SMRB. SMRB re-generates the parity of the processor states and compares it with theChapter 3 Improving The Reliability of State Retention Designs 51
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Figure 3.20: Control ﬂow of error detection and state recovery mechanism.
stored parity bits (generated before going to sleep mode). In the case of a mismatch
(error detection), the following sequence of events occur: Firstly, an attempt is made to
recover the states through Hamming code, and if successful, the corrected states are fed
back through the processor scan-in port. Secondly, the state integrity is checked by com-
paring the parity generated by the CRC code of the corrected states (through Hamming)
with the one generated before going to sleep mode. In the case of a mismatch, which
indicates that the hardware error correction is not successful, this event is registered in
an error register. Now the processor core is in an unreliable state so it must be reset; the
reset handler will check the reset entry reason by examining the error register, and if it
is due to state corruption it will branch to the software recovery routine before servicing
the wake-up event. The detail descriptions of software recovery ﬁrmware is presented
in Appendix C. After the processor’s architectural states are recovered, the processor is
redirected to the appropriate instruction for the active mode of operation.52 Chapter 3 Improving The Reliability of State Retention Designs
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3.3.1 Processor System Components
This section shows the detailed implementation of processor system components. Gen-
eral purpose input and output (GPIO) is used in most processor platforms to provide
digital control signals or software reconﬁgurable interface. The schematic of the 1-bit
GPIO unit is shown in Figure 3.21. The port register (PORTR) takes the data from the
data bus and make it available to the output pin. The pin register (PINR) samples the
data from the input pin which then can be read by the data bus. The data direction
register (DDR) controls the function of a particular pin, which can be set by the data
bus. When DDR is set to ‘0’, the tristate buﬀer disables the output and the multiplexer
directs the input data to the pin registers; the pin becomes an input pin. When DDR
is set to ‘1’, the multiplexer selects the data from port register and the tristate buﬀer is
enabled; the pin becomes an output pin.
The universal asynchronous receiver and transmitter (UART) is implemented to provide
simple communication between the workstation and the processor using the RS-232
standard. There are two major functions; ﬁrst it helps the programmer to download
binary program code to the system ROM, and secondly it provides the remote access
console interface. Figure 3.22 shows the schematic of the UART unit. It has a receiver
which covert bit-stream from the RS-232 interface to bytes and stored in receiving buﬀer
which can then be read by the data bus. When new data are read, the receiver sends
an interrupt signal to the interrupt controller that notiﬁes the processor core. The
transmitter takes the data from the transmitting buﬀer and converts it into bit-stream
which can then be sent to the workstation through the RS-232 interface.
The ARM Cortex-M0 has built-in support for power gating. It has two operational mode
active mode and sleep mode; in sleep mode, the processor core can be safely powered
oﬀ. A sleep controller is implemented to control the sleep and wake-up sequence. TheChapter 3 Improving The Reliability of State Retention Designs 53
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Figure 3.22: Universal asynchronous receiver and transmitter schematic
sleep controller is initialised to the “ACTIVE” state from reset where the processor
core is running a normal program. The WFI (wait for interrupt) instruction signals
the processor to stop program execution and enter sleep mode where it is safe to stop
the clock, save the states and turn oﬀ the power. Figure 3.23 shows the state machine
of the sleep controller. The processor core sets The “Sleeping” signal of the processor
core is set high to indicate that the processor core is ready to be powered down. The
sleep controller enters the “TRANSITION TO SLEEP” state and the sleep controller
signals the power controller to turn oﬀ the power. After the power down sequence is
completed, the power controller sends an acknowledge signal to the sleep controller by
setting “pwr down ack” high; the sleep controller enter the “SLEEPING” state. When
the sleep controller senses the interrupt from the interrupt controller in “SLEEPING”
state, it holds the interrupt signal and sends power-up request to the power controller
to initiate the wake-up sequence. Then the power controller powers up the processor
core, enables the clock and sends an acknowledge signal to the sleep controller by setting
“pwr up ack” high. The sleep controller goes back to the “ACTIVE” state and passes
the interrupt signal to processor to process the pending interrupt.
The interrupt controller is used to coordinate the interrupt events from the devices which
require the attention of the processor core. Figure. 3.24 shows the schematic of interrupt
controller. In this system there are two devices that require interrupt services: error
register and UART; these are shown on the right hand side of Figure. 3.24. When a new
byte of data is received by the UART, it sends an interrupt requesting processor core
to read the newly arrived data. When the error register records the uncorrectable error
event, it sends an interrupt and asks for immediate attention to cope with the error
(roll back to the clean state through software checkpoint), and the interrupt controller
gives the error register a higher priority over UART. When an interrupt is received, the
interrupt controller ﬁrst checks the operation mode of the processor core by checking
the state stored in the sleep controller. If the processor core is in active mode, the
interrupt controller sends the interrupt to the processor core; if the processor core is54 Chapter 3 Improving The Reliability of State Retention Designs
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Figure 3.24: Interrupt controller
in sleep mode, the interrupt controller holds the interrupt event and notiﬁes the sleep
controller to wake up the processor core. As soon as the processor core is back to active
mode, the interrupt controller sends the interrupt to the processor core.
Figure 3.25 shows the state machine of the interrupt controller. It starts in state ‘S0’
waiting for the interrupt event from peripheral devices. When interrupt is detected, it
goes to state ‘S1’ and checks the processor states. If the processor is not in sleep mode,
it goes to state ‘S3’ and sends the interrupt to processor. If the processor is in sleep
mode, it goes to state ‘S2’ and notiﬁes the sleep controller to wake up the processor, and
waits for the processor to be powered up. When the processor is powered up, it goes to
state ‘S3’ and sends the interrupt to the processor.Chapter 3 Improving The Reliability of State Retention Designs 55
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Figure 3.26 shows an example of the text ﬁle containing a program that is transmitted
to the system through UART. When the processor system is in programming mode, the
programmer downloads the program through UART, converts it to hex numbers and
writes it to the program memory “ROM”. For example, the programmer reads data
from the UART receiving buﬀer. When the character ‘p’ is detected, the programmer
converts the following 8 characters from 8-bits ASCII code to 4-bits binary numbers,
then it combines 8 sets of 4-bit binary numbers into 32-bits word to be written into the
“ROM”.
Figure 3.27 shows the memory map for the processor platform. The private peripherals
are the control registers of the processor core, such as system timer register, interrupt
control register and system control register [150]. The error register holds the error
ﬂag and controls the error injections. The UART TXD and UART RXD are UART
transmitting and receiving buﬀer entry. The GPIO DDR and GIPO DATA are GPIO
data direction registers and data registers. SRAM is used for storing intermediate data
and program stack. ROM holds the program instructions.
3.3.2 Error Generation and Injection
Error rate is application, environment and implementation dependent [151]; this is why
a wide range of bit error rate is considered in this work, which is from 10−12 to 10−1
errors per bit-hour. When considering soft errors, a study has reported that the error
rate is in the range of 10−12 to 10−7 errors per bit-hour [152]. It is observed in a recent
publication [153] that soft error rate (SER) is exponentially increasing mainly due to
reduction in critical charge and supply voltage. In addition, power supply ﬂuctuations
and rush currents may also induce clustered errors, which may lead to higher error rates.56 Chapter 3 Improving The Reliability of State Retention Designs
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Figure 3.26: Programmer converts text ﬁle to data in ROM
This is why error rates up to 10−1 per bit-hour and clustered errors are considered in
this work, represented by bit error rate (BER). This is used to develop a robust system
for state integrity, which is applicable for future technology nodes.
In Section 3.2.1, a simple LFSR was used to generate random error locations for fault in-
jection, which provides limited sets of error patterns. In this work, the Mersenne Twister
algorithm [154] is used to provide higher randomness (longer repeating period) for error
injection. Radiation-induced soft errors are evenly distributed and the available soft er-
ror injection model uses uniform distribution [155]. The proposed method also protects
the embedded processor from clustered errors caused by power supply ﬂuctuations and
rush currents. Clustered errors are generated using a model presented in [156]:
Pi = γ  
Nini  
j=1
 
1
dij
 α
(3.2)
where Pi is the error probability of each node, dij is the distance between two ﬂip-ﬂops
i and j, α is the clustering factor, and higher α implies higher clustering. α was varied
from 0 to 2 in these experiments, where 0 represents uniform distribution of errors
(Figure 3.29a) and α > 0 represents clustered errors (Figure 3.29b), Nini is the number
of initial errors and γ is the normalisation factor, which is calculated using the following
equation:Chapter 3 Improving The Reliability of State Retention Designs 57
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where ǫtg is the target error rate, and Nrst is the number of uncorrupted bits after initial
error injection. The number of clusters is decided by the initial injected errors Nini,
given a speciﬁc error rate for a design, Nini is inversely proportional to the number of
errors per cluster. In the case-study, Nini is chosen to be 10% of total errors.
The error injection method is shown in Algorithm 1 and the example implementation is
shown in Figure 3.28, which consists of two stages. First initial errors Nini are evenly
injected (step-1 to step-7), which is kept at 10% of target error rate ǫtg. Next, in the
second phase, the error probability Pi of all the ﬂip-ﬂops in the system is recalculated,
and clustered errors are injected (step-8 to step-14).
The C code implementation for generating cluster error distribution is shown in Fig-
ure 3.28. The injection stage is straightforward given the bit error rate of each node,
only the stages that calculate the error probability are shown here. The ﬁrst stage calcu-
lates the error-occurring probability for each bit in relation to the cluster centres (initial
injection). The second stage scales the probability by the normalisation factor γ.58 Chapter 3 Improving The Reliability of State Retention Designs
Algorithm 1 Method for Error Injection
1: for i = 1 to N do
2: Pinit = ǫtg   β
// Pinit is the initial error probability
// ǫtg is target error rate, β is the initial injection ratio
// N represents the total number of ﬂip-ﬂops
3: Ri ← Generate a random number
4: if Ri < Pinit then
5: Inject error at node i
6: end if
7: end for
8: for i = 1 to Nrst do
9: Calculate Pi
// Pi is calculated using Equation (3.2) and Equation (3.3)
10: Ri ← Generate a random number
11: if Ri < Pi then
12: Inject error at node i
13: end if
14: end for
Calculates the 
error probability 
based on the 
distance from the 
cluster center
Normalize the 
error probability 
so it does not 
exceed the target 
error rate
Figure 3.28: Cluster error injection implementationChapter 3 Improving The Reliability of State Retention Designs 59
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Figure 3.29: Error distribution using error injection method shown in Algo-
rithm 1
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Figure 3.30: Hardware error injection architecture
These error distribution patterns are generated on a workstation in the form of memory
maps indicating error locations. To inject errors at speciﬁc locations in the design,
the memory map is transferred into the FPGA test bench through UART as shown in
Figure 3.30, where fault injection registers hold the error location map, which is XORed
with the states of the protected circuit through scan chains.
3.3.3 Experimental Results
Three experiments are performed to evaluate the eﬀectiveness of the proposed method in
improving the reliability of embedded processor implementations, in terms of hardware
error detection, hardware error correction and software state recovery. CRC is well-
known for its high detection capability, low area overhead and simple design [157]. An
experiment is conducted to compare the detection capability of CRC-8 and CRC-16
under diﬀerent bit error rates ranging from 10−1 to 10−6 errors/bit. Using the hardware
setup shown in Figure 3.19, errors were injected evenly across all 768 ﬂip-ﬂops in the
processor core for 10 thousand test runs at each bit error rate. The results are shown60 Chapter 3 Improving The Reliability of State Retention Designs
Figure 3.31: Detection Capability of CRC-8 and CRC-16 on Cortex-M0 as a
case study
in Figure 3.31. As can be seen, both codes exhibit nearly 100% error detection capability
when the bit error rate is less than or equal to 10−4 errors/bit. However, the detection
rate of CRC-8 dropped down to 99.6% under 10−2 or higher bit error rates, while CRC-
16 continued to detect nearly 100% of all injected errors. For this reason, CRC-16 is
used in this work for hardware error detection. The polynomial used in this work is the
same as the one used to encode data in USB 2.0 [158]; that is (x16 + x15 + x2 + 1). To
enable faster execution a parallel-CRC implementation [159] is used.
The eﬀect of radiation on 65-nm memory has been studied [160], where 44 upset events
and 70 bit ﬂips per Mbits are observed in 2.5×107 hours, 25% of which are multiple-bit
upsets and always aﬀect the adjacent bits. This implies that these multiple-bits upsets
are caused by the same partical strike. The ﬂip-ﬂops in a circuit are not clustered as
memory cells and therefore the chance of radiation event corrupting multiple ﬂip-ﬂops
is much lower than corrupting multiple memory cells. If the bit error rate is λ and there
are R ﬂip-ﬂops in the system, the unprotected system failure rate is:
System Failure Rate = λ   R (3.4)
Hamming code can achieve single error tolerance in each codeword and it can correct
multiple errors in a circuit if these errors are not in the same codeword. It has small
encoder and decoder area overheads and fast encoding and decoding. The number of
times a state is checked aﬀects state integrity of a storage element; state integrity of a
ﬂip-ﬂop that is checked once a day is lower than the one checked every minute. This
concept is called ECC scrubbing [161] and the checking period is termed as scrubbing
interval. In this work scrubbing interval is equal to sleep duration. Assuming everyChapter 3 Improving The Reliability of State Retention Designs 61
particle strike only causes a single bit upset and at sleep frequency of 0.1 Hz (average
sleep duration or scrubbing interval up to 10 seconds), the system failure rate of a
protected system is given by [161]:
Protected System Failure Rate = 0.5  
R
k
  λ2n2 (3.5)
Using Equations 3.4 and 3.5, the system failure rate (SFR) can be estimated, Figure 3.32
shows how Hamming (63,57) code reduces the SFR under diﬀerent soft error rates (SER)
with the range between 10−12 to 10−7 (err/bit-hr), this range is based on ﬁndings from a
previous study [152]. Supply voltage scaling increases the soft error rate due to reduction
in critical charge [162]. Using the proposed technique, the reliability of the idle circuit
can be improved to compensate for the reduction in reliability due to supply voltage
scaling. This can be demonstrated through the following example. In the case study
of Cortex-M0, the system failure rate (SFR) is plotted against bit error rate (BER)
in Figure 3.32. It is assumed that a system operating at 1V supply and its bit error rate
λ1V is 10−7. From Figure 3.32 it can be seen that for an unprotected system BER λ1V
of 10−7 corresponds to SFR f of 10−4. A previous study has shown that BER increases
by 3 times when supply voltage is reduced from 1V to 0.5V for a 65-nm technology
node [153], which means the BER at 0.5V is λ0.5V = 3 × 10−7. Using the proposed
hardware correction through Hamming (63,57) code, it can be seen that even at BER
λ0.5V of 3 × 10−7 the SFR fp is signiﬁcantly lower (10−8) than the SFR f at 1V (10−4)
of an unprotected system. The impact of the proposed protection method on circuit
idle power is also analysed in Section 3.3.4. It is shown in Figure 3.32 that Hamming
code is eﬀective in protecting the system when SER is between 10−12 to 10−7; however
it starts to lose eﬀectiveness for bit error rate above 10−5. It should be noted that the
reliability of the stored parity bits is taken into account by the error detection (CRC)
and correction (Hamming and software state recovery) and therefore they are protected.
Software state recovery is invoked when errors correction through Hamming fails due to
more than one bit error in the same codeword. An experiment is conducted to analyse
the eﬀect of higher error rates (5 x 10−3 to 55 x 10−3) on error detection capability of
CRC-16 and error detection and correction capability of diﬀerent Hamming codes. Two
diﬀerent error distribution coeﬃcients were used (Equation 3.2). Figure 3.33a shows
the case of evenly distributed errors using α = 0 and Figure 3.33b shows the eﬀect
of clustered errors that are generated using α = 2. From the two ﬁgures, it can be
seen that the error detection capability of CRC-16 remains unaﬀected across higher
error rates and diﬀerent clustering coeﬃcients, however error detection and correction
capability of all Hamming codes reduce signiﬁcantly as error rate increases all the more
strongly when clustered errors are injected as shown in Figure 3.33b. It should be noted
that conventional scan chain conﬁguration is used in this work, where neighbouring
ﬂip-ﬂops are connected together. The impact of clustered errors can be reduced by62 Chapter 3 Improving The Reliability of State Retention Designs
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Figure 3.32: The system failure rate with and without hardware error recovery
on Cortex-M0 as a case study
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Figure 3.33: Error correction capability of Hamming codes and error detection
capability of CRC-16 at bit error probability of 0.005 to 0.05 errors/bit.
conﬁguring scan chains to achieve maximum physical separation between consecutive
ﬂops. In this work clustered errors are dealt with using CRC detection and software
state recovery. For software state recovery, the corrupted states are recovered through
software checkpoints [163]. This is implemented by saving the architectural states before
going to sleep mode. The states are placed in the ECC-protected SRAM for software
state recovery, which is in “Always ON” power domain as shown in Figure 3.19. In
the case of multiple errors in the same codeword, the software recovery is invoked that
restores the saved states of the processor. Figure 3.31 shows that CRC-16 can detect
99.9978% of errors and subsequently all detected errors can be corrected by software
state recovery. This clearly demonstrates the eﬀectiveness of the proposed software
state recovery method.Chapter 3 Improving The Reliability of State Retention Designs 63
This work exploits the advantages of both techniques (hardware error correction and
software state recovery) to achieve an eﬀective state monitoring and recovery. For ex-
ample, hardware error correction (Hamming code) is faster than the software state re-
covery technique. On the other hand, the software recovery technique has negligible area
overhead and it can be used to recover burst errors, which cannot be corrected using
Hamming code. It should be noted that, in the case of software recovery, the correction
energy and latency cost is incurred only when errors are detected. The detailed trade-oﬀ
analysis of the two techniques is discussed in the next section.
3.3.4 Trade-oﬀ Analysis
To protect a design with the proposed state monitoring and recovery technique, there
is a trade-oﬀ between wake-up latency, area overhead and energy consumption. In this
section, the trade-oﬀs are analysed on the embedded processor shown in Figure 3.19.
The eﬀect of sleep rate on leakage power savings are examined. The deep sleep mode
is not considered, because the whole circuit is completely powered down and there is
no state integrity problem. The embedded system with the proposed state monitoring
and recovery technique (Figure 3.19) is synthesised using a 65-nm STMicroelectronics
gate library and Synopsys design compiler. Errors are injected in the system using the
algorithm presented in Section 3.3.2 for evenly distributed errors (α = 0) as well as for
clustered errors (α = 2).
The proposed scan-based state protection method incurs three costs for a design: ﬁrstly,
it increases wake-up latency that is the time required for the circuit to switch from sleep
mode to active mode; secondly, it incurs some area overhead due to the additional coding
circuitry and parity storage; lastly, it consumes energy in every sleep and wake-up cycle.
The generalised relation between coding scheme selection, scan chain conﬁguration and
the overhead is shown in this section.
For both Hamming and CRC protection, additional coding circuitry and parity storage
lead to area overhead, which can be estimated using the following equation
Aov = Nc × Ac + Ns × As + APSMC (3.6)
where Ac is the area of a single coder, Nc is the number of coders used, As is the area
of a single storage unit, Ns is the number of parity storage units, and APSMC is the
area of the PSMC (Power and State Monitoring Control) block. The number of coders
is proportional to the number of parallel scan chains. The number of parity storage
units is proportional to the number of ﬂip-ﬂops in a design and the coding scheme used.
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Aov =
Wsc
k
× Ac +
Nff   d
k
× As + APSMC (3.7)
where Wsc is the number of parallel scan chains created, and Nff is the number of
ﬂip-ﬂops in a design. For any error correction code, a codeword consists of data bits
for storing information and parity bits for protecting the information, k is the number
of data bits and d is the number of parity bits in a codeword. It shows that the area
overhead increases with the number of parallel scan chains Wsc, due to additional encoder
and decoder. The area overhead also increases with the ratio of parity bit to data bit
of the selected coding scheme due to redundancy storage (5th column in Table 3.6 and
Table 3.7).
The scan chains need to be circulated to generate parity bits, and the number of clock
cycles required are equal to the number of ﬂip-ﬂops in each scan chain Lsc. If the clock
period is Tclk, the increase in wake-up latency can be calculated with
Tov = Tclk × Lsc (3.8)
As expected, the hardware error detection and correction latency increases with the
number of ﬂip-ﬂops in each scan chain. The power overhead for hardware error detection
and correction has four components: scan shifting of circuit states Psc, the operation of
encoder and decoder Pc, parity storage power per bit Ps and the PSMC block PPSMC
Pov = Psc + Nc × Pc + Ns × Ps + PPSMC (3.9)
= Psc +
Wsc
k
× Pc +
Nff   d
k
× Ps + PPSMC (3.10)
The power overhead increases with the number of parallel scan chains because more
coders are working in parallel. From Equations (3.8) and (3.10), energy consumed in
each sleep and wake-up cycle can be calculated by
Eov = Pov × Tov (3.11)
The above equation shows that the total energy is proportional to the number of ﬂip-
ﬂops Lsc in each scan chain; this is further evaluated in the last column of Table 3.6
and Table 3.7. The above set of equations can be solved for any embedded processor to
determine the overhead in terms of area, power, latency and energy. Table 3.5 shows the
values of these parameters for hardware corrections (synthesised using 65-nm STMicro-
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Hamming (63,57) has 57 data bits (k) and 6 parity bits (p). The area and power of the
coder (Ac and Pc) reduces with each Hamming code; that is, from Hamming (63,57) to
Hamming (7,4) due to reduction in parity generation tree. The rest of the variables are
constant across all Hamming codes and their approximate values are shown in the last
row of Table 3.5.
As discussed in Section 3.3.3, CRC-16 is chosen for error detection because of higher
detection capability, low redundancy and simple encoder and decoder implementation.
Table 3.6 shows the overhead on timing, area and energy consumption using four dif-
ferent scan chain conﬁgurations in comparison to a design without CRC unit. It can be
seen that the area overhead increases linearly with the number of parallel scan chains
(“Width”), from 3.5% to 6.1% as in the case of 16 scan chains to 80 scan chains re-
spectively. This is because additional logic is required for encoding and decoding each
additional scan chain through state monitoring and recovery block as shown in Fig-
ure 3.1. For all four scan chain conﬁgurations, the critical path length remains the same
in comparison to a design without the CRC unit. The CRC unit does not increase
the logic depth of the critical path because the system core is separated from the CRC
unit (state monitoring block as shown in Figure 3.3(a)) through a clamp gate which is
Table 3.5: Parameters for calculating area, latency, power and energy consump-
tion for hardware corrections
Code k d Ac( m2) Pc ( W/MHz)
Hamming (63,57) 57 6 665 0.47
Hamming (31,26) 26 5 282 0.25
Hamming (15,11) 11 4 119 0.15
Hamming (7,4) 4 3 36 0.06
As ≈ 19.5  m2/bit, APSMC ≈ 900  m2, Nff=768 bits
Ps ≈ 9.8 nW/MHz.bit, Psc ≈ 25.8  W per MHz, PPSMC ≈ 0.3  W per MHz
k → Data bits, d → Parity bits, Ac → Coder Area, Pc → Coder Power
Ps → Storage Power, APSMC → PSMC Area, PPSMC → PSMC Power
Table 3.6: Error detection (CRC-16) overhead on timing, area, latency, power
and energy consumption using diﬀerent scan chain conﬁgurations
Code Scan Chain Time Cell Area Latency Power Energy
W L (ns) ( m2) inc(%) cycles  W/MHz (nJ)
Unprotected 11.9 37814
CRC-16
16 49 11.9 39122 3.5 49 26.9 1.27
32 25 11.9 39345 4.0 25 27.04 0.67
57 14 11.9 39823 5.3 14 27.29 0.37
80 10 11.9 40120 6.1 10 27.52 0.2766 Chapter 3 Improving The Reliability of State Retention Designs
inactive during functional mode and adds negligible load capacitance on ﬂip-ﬂops con-
nected to the state monitoring block. The next column (“Latency”) shows the sleep and
wake-up latency in number of clock cycles, which depends on scan chain length, longer
scan chains require longer time to encode and decode the circuit’s states. As expected
the coding latency reduces from 49 to 10 at the cost of area overhead, which increases
from 3.5% to 6.1%. The next column shows the power consumption of the CRC unit,
which is estimated by Synopsys PrimeTime PX. The power consumed by the CRC unit
increases with the number of scan chains due to additional gates in state monitoring
blocks to encode more scan chains in parallel. The last column shows the overall energy
consumed by the CRC protected system. It can be seen that the energy consumption
reduces from 1.27-nJ to 0.27-nJ with reduction in scan chain length from 49 to 10. This
is because energy consumption reduces with latency (number of clock cycles), which is
dependent on scan chain length, clearly showing a trade-oﬀ between energy consumption
and area overhead across diﬀerent scan chain conﬁgurations.
Next, the implementation trade-oﬀ is analysed using four diﬀerent Hamming codes where
each is implemented with diﬀerent scan chain conﬁgurations. The results are shown in
Table 3.7. The critical path length is shown in the third column, which stays the same
for all conﬁgurations with or without Hamming code. This conﬁrms that the state
monitoring does not aﬀect the timing of the design. The next column shows the sleep
and wake-up latency in the number of clock cycles; as expected the coding latency varies
with the scan chain length from 7 to 196 as in the case of Hamming (63,57) and Hamming
(7,4). Area overhead is shown in the next column; it can be seen that Hamming (63,57)
has the smallest area overhead (8.6%) in comparison to a design without error correction
capability. Hamming code requires redundancy for code storage, which increases from
Hamming (63,57) to Hamming (7,4) resulting in higher area overhead (up to 30.9%).
The power consumption of the ECC unit is shown next, which is lowest (27.69  W
per MHz) in the case of Hamming (63,57) code, but increases with diﬀerent Hamming
codes due to additional load capacitance of redundant storage elements; that is, when
the redundancy increases from 8.6% to 30.9% as in the case of Hamming (63,57) to
Hamming (7,4). The last column shows the energy consumption; as expected this varies
with the scan chain length resulting in lower latency and energy consumed for encoding
and decoding. It can be seen that the lowest and the highest energy consumption are
0.2-nJ and 6.09-nJ, for scan chain lengths of 7 and 196 respectively.
The results presented in Table 3.6 and Table 3.7 demonstrate the trade-oﬀ between en-
ergy consumption, latency and area overhead across diﬀerent scan chain conﬁgurations.
Increasing the number of scan chains increases the area overhead and coding power;
however the wake-up latency and energy consumption is reduced. From the two tables
it can be observed that a scan chain conﬁguration of 57x14 gives the best results. Area
overhead is 8.6% as in the case of Hamming (63,57) (Table 3.7) and 5.3% as in the
case of CRC-16 (Table 3.6). Since this conﬁguration requires only 14 clock cycles forChapter 3 Improving The Reliability of State Retention Designs 67
Table 3.7: Error correction (Hamming) overhead on timing, area and energy
consumption using diﬀerent scan chains conﬁguration
Code Scan Chain Time Cell Area Latency Power Energy
W L (ns)  m2 inc(%) cycles  W/MHz (nJ)
Unprotected 11.9 37814
Hamming (63,57)
57 14 11.9 41070 8.6 14 27.69 0.39
114 7 11.9 41734 10.4 7 28.46 0.2
Hamming (31,26)
26 31 11.9 42861 13.4 31 28.15 0.86
52 16 11.9 43145 14.1 16 28.46 0.46
104 8 11.9 43997 16.4 8 29.38 0.24
Hamming (15,11)
11 72 11.9 43829 15.9 72 28.92 2.10
22 36 11.9 43948 16.2 36 29.53 1.03
44 18 11.9 44305 17.2 18 29.84 0.54
Hamming (7,4)
4 196 11.9 49357 30.5 196 31.07 6.09
8 98 11.9 49393 30.6 98 31.38 3.04
16 49 11.9 49501 30.9 49 32.15 1.57
state monitoring and recovery, the energy overhead is 0.39-nJ and 0.37-nJ in the case of
Hamming (63,57) and CRC-16 respectively.
Next the overhead of software state recovery is discussed and compared with Hamming
(63,57) code when using the same scan chain conﬁguration (57x14). In terms of area it
has 5.3% overhead due to using CRC-16 for error detection and the state recovery power
is 13.69- W per MHz (calculated using Synopsys PrimeTime PX). The software state
recovery has high wake-up latency of 184 clock cycles and energy overhead of 2.67-nJ. In
comparison to Hamming (63,57), software state recovery introduces 13x higher wake-up
latency and consumes about 7x more energy.
Error correction has encoding and decoding energy overheads in each sleep cycle and
leakage power overhead due to the additional circuitry for coder and code storage, adding
to the idle power of the design. Figure 3.34 shows the trade-oﬀ between idle power
and sleep frequency (number of sleep and wake-up cycles per second) of the processor
core with and without protection, taking into account all sources of leakage in the
design, including the storage of parity bits during sleep mode. For illustration purposes,
20% duty cycles (activity factors) are used, and activity factor is calculated by taking
the ratio of total active time to total runtime of the processor. The leakage power
of the processor core in sleep mode is estimated by using Synopsys PrimeTime PX.
Figure 3.34 shows the relation between idle power and sleep frequency for retention
voltage Vret of 1V and 0.5V with and without protection. Four diﬀerent scenarios are
created: Vret = 1V without protection, Vret = 0.5V without protection, Vret = 0.5V
with hardware error correction and Vret = 0.5V with software state recovery. The idle68 Chapter 3 Improving The Reliability of State Retention Designs
power was normalised to that of the unprotected system with Vret = 1V . It can be
observed that the idle power is lowest for an unprotected system with retention voltage
Vret = 0.5V when compared with hardware error correction and software state recovery.
This is because hardware error correction and software state recovery require additional
circuitry to improve system reliability. When comparing the two recovery methods,
software recovery has higher idle power, which is due to its higher latency (number
of clock cycles for state recovery) in comparison to hardware recovery method. For
example, at sleep frequency of 100 Hz, Figure 3.34 shows that hardware error correction
has 0.21 idle power while software recovery has 0.4 idle power. For these two error
recovery methods, idle power is also related to sleep frequencies. Idle power is similar
with or without protection until sleep frequency is greater than 10-Hz; this is because
when number of sleep and wake-up cycles is small, the energy used for error checking is
negligible. For software state recovery, when the sleep frequency is higher than 400-Hz,
its idle power is greater than the unprotected system with Vret = 1V (without voltage
scaling), which means it consumes more energy than it saved.
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Figure 3.34: Trade-oﬀ analysis between leakage power saving and sleep fre-
quency of the processor core at 0.5-V supply voltage
3.4 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter an eﬃcient design method is proposed to improve the reliability of state
retention design by protecting state retention registers through monitoring and recovery.
This is achieved by exploiting the available scan chain infrastructure without aﬀecting
manufacturing test and critical paths of state retention designs. Using synthesised de-
signs and various scan chain conﬁgurations, it is shown that the proposed method can
be incorporated into the state retention design ﬂow. To study the eﬀectiveness of the
proposed method, it is ﬁrst used to improve the reliability of FIFO design implementedChapter 3 Improving The Reliability of State Retention Designs 69
in FPGA and shows 100% error detection both for single error and burst error injection.
In addition, it achieves 100% error correction in the case of single errors. The proposed
method is further validated using a commercial microprocessor ARM Cortex-M0 im-
plemented in FPGA, and additional software recovery is used together with hardware
detection for burst error correction. Under low bit error rate (10−5 to 10−12) hardware
error correction can improve system error rate by at least 2 order of magnitude, under
high error probability (0.5 to 10−5) hardware error detection can detect 99.6% errors
and software recovery can be used. Finally both FIFO and microprocessor design were
synthesised using ST 65nm standard cell library to analyse the implementation trade-
oﬀs of the proposed method. In the case of FIFO design, the area overhead of hardware
error detection is between 2.8% and 9.2% depends on scan chain conﬁgurations and
hardware error detection and correction using Hamming (63,57) is 15.9%. In the case
of the microprocessor design, the area overhead of hardware error detection is between
3.5% and 6.1% depends on scan chain conﬁgurations and hardware error detection and
correction using Hamming (63,57) is 8.6%.Chapter 4
Improving the State Integrity of
Flip-ﬂops under PVT Variation
In Chapter 1 Section 1.2.2, it was shown that power gating [37] and supply voltage
scaling [41] are two state retention design techniques for eﬀective standby circuit leak-
age power reduction. In Chapter 2 Section 2.3, it was shown that process variation
signiﬁcantly impacts critical charge of storage elements, supply voltage scaling further
exacerbating the problem. In Chapter 3 a method was proposed for improving reliability
of state retention designs, which was validated using two case studies. An important
objective of the research is to investigate the impact of process, voltage and tempera-
ture (PVT) variations on the reliability of state retention registers in low power designs.
The research aim of this chapter is to maximise the leakage saving using supply voltage
scaling while improving the reliability of ﬂip-ﬂops under PVT variation. Monte-Carlo
simulations and measured results on 82 dies are used to demonstrate ﬂip-ﬂop state
integrity sensitivity due to PVT variation. Binary search based Minimum Retention
Voltage (MRV) characterisation is proposed to determine the MRV of individual die in
the presence of PVT variation for aggressive leakage power reduction. A control ﬂow
is proposed for state monitoring and protection of ﬂip-ﬂops, which uses horizontal and
vertical parity checks for multi-bit error detection and single bit error correction. Sili-
con results show that state integrity is preserved, while reducing leakage power during
standby mode.
This chapter is organised as follows: In Section 4.1, Monte-Carlo simulations and test
chip measurement results are used to demonstrate that state integrity of ﬂip-ﬂops are sen-
sitive to PVT variations. The new MRV characterisation and ﬂip-ﬂop state-protection
technique are presented in Section 4.2. The test chip implementation is presented in
Section 4.3. Experimental results to demonstrate leakage power saving with state reten-
tion integrity are presented in Section 4.4. Conclusions on the approach are drawn in
Section 4.5.
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4.1 State Integrity Challenges under PVT Variation
Supply voltage scaling is an eﬀective technique for reducing standby mode leakage power,
and is frequently used in energy-constrained designs [38]. Recent research has shown
that it eﬀectively reduces sub-threshold and gate-leakage power in deep-submicron de-
signs [38,77]. This is because of the negative exponential relationship of leakage power
and supply voltage, when Vgs ≈ 0 [164]. Power minimization through supply voltage
scaling during sleep state was proposed [41, 76]. Maximum leakage power saving is
achieved under the lowest supply voltage where ﬂip-ﬂops can still retain their states;
this voltage is referred to as Minimum Retention Voltage (MRV).
State integrity is referred to as the capability of ﬂip-ﬂops to retain their logic value
last clocked-in. To analyse state integrity of voltage scaled state retention ﬂip-ﬂops,
two identical register arrays of 8192 ﬂip-ﬂops referred to as retention register block
is implemented in TSMC 65nm “LP” low leakage technology with nominal operating
voltage of 1.2V using Uniﬁed Power Format (UPF) design ﬂow refer to latest IEEE 1801-
2013 (UPF 2.1) Standard [165] and standard EDA tools (Synopsys Inc, Mentor Graphics
Inc). The test chip is shown in Figure 4.1, where Figure 4.1-(a) shows the die photo of
the test chip with detailed implementation presented in Section 4.3, and Figure 4.1-(b)
shows the test board photo. Measurements presented in this work are based on 82 test
chips. As shown in Figure 4.1-(a), the retention register blocks are located on the bottom
left-hand side of the die, and the parity storage is placed above the register block. A
Cortex-M0 micro-controller from ARM Ltd (referred to as CM0) is used in this work for
state monitoring and it can be seen on the left-hand side of the register block. The detail
description of CM0 is in Appendix A A pair of oscillators has also been used to measure
delay variation due to process, voltage and temperature variations, when considering
inter-die and intra-die process variation. The oscillators are located next to the parity
storage unit. Due to the small size, these are not marked explicitly on the die photo.
The layout is part of a 2x2-mm system on chip (SoC), and the rest of the SoC is made
up of SRAM for instruction and data storage. The test board is shown in Figure 4.1-(b),
which provides voltage rail probe-points, power supply connections and USB interface
to communicate with the host computer through an ASCII debug protocol.
In this work, the First Failure Voltage (FFV) of a ﬂip-ﬂop is deﬁned, such that scaling
down supply voltage to FFV leads to the ﬁrst bit(s) failure in a design consisting of
n ﬂip-ﬂops, where bit-failure refers to the change in stored logic value from the initial
(or correct) value. Note, that single or multiple bits failures are possible at FFV. Due
to process, voltage and temperature variation, the FFV of a given design varies from
die to die. To ensure state integrity, it is important to analyse this change in FFV of
state-retention ﬂip-ﬂops. Using measured results from 82 dies, this section analyses the
change in FFV due to process, voltage and temperature variation. Section 4.1.1 shows
FFV distribution from 82 dies. Section 4.1.2 analyses change in FFV due to within dieChapter 4 Improving the State Integrity of Flip-ﬂops under PVT Variation 73
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Figure 4.2: Schematic of master-slave ﬂip-ﬂop.
process and voltage variation, and ﬁnally Section 4.1.3 analyses change in FFV due to
temperature variation.
Figure 4.2 shows the schematic of master-slave ﬂip-ﬂop commonly used in modern digital
designs. The master latch is transparent when the clock is low and the slave latch is
transparent when the clock is high. The slave latch that is made of two cross-coupled
inverters is used for state retention at low supply voltage. In theory, the latch is capable
of retaining its state at a very low supply voltage, given that the design is not aﬀected
by process variation; that is both PMOS and NMOS of the two cross-coupled inverters
(I2 and EI2) have the same drive strength; and there is no noise for example, due to
supply voltage ﬂuctuation and radiation-induced soft error. This is because transistor
ON-current is always higher than its OFF-current.
In real-life digital circuit designs, however, there are environmental noises and PVT
variation. It was shown in Section 2.4 that process variation reduces the critical charge74 Chapter 4 Improving the State Integrity of Flip-ﬂops under PVT Variation
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Figure 4.3: Simulated results showing noise margins of a typical ﬂip-ﬂop for state
retention (Figure 4.2) when operating at 0.3-V, and reduced noise margins due
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of ﬂip-ﬂops makes them more sensible to soft errors. PVT variation also reduces the FFV
of ﬂip-ﬂops. To get an insight into FFV spread of state-retention ﬂip-ﬂops, HSPICE was
used to simulate the eﬀect of process variation on state-retention capability of a ﬂip-ﬂop.
The simulation was carried out on the slave latch (Figure 4.2), using design parameters
from typical, fast-slow and slow-fast process corners of TSMC 65-nm Low-Power design
library. The results are shown in Figure 4.3. In all three plots, the voltage transfer
curve of inverter ‘I2’ is represented by circular dots, and that of ‘EI2’ is represented by
black crosses. X-axes show voltage at node ‘N3’ and y-axes show voltage at node ‘N4’
(output, Figure 4.2). Figure 4.3-(a) shows a typical design operating at 0.3-V. It can
be seen that the logic threshold voltages of both inverters are equal at about 0.5 ∗ Vdd,
leading to symmetric noise margins for storing both logic values in the slave latch.
However, when considering a fast-slow process corner, operating at 0.3-V (Figure 4.3-
(b)), the logic threshold voltages of both inverters reduce to about 0.23 ∗ Vdd, leading
to asymmetric noise margins for storing logic-0 on both nodes ‘N3’ and ‘N4’. This
means that a small noise can convert logic-0 to logic-1 on ‘N3’ and ‘N4’, leading to
data corruption of stored states at low-supply voltage. Similarly, when considering a
slow-fast process corner, operating at 0.3-V (Figure 4.3-(c)), the logic threshold voltages
of both inverters increase to about 0.7∗Vdd, again leading to asymmetric noise margins
for storing logic-1 on both nodes ‘N3’ and ‘N4’, and a small noise can convert logic-
1 to logic-0 on both nodes, leading to state corruption at low-supply voltage. These
results clearly demonstrate that the state-retention capability of a voltage-scaled ﬂip-
ﬂop is aﬀected by process variation, and simulated results (Figure 4.3) reveal that due
to process variation, the noise margin of a ﬂip-ﬂop gets skewed leading to variation in
FFV (First Failure Voltage).
4.1.1 Measuring Inter-die Process Variation Impact on State Reten-
tion
Measurements were taken for 82 packaged dies and the FFV results are shown plotted
in Figure 4.4-(a). The spread in FFV is clearly visible. This measurement was carried
out at room temperature (25◦C) using 82 dies, each with 8192 ﬂip-ﬂops, and with the
implementation set-up shown in Figure 4.1. For this measurement, a test board was
connected with a host computer through USB interface, and a control program written
in Python script was used to communicate between the host computer and the test
board. The FFV is found using a binary search algorithm with resolution of 1-mV per
iteration, starting from 400-mV, until ﬁrst bit failure is observed (Figure 4.11). Each
iteration consisted of the following ﬁve steps:
1. Voltage of the design was set to 1.2-V.
2. A single logic value (logic-0 or logic-1) was stored in all 8192 ﬂip-ﬂops, referred to
as initial logic state.76 Chapter 4 Improving the State Integrity of Flip-ﬂops under PVT Variation
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Figure 4.4: Results from 82 dies and Monte-Carlo simulations showing the
spread of ﬁrst failure voltage point of voltage-scaled ﬂip-ﬂop for state reten-
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(a) failure voltage map from 220-270 mV 
of retention register block
0.27V
0.27V
0.22
0.27
0.240
0.270
(b) failure voltage map from 240-270 mV 
of retention register block
Figure 4.5: Measured results showing failure bit locations mapped on the circuit
physical layout in the retention register block of the test chip.78 Chapter 4 Improving the State Integrity of Flip-ﬂops under PVT Variation
3. Supply voltage was reduced to a lower voltage with a fall-time of 40- s and this
was held for 10-sec.
4. Supply voltage was raised back to 1.2-V with a rise-time of 40- s.
5. The ﬂip-ﬂop state values were read out and compared with the initial logic state
to determine if FFV has been observed.
Each iteration was executed 10-times to minimise the eﬀect of jitter and most common
value was recorded. The maximum jitter of 2-mV was observed when charge time
was 40- s and this value increased to 18-mV with a shorter charging time (≤ 4- s).
From Figure 4.4-(a), it can be seen that the First Failure Voltage (FFV) point of each
design varies from die to die, and for these 82 dies FFV is in between 245-mV to 315-
mV, with 95% dies exhibiting their FFV below 285-mV. The measured results shown
in this work use Standard Vth (SVT) cell. Simulation results using Low Vth (LVT)
and High Vth (HVT) cells show that LVT cell has the lowest FFV and HVT cell has
the highest FFV. Figure 4.4-(b) shows the Monte-Carlo simulation result for the same
65-nm TSMC technology library. The HSPICE script used to generate this result is
described in Appendix D. This is used to analyse how well simulated results correlate
with measured results (Figure 4.4-(a)). The eﬀect of process variation is incorporated
by varying three parameters, which include: gate length (L), threshold voltage (Vth),
and mobility ( eff) (Mobility varies due to variation in eﬀective strain in a strained
silicon process [90]). These parameters follow Gaussian distribution (±3σ variation)
with standard deviations of 4% for L, 5% for Vth and 21% for  eff. It can be seen
that the overall distribution trend remains the same while the mean FFV has shifted to
lower voltage. This is because simulation results do not take into account environmental
noise and inductive eﬀects. It can also be observed that the spread of FFV is slightly
wider in simulation than measured results; this is because the eﬀect of process variation
on fabricated devices is less than simulated results. Similarly, the FFV for a 45-nm
technology library [166] was simulated. Results are shown in Figure 4.4-(c). When
comparing it with simulated results of 65-nm technology library (Figure 4.4-(b)), it can
be observed that the overall distribution trend remains the same, however the mean
FFV has shifted to a higher voltage due to higher process variation.
4.1.2 Eﬀect of within Die Process and Voltage Variation
To analyse failure voltage across 8192 ﬂip-ﬂops within a single die, a die exhibiting
nominal process characteristic is used and measurement set-up outlined in Section 4.1.1.
Figure 4.5 shows measured results from the test chip to demonstrate the failure voltage
behaviour of 8192 ﬂip-ﬂops and their individual XY co-ordinates within the design layout
(Figure 4.1-(a)). Figure 4.5 shows the location of failed ﬂip-ﬂops as observed on the test
chip. The ‘X’ and ‘Y’ axes show physical location of each ﬂip-ﬂop and indicate theChapter 4 Improving the State Integrity of Flip-ﬂops under PVT Variation 79
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Figure 4.6: Measured results showing the distribution of failing voltage point of
ﬂip-ﬂops at reduced supply voltage.
distance (in  m) from the bottom left corner of the retention register block (Figure 4.1).
The Z-axis shows the supply voltage during retention mode. It can be observed that
the First Failure Voltage (FFV) occurs at 270-mV, and this ﬂip-ﬂop continues to fail
with further reduction in supply voltage. A few subsequent failure points are at about
260-mV. In general, over all ﬂip-ﬂops, when the supply voltage is ≤ 240-mV, increasing
numbers of ﬂip-ﬂops start to fail, and this is shown in Figure 4.6 using 5-mV step size.
For this measurement (Figure 4.6), ten test runs were conducted, and the plot shows the
average number of failed bits over all test runs. Figure 4.6 shows that the ﬁrst bit failure
is observed at 270-mV, and the number of failed bits increase with further reduction in
supply voltage until the supply voltage is reduced to 190-mV, where all ﬂip-ﬂops failed
to retain initially stored logic values.
To get an insight into failure pattern across all 82 dies, a measurement is taken at room
temperature (25◦C) to determine the FFV of each die, and voltage diﬀerence between
the ﬁrst and subsequent failing ﬂip-ﬂops. The results are shown in Figure 4.7, where
X-axis show FFV of each die, and Y-axis show the voltage diﬀerence between the ﬁrst
and subsequent failing ﬂip-ﬂop for each die. For example, in the case of Die-3, FFV is
observed at about 250-mV, and the voltage diﬀerence (Y-axis) is 0, representing multi-bit
failure (two or more ﬂip-ﬂops) at FFV. Similarly, in the case of Die-2, FFV is observed at
about 270-mV, but the diﬀerence between the ﬁrst bit failure and subsequent bit failure
is about 9-mV. As can be seen, the voltage diﬀerence between ﬁrst and subsequent ﬂip-
ﬂop failures is highest (66-mV) in the case of Die-1. In general, when using a discrete
step size of 5-mV, across all dies it was found that 20.73% of all dies show multiple bit
failure at First Failure Voltage (FFV) point and the rest (79.27%) show only single bit
failure at FFV. This ﬁnding is exploited in our proposed technique (Section 4.2), which80 Chapter 4 Improving the State Integrity of Flip-ﬂops under PVT Variation
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Figure 4.7: Measured results from 82 dies showing voltage diﬀerence between
ﬂip-ﬂop’s ﬁrst failure voltage and subsequent failure voltages, three dies were
selected from the population and re-numbered 1-2-3.
employs a simple parity-based error detection and correction technique for multi-bit
error detection and single bit error correction.
4.1.3 Eﬀect of Temperature Variation
The eﬀect of temperature variation on state retention voltage of a ﬂip-ﬂop was also ex-
amined for three dies marked in Figure 4.7. These three dies represent both nominal and
corner cases. First Failure Voltage (FFV) on the following four temperatures are mea-
sured: 25◦C, 41◦C, 56◦C, and 79◦C. The temperature of the test chip was raised using a
temperature chamber. Figure 4.8 shows the relationship between FFV and temperature.
For all three dies, as expected, it was found that FFV increases with temperature. This
is because transistor leakage current increases with temperature, while drive current
(Ion) decreases [164]. In the case of the master-slave ﬂip-ﬂop shown in Figure 4.2, the
state integrity of a storage node (N3 or N4) depends on the charge stored and the feed-
back current. As temperature increases, this feedback current reduces due to increase in
leakage current and reduction in drive current, which negatively aﬀects state retention
capability of storage node at higher temperatures. This means that the state retention
voltage of a ﬂip-ﬂop has to be raised at higher temperatures to ensure state integrity.
To get an insight into the combined eﬀect of process, voltage, and temperature variation
on a given design. Using Die-2 (Figure 4.7), within-die delay variation is measured by
changing the supply voltage and temperature, using two identical ring oscillator chainsChapter 4 Improving the State Integrity of Flip-ﬂops under PVT Variation 81
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Figure 4.8: Measured results showing the ﬁrst failing voltage point of ﬂip-ﬂops
due to within-die temperature variation.
(OSC) each with 95 NAND gates. The results are shown plotted in Figure 4.9, where X-
axis show supply voltage and Y-axis show normalised delay variation at four temperature
points. Normalised delay variation is calculated by taking the relative mean diﬀerence
of measured delay between the pair of OSC, at each temperature and supply voltage
point, and it is normalised with that of 1.2-V supply voltage at 25◦C temperature. It
can be seen that normalised delay variation is smallest at nominal supply (1.2-V) and
room temperature (25◦C). It increases by up to 15x at 79◦C when supply voltage is
reduced from 1.2-V to 0.5-V. This shows that at lower voltage and higher temperature,
the eﬀect of Vth variation has greater impact at oscillator frequency variation [167].
This means that due to process variation, the state integrity of a ﬂip-ﬂop (Figure 4.2)
is more vulnerable at reduced supply voltage and higher temperature. Note that these
results (Figure 4.8 and Figure 4.9) are speciﬁc to this technology library and are shown
for illustration purposes only. For smaller geometry (below 65-nm), temperature spread
and delay variation may be more strongly aﬀected by, for example, additional mobility
caused by increased mechanical strain process engineering and reduced threshold voltage.
As shown in Figure 4.8, First Failure Voltage (FFV) point of a ﬂip-ﬂop increases with
increase in temperature. This means “Sleep State” voltage should take temperature
variation into account to ensure state integrity. This has an eﬀect on leakage power
consumption of a design in “Sleep State”. To get an insight into voltage scaling and
leakage power, Figure 4.10 shows “Sleep State” leakage power by measuring Ids, and
varying the supply voltage after setting Vgs = 0. The measurements were carried out
on a test chip (Die-2, Figure 4.7) under four diﬀerent temperature settings: 25◦C, 41◦C,
56◦C, and 79◦C. The x-axis shows the supply voltage ranging from 0.3-V to 1.2-V. The
y-axis shows the normalised leakage power plotted on a log-scale. It can be observed
that leakage power reduces exponentially with reduction in supply voltage, and 97.5%
leakage power minimization is possible by reducing the supply voltage from 1.2-V to82 Chapter 4 Improving the State Integrity of Flip-ﬂops under PVT Variation
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Figure 4.9: Measured results of Intra-Die PVT Variation on delay of the test
chip. These results demonstrate that due to change in temperature the eﬀect of
within die process variation gets worse as shown by within die higher normalised
delay variation.
0.3-V. The eﬀect of temperature variation can also be observed: as can be seen, at a
given voltage, leakage power increases with temperature. The leakage power at 79◦C is
an order of magnitude higher than at room temperature (25◦C).
In this work, Minimum Retention Voltage (MRV) is deﬁned as the scaled supply voltage
value, at which all ﬂip-ﬂops in a given design can still preserve their state integrity. For
a given technology and ﬂip-ﬂop design, the minimum retention voltage of a design has
to be characterised across all process and temperature corners to ensure state integrity.
From the trend shown in Figure 4.7 (Section 4.1.2) and Figure 4.8 (Section 4.1.3), an
important observation can be made. Due to process variation, MRV varies from die to
die and characterizing each die separately will not only ensure state integrity but can
also minimise retention voltage per die, thus reducing leakage power. In this case, MRV
can be calculated by adding a voltage margin (referred to as Retention Voltage Margin
(RVM)) to First Failure Voltage (FFV) of the given die, that is MRV = FFV +RV M.
For example setting RVM to 54-mV for all dies (see Section 4.2.1 for details of calculating
RVM), the MRV of Die-1 is 315+54 = 369-mV, and that of Die-3 is 249+54 = 303-mV.
Therefore setting MRV for each individual die separately is beneﬁcial to leakage power
minimization, when compared to a technique that sets the MRV of all dies using worst-
case process and temperature corners. This observation is exploited in the proposed
technique (Section 4.2), which employs a characterisation algorithm to identify the MRV
of each die to minimise leakage power.Chapter 4 Improving the State Integrity of Flip-ﬂops under PVT Variation 83
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Figure 4.10: Measured test chip leakage power normalised to 1.2V nominal
supply voltage at 25◦C.
4.2 PVT Aware State Protection Technique
PVT variation analysis discussed in the previous section shows two important obser-
vations. Firstly, 79% of all dies exhibit single bit failure at FFV (when using 5-mV
discrete voltage steps), while the rest show multi-bit failure. Secondly, MRV charac-
terisation per die is beneﬁcial for leakage power minimization. These two observations
are used to develop a simple and eﬀective technique to improve state-integrity of volt-
age scaled ﬂip-ﬂops under process, voltage and temperature variation. The proposed
technique consists of the following two parts:
1. Section 4.2.1 presents a characterisation algorithm that is used to determine the
MRV of a given die; this is because the MRV of each die varies due to process
variation as observed in Figure 4.7. The characterisation is an oﬄine process and
is performed before the die is used.
2. Section 4.2.2 presents a control ﬂow for error detection and single-bit error correc-
tion, which relies on horizontal and vertical parity; The control ﬂow is an online
process which monitors the ﬂip-ﬂops states. If any errors are detected, it raises the
pre-characterised MRV to reduce subsequent error possibility. This is because the
MRV can change with the operating environment such as rising temperature. The
prototype of the proposed control ﬂow is implemented in the host computer using
Python script, which provides voltage scaling by controlling an external power
supply to the test chip (Figure 4.1-(b)).84 Chapter 4 Improving the State Integrity of Flip-ﬂops under PVT Variation
Input: Initial Retention Voltage (IRV), Voltage Scaling Resolution (VSR), Retention
Voltage Margin (RVM)
Output: Minimum Retention Voltage (MRV)
1: Vcorrect = IRV; Vfail = 0
// Vcorrect is the lower bound of supply voltage for correct state retention and Vfail
is the upper bound of supply voltage for failed state retention
2: Current Supply Voltage =
Vcorrect+Vfail
2
3: while Vcorrect − Vfail >VSR do
4: if error detected then
5: Vfail = Current Supply Voltage
6: else
7: Vcorrect = Current Supply Voltage
8: end if
9: Current Supply Voltage =
Vcorrect+Vfail
2
10: end while
11: FFV = Vfail
12: MRV = FFV + RVM
13: return MRV
Figure 4.11: Process and Temperature Variation Aware Minimum Retention
Voltage (MRV) Characterisation Algorithm at 25◦C.
4.2.1 MRV Characterisation Algorithm
For each die, First Failure Voltage (FFV), is determined through voltage scaling, and
then a Retention Voltage Margin (RVM) is added to FFV to get the minimum retention
voltage (MRV) of each die; that is, MRV = FFV + RV M. The added Retention
Voltage Margin (RVM), is the sum of Temperature Variation Margin (TVM) and Safety
Margin (SM). Temperature Variation Margin is the worst case diﬀerence in FFV at
the highest and the lowest operating temperatures for a given technology and ﬂip-ﬂop
design when considering process variation. In this work, TVM is set to 30-mV by using
the maximum FFV diﬀerence of three corner case dies (Die-2; Figure 4.7), as shown
in Figure 4.8. Safety Margin is set to 2% of nominal supply voltage. In this work
nominal supply voltage is 1.2-V, and therefore safety margin is set to 24-mV. Therefore
the retention voltage margin (RVM) is set to 30 + 24 = 54-mV.
For each one of the test chips, MRV is determined through a characterisation algorithm
(at room temperature 25◦C) shown in Figure 4.11. It requires three inputs:
1. Initial Retention Voltage (IRV), as a starting point to determine FFV.
2. Voltage Scaling Resolution (VSR).
3. Retention Voltage Margin (RVM).
IRV, VSR and RVM are determined through the following criteria: Figure 4.7 shows
measured results to determine the diﬀerence between ﬁrst and second failure voltageChapter 4 Improving the State Integrity of Flip-ﬂops under PVT Variation 85
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Figure 4.12: Control Flow for State Monitoring and Protection of Flip-Flops
for Voltage-Scaled State Retention.
points across all test chips. These measurements are used to set the value of IRV to
400-mV. This is because none of the dies fail at this voltage. The VSR is set to 1-mV,
which is the smallest step size supported by the external power supply source (Agilent
U3606A). Finally, RVM is set to 54-mV to accommodate safety margin and the eﬀect
of temperature variations.
As can be seen in Figure 4.11, the algorithm starts by setting Vcorrect to IRV, and Vfail
to 0-V. Vcorrect is the lower bound of supply voltage for correct state retention, and
Vfail is the upper bound of supply voltage for failed state retention. Next, to determine
First Failure Voltage (FFV), the algorithm reduces the diﬀerence Vcorrect (correct state
retention) and Vfail (failed state retention) by iterating until the diﬀerence between
these two variables is smaller than VSR, which is the minimum resolution of the power
supply. In line-2 of the algorithm, the current supply voltage is set to the mid-point of
Vcorrect and Vfail. In each iteration, the two variables are updated; if state corruption
is detected, Vfail is raised to the current supply voltage, otherwise Vcorrect is reduced
to current supply voltage. This process is repeated by changing current supply voltage
to the mid-point of updated Vcorrect and Vfail. The loop exits with Vfail holding First
Failure Voltage (FFV) value (line-11). Finally, the algorithm adds Retention Voltage
Margin (RVM) to the observed FFV to calculate Minimum Retention Voltage (MRV)
of the given test chip.86 Chapter 4 Improving the State Integrity of Flip-ﬂops under PVT Variation
4.2.2 MRV Control Flow
The control ﬂow is implemented using a Python script running on the host computer
to communicate with the test chip through USB interface, and the test chip is powered
by an external power supply (Figure 4.1-(b)). Figure 4.12 shows the control ﬂow of the
proposed technique. It consists of three states: Active State, Idle State, and Sleep State.
It can be seen that as soon as ‘sleep’ signal is received from the host computer during
“Active State”, the parity is generated from the current ﬂip-ﬂop data and is stored in
parity storage unit (Figure 4.1-(a)). Parity generation and its storage is controlled by a
micro-controller (ARM C-M0) integrated in the SoC. This is why the micro-controller
and parity storage unit is placed in always-on power domain (Figure 4.13). Once parity
is stored, the design goes to “Idle State”, after which the clock is stopped, the output of
retention register block is isolated, and supply voltage is scaled down to pre-characterised
Minimum Retention Voltage (MRV; Figure 4.11). The design then goes to “Sleep State”.
During “Sleep State”, the ﬂip-ﬂop states are continuously monitored and compared with
the stored parity bits. In the case of a mismatch, an ‘Error’ signal is generated in the
form of hardware interrupt, which is received by the micro-controller. In response to
that interrupt, the micro-controller raises the supply voltage to nominal supply voltage
(1.2-V) and uses parity information (computed and saved) for single-bit error correction.
In the case error correction fails due to multi-bit errors, the control software is notiﬁed
through USB interface. Software state recovery such as check-pointing can be used [168];
however such well-known techniques are treated as out of the scope of this work. In the
case of an error, the pre-computed Minimum Retention Voltage (MRV) is raised by
Safety Margin (SM) which is set to 2% of nominal supply voltage (24-mV) to avoid
subsequent errors. The updated value of MRV is stored in the host computer, which is
used in subsequent “Sleep State”. After increasing the MRV, the control is transferred
to “Idle State”, which in turn reduces the supply voltage to newly calculated MRV,
and the design enters “Sleep State”. Finally, upon receiving a ‘wake-up’ request during
“Sleep State”, the supply voltage is raised to nominal supply voltage, and the design
enters “Active State”.
4.2.3 Two-dimensional Parity for Improving Flip-ﬂops State Integrity
Figure 4.13 shows the schematic of the retention register block that is protected using
horizontal and vertical parity logic. The register block (Figure 4.1-(a)) contains 8192
ﬂip-ﬂops, which are divided into 8 blocks, each with (32X32) 1024 ﬂip-ﬂops. The control
of the parity logic is provided by CM0 micro-controller, which is a 32-bit 3-stages pipeline
RISC processor. There are two power domains (PD) in the design (Figure 4.13). Power
Domain 1 (PD-1) is used for register block, which can be scaled down during state
retention mode through external Power Supply. Power Domain 2 (PD-2) is used for
parity storage and micro-controller, which is kept in always-on power domain (alwaysChapter 4 Improving the State Integrity of Flip-ﬂops under PVT Variation 87
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Figure 4.13: Vertical and horizontal parity protected retention register block.
operating at nominal supply voltage of 1.2-V) for continuous state monitoring of register
block.
To automate the insertion of 2D parity logics, an additional step in digital circuit design
ﬂow is needed as shown in Figure 4.14. In a conventional design, ﬁrstly the RTL of
a circuit is converted to gate level netlist through logic synthesis, which is followed by
scan chain insertion for manufacturing test. The last stage is placement and routing.
For the proposed design ﬂow, an additional step is needed after scan chain insertion
for horizontal and vertical parity insertion. This is because the scan chain converts
distributed ﬂip-ﬂops to structured arrays. A TCL script is used to read the output of
Design For Test (DFT) tool after scan chains have been inserted, and it connects all ﬂip-
ﬂops along the scan chains for horizontal parity generation. Similarly for vertical parity
generation, all ﬂip-ﬂops at the same depth of each scan chain are connected together.
This concept is elaborated in Figure 4.14, which shows how ﬂip-ﬂops are connected for
horizontal and vertical parity generation. Scan chains may have diﬀerent numbers of
ﬂip-ﬂops, in which case the missing ﬂip-ﬂop (Horizontally or Vertically) is replaced by
using a direct connection. An example with two scan chains is shown in Figure 4.14,
where the ﬁrst scan chains has three ﬂip-ﬂops and the second scan chain has two ﬂip-
ﬂops. It can be seen that the ﬁrst horizontal parity is generated by using two XOR gates,
while the second horizontal parity is generated by using only one XOR gate. Likewise,
the last vertical parity is generated without using any XOR gate. The 2D parity logics88 Chapter 4 Improving the State Integrity of Flip-ﬂops under PVT Variation
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Figure 4.14: Vertical and horizontal parity insertion synthesis ﬂow.
insertion ﬂow is applicable for any digital circuit designs where the ﬂip-ﬂops organisation
is not structural. For structural ﬂip-ﬂops such as register-banks shown in Figure 4.13,
2D parity logics were inserted into registers array in the RTL design stage.
The implementation cost of 2D parity in terms of area, power and delay needs to be
analysed. The proposed technique requires two XOR gates per ﬂip-ﬂop. This imple-
mentation has 8192 ﬂip-ﬂops and the parity logic is about 51% of the ﬂip-ﬂop area. The
parity logic used in this work incurs about 2.7 additional nets per ﬂip-ﬂop. From Fig-
ure 4.13, it can be observed that the number of horizontal parity storage registers is
equal to the number of scan chains and the number of vertical parity storage registers is
equal to the depth of the longest scan chain in the design. One level-shifter is needed for
each of the parity storage registers. There is a negligible increase in delay and dynamic
power in normal mode of operation; this is because the parity logic is disabled during
that mode. However, the leakage power increases, which is proportional to the area
overhead.
4.3 Test Chip
To study ﬂip-ﬂop state integrity and test the proposed PVT aware state protection
technique, a test chip is designed and fabricated. Figure 4.15 shows the test chip top level
architecture, which is divided into two system layers: System layer 0 (provided by our
industry partner ARM Ltd) controls clock, power, communication with workstation and
software program downloads; System layer 1 is for the ﬂip-ﬂop state integrity experiment.Chapter 4 Improving the State Integrity of Flip-ﬂops under PVT Variation 89
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Figure 4.15: Test chip architecture.
The components are described next: components in the left-hand side of buses are bus
masters and those in the right-hand side of buses are bus slaves. Bus masters only send
requests and bus slaves only respond to requests, a component has read and write access
to the components in its right-hand side only. ASCII Debug Protocol (ADP) provides
character-based read and write access to the entire memory map; it is used to download
software programs to SRAM and to send back test results to workstation. The ARM
Cortex M0 in Layer 0 (CM0L0) is used for general SoC control. Control registers stores
clock and power control signal. Pulse Density Modulation (PDM) of the power-switches
with the feed back from the ring-oscillator is used as the on-chip voltage regulator. The
Registers array is used for for ﬂip-ﬂop state integrity experiments. ARM Cortex M0 in
Layer 1 (CM0L1) is used to control the test sequence of registers array. Status registers
are used to control the function of registers array and store parity information.
The main component for ﬂip-ﬂop state integrity experiment is the array(s) of registers
which has two modes of operations as shown in Figure 4.16. Figure 4.16.(a) shows
that 8192 ﬂip-ﬂops are divided into 8 blocks of 32x32-bit register sub-arrays, acting as
memory with single cycle synchronous write and asynchronous read. To minimise circuit
area, ﬂip-ﬂops without asynchronous reset functionality were densely constrained in the
layout; and the array had to be initialised by software. Figure 4.16.(b) shows the barrel90 Chapter 4 Improving the State Integrity of Flip-ﬂops under PVT Variation
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Figure 4.16: 8192 ﬂip-ﬂops divided into 8 blocks register array each with 128
ﬂip-ﬂops, there are two mode of operations
shifting mode that allows data in register array to be rotated at clock rate, which allows
a programmable switching pattern to generate controllable simultaneous switching noise.
Under barrel rotation mode the 8 blocks appear as a contiguous block of shift register
array.
Figure 4.17 shows the power conﬁguration of the ﬂip-ﬂop state integrity experiment,
two banks of registers arrays are created each with 8192 ﬂip-ﬂops. Both banks can
be used for voltage scaled state retention or switching noise generation through barrel
rotation mode (Figure 4.16.(b)). They are power-gated using header switches created
between main supply rail VDD and its virtual rail (VVDD). By rapidly switching on
and oﬀ the header switches, Pulse Density Modulation (PDM) is used to scale voltage
on-chip. The retention voltage can be observed in the virtual rails VVDD; however
there is no analogue pad available for this experiment and VVDD is not visible outside
the chip. Therefore two ring oscillators are employed to measure VDD and VVDD B0.
Parity bits and control signals of both banks are stored in status registers, and level
shifters are created between registers array and status registers because under retention
mode the supply voltage of registers arrays is diﬀerent from that of status registers.
Microprocessor (CM0L1) monitors registers arrays state integrity through status registerChapter 4 Improving the State Integrity of Flip-ﬂops under PVT Variation 91
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Figure 4.17: Power conﬁguration of ﬂip-ﬂop state integrity experiment.
Address Register Name Description
0x600000000 - 0x6000003FF SREG_B0 Registers array bank 0
0x600000400 - 0x6000007FF SREG_B1 Registers array bank 1
0x680000000 SREG_CTRL Registers arrays operational mode control
0x680000004 2DPAR_ERR Parity error
0x680000008 2DPAR_INT Parity interrupt
0x68000000C 2DPAR_PARGEN_B0 Bank 0 parity generation
0x680000010 2DPAR_PARGEN_B1 Bank 1 parity generation
0x680000014 - 0x680000020 2DPAR_VPAR_B0 Bank 0 Vertical parity storage
0x680000024 - 0x680000028 2DPAR_HPAR_B0 Bank 0 Horizontal parity storage
0x68000002C - 0x680000038 2DPAR_VPAR_B1 Bank 1 Vertical parity storage
0x68000003C - 0x680000040 2DPAR_HPAR_B1 Bank 1 Horizontal parity storage
0x680000044 OSC_H_CNT osc_h counter
0x680000048 OSC_L_CNT osc_l counter
0x68000004C OSC_CTRL Ring oscillator control
0x680000050 - 0x68000005C 2DPAR_VERR_B0 Bank 0 Vertical parity error
0x680000060 - 0x680000064 2DPAR_HERR_B0 Bank 0 Horizontal parity error
0x680000068 - 0x680000074 2DPAR_VERR_B1 Bank 1 Vertical parity error
0x680000078 - 0x68000007C 2DPAR_HERR_B1 Bank 1 Horizontal parity error 0x680000078 - 0x68000007C 2DPAR_HERR_B1 Bank 1 Horizontal parity error
0xC000000C0 PDM_CTRL Pulse Density Modulation (PDM) control
Figure 4.18: Memory map of components used for ﬂip-ﬂop state integrity ex-
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which generates hardware interrupt when parities change from the stored value. CM0L1
controls the functions of register array by setting status registers. The memory map
of register array, status registers, ring oscillator control and PDM control are shown in
Figure 4.18.
Figure 4.19 shows a visualisation of the power intent of ﬂip-ﬂop state integrity experi-
ment. The top level power domain is SREG PD whose UPF description is:
create_power_domain SREG_PD -include_scope
set_domain_supply_net SREG_PD
-primary_power_net VDD -primary_ground_net VSS
Power supply ports are created for connections with external power supply. Supply ports
are connected to corresponding supply nets which are the internal supply rails:
create_supply_port VDD
create_supply_net VDD -domain SREG_PD
connect_supply_net VDD -ports VDD
create_supply_port VSS
create_supply_net VSS -domain SREG_PD
connect_supply_net VSS -ports VSS
SREG B0 PD and SREG B0 PD are power domains for 2 banks of registers array, For
demonstration purposes, only bank 0 is described:
create_power_domain SREG_B0_PD -elements {SREG_B0}
set_domain_supply_net SREG_B0_PD
-primary_power_net VVDD_B0 -primary_ground_net VSS
The option -elements assigns RTL instantiation of registers array to the corresponding
power domains. Two banks of registers arrays have identical internal physical structures.
Supply and ground nets of SREG B0 PD are created:
create_supply_net VDD -domain SREG_B0_PD -reuse
create_supply_net VSS -domain SREG_B0_PD -reuse
The option -reuse is to extend existing supply nets from top power domain SREG PD
to the hierarchical power domain SREG B0 PD. Power-gating transistors are inserted
between primary supply rail VDD and power-gated virtual supply rail VVDD B0. As
shown in Figure 4.17, Pulse Density Modulation (PDM) controls supply voltage of regis-
ters array by rapidly switching power-gating transistors, PWRn B0 is the control signal
from PDM to power gating transistors. The description in UPF is:C
h
a
p
t
e
r
4
I
m
p
r
o
v
i
n
g
t
h
e
S
t
a
t
e
I
n
t
e
g
r
i
t
y
o
f
F
l
i
p
-
ﬂ
o
p
s
u
n
d
e
r
P
V
T
V
a
r
i
a
t
i
o
n
9
3
VVDD_B0
VDD
VSS
INL
SREG_B0_PD SREG_STATUS_PD
VDDL VDDH
Level shifter
OUTH
PWRn_B0
CLAMPn
Parity tree
Isolation 
cell Parity 
storage
Flip-flop Flip-flop
Parity
Parity_B0
osc_l osc_h
SREG_B1_PD
SREG_PD
Figure 4.19: Power intent of ﬂip-ﬂop state integrity experiment.94 Chapter 4 Improving the State Integrity of Flip-ﬂops under PVT Variation
￿
￿
￿
￿
DDH
￿
DDL
INL
OUTH
Figure 4.20: Level shifter schematic [38].
create_supply_net VVDD_B0 -resolve parallel
create_power_switch VVDD_B0_SW -domain SREG_B0_PD \
-input_supply_port {VDD VDD} -output_supply_port {VVDD VVDD_B0} \
-control_port {sleep PWRn_B0} -on_state {on_state VDD {!sleep}}
The parity tree is located inside register array for 2D parity generation. The output of
parity chains are connected to ﬂip-ﬂops in status registers for storage and comparison.
The comparison circuit is a simple XOR gate as comparator which is omitted in the
ﬁgure. The power domain of status registers is SREG STATUS PD:
create_power_domain SREG_STATUS_PD -elements {SREG_STATUS}
set_domain_supply_net SREG_STATUS_PD
-primary_power_net VDD -primary_ground_net VSS
Under retention mode, parity signals from SREG B0 PD and SREG B1 PD are at a
diﬀerent voltage level to the parity storage unit of SREG STATUS PD. In a multi-
voltage design a level shifter is required especially when the signal is coming from lower
voltage region to higher voltage region, this is because when the CMOS gate’s input is
lower than its supply voltage but higher than ground, both NMOS and PMOS transistor
are half turned on creating large crossbar current [38]. Therefore level shifting is required
to increase voltage level of parity signal before capturing it. The schematic of level shifter
is shown in Figure 4.20 [38]. It takes a buﬀered and an inverted from the lower voltage
signal and uses this to drive a cross-coupled transistor structure running at the higher
voltage. Up-converting level shifters requires two supply rails, one from the lower voltage
region of input signal and one from the higher voltage region of output signal. Therefore,
beside primary supply rails VDD and VSS, virtual supply rails from SREG B0 PD and
SREG B1 PD are extended to SREG STATUS PD:
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create_supply_net VSS -domain SREG_STATUS_PD -reuse
create_supply_net VVDD_B0 -domain SREG_STATUS_PD -reuse
create_supply_net VVDD_B1 -domain SREG_STATUS_PD -reuse
Input isolation and level shifting are:
set_isolation SREG_B0_iso -domain SREG_B0_PD
-isolation_power_net VDD -isolation_ground_net VSS \
-clamp_value 0 -elements {SREG_B0/VPO SREG_B0/HPO}
set_isolation_control SREG_B0_iso -domain SREG_STATUS_PD \
-isolation_signal CLAMPn_B0 -isolation_sense low -location parent
set_level_shifter SREG_B0_shift_up -domain SREG_B0_PD \
-applies_to outputs -threshold 0.0 -rule low_to_high \
-location fanout -elements {SREG_B0/HPO SREG_B0/VPO}
Signal isolation is integrated into level shifter in the cell library. Although they are
deﬁned in SREG B0 PD, the physical location is in SREG STATUS PD due to option
-location fanout. One ring oscillator is placed in SREG B0 PD to measure the voltage
of virtual rail VVDD B0 and one ring-oscillator is placed in SREG STATUS PD to
measure the voltage of supply rail VDD.
Figure 4.21 shows the test chip synthesis and physical implementation ﬂow. One input
of the ﬂow is Register Transfer Level (RTL) of the design written in Verilog. The other
input is power intent ﬁle which deﬁnes power domains, power-gating transistors and
isolation strategy of power gating techniques used in this design. The power intent is
described by universal power format (UPF). The design is ﬁrst validated through RTL
functional simulation. After passing RTL functional tests, the design is synthesised
using Synopsys design compiler and TSMC 65nm standard cell library. To ﬁt the design
into a restricted chip area, clock timing is constrained to 100-MHz to reduce excessive
buﬀers insertion, because the focus of this study is not on high performance circuits.
The synthesis stage generates gate level net list and delay description ﬁle in Standard
Delay Format (SDF), which are used for post-synthesis simulation with clock speed of
100-MHz. Physical implementation of the design is done through Synopsys IC compiler.
The inputs are post synthesis netlist and power description (UPF ﬁle) of the design. The
physical implemenation is divided into two stages: design planning and place & route.
The design planning stage includes voltage area deﬁnition, power switches placement
and power grid creation. The place & route stage includes standard cell placement,
clock tree synthesis and routing. Standard cell placement places the gates from the
post-synthesis netlist into deﬁned area, after which clock buﬀering is created to balance
the clock tree to remove clock skews. Routing connects all standard cell signal lines.
The placement and routing generates the ﬁnal GDSII layout ﬁle that is required for96 Chapter 4 Improving the State Integrity of Flip-ﬂops under PVT Variation
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fabrication and delay description ﬁle for ﬁnal post placement and routed simulation.
Post placement and routed timing and functional simulation is done to make sure the
design has been correctly constrained and implemented with extracted parasitic loads
and capacitance. The ﬁnal stage is silicon sign-oﬀ veriﬁcation using Mentor Graphic’s
Calibre tool, Design Rules Checking (DRC) is done to ensure no design rule violations
and Logic Versus Schematic (LVS) checking is done to ensure the function of the ﬁnal
schematic matches its gate level description.
The physical layout of the chip implemented using TSMC 65nm technology is shown
in Figure 4.22. The ﬂip-ﬂop state integrity experiment only uses part of the chip area,
which is highlighted on the bottom left corner of the chip. There are two blocks of
register arrays each consists of 8192 ﬂip-ﬂops and corresponding parity check circuitry.
Both blocks can be conﬁgured to study ﬂip-ﬂops data integrity under diﬀerent supply
voltage or to generate power supply noises. Status registers are implemented and used
to control the register arrays and to provide parity storage. Two ring oscillators are
created to monitor the voltage of supply rail and virtual rail. ARM CM0 processor core
is used to set or read the status registers and react to the interrupt event when error
is detected. SRAM is used to store the code and data for the software programs that
control the experiment.98 Chapter 4 Improving the State Integrity of Flip-ﬂops under PVT Variation
4.4 Experimental Results
Two experiments have been conducted to demonstrate improved state integrity of ﬂip-
ﬂops with aggressive supply voltage scaling in “sleep state” that is possible through the
proposed technique. The ﬁrst experiment demonstrates improved state integrity of ﬂip-
ﬂops in “sleep state”, and the second experiment demonstrates the eﬀect of aggressive
supply voltage scaling on leakage power savings.
4.4.1 Improved State Integrity
The ﬁrst experiment was conducted using three dies (Figure 4.7); the operating temper-
ature was set to 79◦C by using a temperature chamber. For this measurement, the test
board was connected with a host computer through a USB interface, and Python script
was used to communicate between the computer and the test board. For each die, the
following ﬁve steps are repeated:
1. Voltage of the design was set to 1.2-V.
2. A single logic value (logic-1) was stored in all 8192 ﬂip-ﬂops, referred to as initial
logic state. This is because our experiments indicate that Logic-1 state retention
is about 3-times more vulnerable to bit failure than logic-0.
3. Supply voltage was reduced to respective characterised Minimum Retention Volt-
age (MRV) of each die for 30-minutes.
4. Supply voltage was raised back to 1.2-V.
5. Flip-ﬂop states were compared with the initial logic state to determine if bit failure
has been observed.
Results are shown in Table 4.1, which shows First Failure Voltage (FFV) and Minimum
Retention Voltage (MRV) of each die. The fourth column shows the number of errors
observed in each die, and the last column shows the response of the proposed technique.
For all three representative dies, no error was detected at MRV. It is important to note
that when using conventional techniques (Canary [83] and open-loop [76]), the ﬂip-ﬂop
state is unknown. However, through this technique, it is possible to detect multi-bit
errors and correct single bit error; thus it improves overall conﬁdence on ﬂip-ﬂop state
integrity at reduced supply voltage. When discussing measured results across 82-dies
shown in Figure 4.7, it was highlighted that almost 80% of the dies exhibited only single
bit failure at FFV. This is why parity logic capable of single bit error correction is used
in the proposed technique to improve state integrity at reduced supply voltage. At FFV,
multi-bit errors were observed in the case of just over 20% of the dies, which can beChapter 4 Improving the State Integrity of Flip-ﬂops under PVT Variation 99
Table 4.1: Measured results for three selected dies shown in Figure 4.7 at 79◦C
in “Sleep State”.
# of Errors Proposed Technique
Die # FFV (mv) MRV (mV) Detected Response
Die-1 315 369 0 No Error Detected
Die-2 285 339 0 No Error Detected
Die-3 250 304 0 No Error Detected
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Figure 4.23: Measured Leakage Power at room temperature normalised to 1.2 V
supply voltage: With ECC vs. Without ECC.
detected through the proposed technique, and can be dealt via a software check-point
technique as explored in recent publications [168].
4.4.2 Aggressive Voltage Scaling
Table 4.1 shows that the diﬀerence in MRV of Die-1 and Die-3 is 65-mV, while still
preserving state integrity. In comparison to using worst-case MRV across all dies, the
improvement in MRV is diﬀerent for each individual die. The proposed characterisation
algorithm (Figure 4.11) achieves up to over 17.5% improvement in MRV in the best
case (Die-1 compared with Die-3). This improvement is lower in the most common case
(represented by Die-2), which is 8% lower (30-mV) than the worst-case MRV. To get
an insight into potential leakage saving using this technique, a further experiment was
conducted with a design without ECC, which computes Minimum Retention Voltage
(MRV) across all process and temperature corners and uses that single MRV across all
dies. For example, in the case of the open-loop technique, voltage is reduced to 0.6-V
for all dies. On the other hand, the proposed technique employs a self-characterisation
algorithm (Figure 4.11), which allows aggressive voltage scaling and each die has its own
individual MRV. Figure 4.23 shows normalised leakage power with and without using100 Chapter 4 Improving the State Integrity of Flip-ﬂops under PVT Variation
ECC. This measurement is taken at 25◦C using Die-2 (Figure 4.7). As can be seen, at a
given voltage, the normalised leakage power of the proposed technique is higher than that
of a design without ECC. This is because of 33% area overhead of parity logic. However,
the proposed technique is capable of state retention at much lower voltage leading to
overall lower leakage power in “Sleep State”, due to using the characterisation algorithm
(Figure 4.11). For example, in comparison to a design without ECC and state retention
at 0.6-V, the proposed technique can retain states at 339-mV (for Die-2) leading to
2.67-times additional leakage power savings.
4.5 Concluding Remarks
This chapter presented measured results from silicon to show that the state integrity of
ﬂip-ﬂops is aﬀected by process, voltage and temperature (PVT) variation. By designing
and implementing special register integrity test structures and integrating these into
a 65nm test chip, detailed and speciﬁc measurements have been possible to compare
and contrast voltage-scaled retention techniques and approaches. Measurements from a
districution of packaged test chips, each with 8192 ﬂip-ﬂops, showed that even at 25◦C,
state integrity of a ﬂip-ﬂop is aﬀected by process variation leading to spread of First
Failure Voltage (FFV), from 245-mV to 315-mV, with 79% of total dies exhibiting sin-
gle bit failure at FFV, while the rest show multi-bit failure. Furthermore, at elevated
temperatures the variation is even more pronounced, it is found that FFV increases by
up to 30-mV with increase in temperature from 25◦C to 79◦C. The eﬀect of process
variation with geometry scaling has also been studied using a 45-nm technology node
through Monte-Carlo simulation, when compared with 65-nm technology, it is found
that the overall distribution trend remains the same; however the mean FFV has shifted
to a higher voltage. The eﬀect of PVT variation on state integrity of ﬂip-ﬂops is ad-
dressed through development of a PVT-aware state protection technique that ensures
state integrity, while minimizing state retention voltage per die. The proposed technique
consists of characterisation algorithm to determine Minimum Retention Voltage (MRV)
of each die, and employs horizontal and vertical parity for real-time error detection and
single bit error correction. In the case of error detection, it enables dynamic adjustment
of MRV per die to avoid subsequent errors. Silicon results show that at characterised
MRV, the ﬂip-ﬂop state integrity is preserved, while achieving up to 17.6% reduction in
retention voltage across 82-dies.Chapter 5
Modelling Framework to
Optimise Memory System
Reliability
The previous chapters of this thesis have focused on the reliability of ﬂip-ﬂops, which
are sequential elements of a processor core. In Chapter 3, a cost eﬀective methodology
is proposed to improve the reliability of the processor core when in sleep mode in the
presence of supply noise and soft errors. Low cost protection is achieved through the
reuse of scan chains for state monitoring and recovery. In Chapter 4, the state integrity
of ﬂip-ﬂops has been studied using HSPICE simulations and measurements taken from
82 fabricated test chips. An algorithm was proposed to determine Minimum Retention
Voltage (MRV) of each test chip to ensure state-integrity, while reducing leakage and
state retention power. It also incorporated horizontal and vertical parity circuit for
state protection under reduced supply voltage. The techniques presented in Chapter 3
and Chapter 4 have improved the reliability of the ﬂip-ﬂop based storage elements of
processor cores. This chapter describes an architectural simulation-based framework for
analysing complete processor memory system in terms of reliability, performance and
energy consumption. Through the analysis, a cost eﬀective reliable design methodol-
ogy is proposed to minimise energy consumption for reliability-constrained low-power
embedded processor system designs.
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.1 provides the motivation for this work.
Section 5.2 describes the architectural simulation-based framework for estimation of
memory reliability, processor performance and energy consumption. Section 5.3 shows
the analysis of memory system reliability using the constructed framework. The pro-
posed cost eﬀective reliable design methodology and reliability aware joint optimisation
is presented in Section 5.4 and Section 5.5 draws conclusions for the application of the
proposed methodology.
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Figure 5.1: ECC overhead in terms of (a) area (b) energy [169].
5.1 Motivation
Soft errors also called Single Event Upset (SEU) are radiation-induced transient er-
rors caused by neutrons from cosmic rays and alpha particles from material used for
IC packaging. Traditionally soft errors were only a concern for space applications, but
for advanced technology nodes, system level soft errors are much more frequent due to
lower critical charge and higher integration density [11]. The induced charge from a
particle strike will ﬂip the state of the memory cell, which can propagate and cause
erroneous outputs. Together with performance and power, reliability has become an
important design parameter for many embedded processors such as micro-controllers,
servers and networking devices. To protect a system against soft errors, redundancy is
usually required which has a cost in chip area, power and performance [161,169,170].
Figure 5.1 shows Error Control Coding (ECC) area and energy overhead for various
coding schemes, where the overhead increases exponentially with error correction capa-
bility. ECC protection is costly; therefore excessive protection may make the product
uncompetitive in terms of cost and energy consumption. On the other hand, inadequate
protection from soft errors may lead to unreliable in-ﬁeld operation, which is undesir-
able. In a processor, the memory system is particularly susceptible to soft error because
it occupies the largest fraction of the chip area [171]. Therefore, appropriate protection
of a memory system is necessary, which is only possible through careful evaluation of
soft error susceptibility.
There are two main types of random access memories Static RAM (SRAM) and Dynamic
RAM (DRAM), which are commonly used in processor systems. SRAM is expensive but
fast and it is used as cache memory to reduce access latency. DRAM requires dynamic
memory cell refresh, has longer access time but is lower-cost for bulk memory and it is
used as main memory to provide large memory size. A typical example of the modern
processor memory hierarchy is shown in Figure 5.2, which consists of two levels of cache
and a main memory. Level-1 (L1) cache normally provides both data and instructionChapter 5 Modelling Framework to Optimise Memory System Reliability 103
L1 Cache
on-chip SRAM
Registers
L2 Cache
off-chip SRAM
Main memory
DRAM
S
m
a
l
l
e
r
 
b
u
t
 
f
a
s
t
e
r
L
a
r
g
e
r
 
b
u
t
 
s
l
o
w
e
r
Figure 5.2: Low-medium performance microprocessor memory hierarchy
caching which connected directly to the processor core. The speed of L1-cache has the
highest impact on the processor’s performance and typically SRAM latency is within a
few nano-seconds [172,173]. It is usually integrated on the same die as the processor
core to reduce access latency. Increasing cache size has a negative impact on access
latency due to a more complex address decoder. For this reason, the maximum size
of L1-cache is limited to 32kB in most modern processors such as POWER7 [174] and
OMAP4460 [175]. When larger cache memory is needed, it is usually divided into
two levels, a smaller L1-cache and a larger but slower L2-cache. In high performance
processors level-3 cache is also used to reduce access to the main memory. The focus of
this research is on low power embedded processors and therefore only two cache levels
are considered together with the main memory as shown in Figure 5.2, although in some
systems the L2 cache could be on-chip or oﬀ-chip.
To accurately analyse the reliability of each memory component with consideration of
performance and energy consumption, an analysis framework is developed and described
in the next section. This framework is used for joint-optimisation of reliability, perfor-
mance and energy consumption when considering a given embedded processor using a
wide variety of benchmark applications and soft error rates.
5.2 Framework for Memory System Reliability Analysis
Figure 5.3 shows the analysis framework for the application-aware joint analysis of reli-
ability, performance and energy of an embedded processor system. The analysis frame-
work is based on an architectural simulator, which is available as an open-source software104 Chapter 5 Modelling Framework to Optimise Memory System Reliability
that models the processor system’s behaviour to predict performance matrices for a given
input. Such a simulator is often used in the design process to allow easy design space ex-
ploration and early software development. The architectural simulator used in this work
is GEM5 [176]. It is an open source and highly conﬁgurable simulator that supports
most modern processor models including ARM and x86. GEM5 is an instruction level
accurate simulator but can be conﬁgured to run at near cycle accuracy at the cost of
simulation speed. The inputs to this analysis framework (Figure 5.3) consist of processor
system conﬁguration ﬁles and benchmark applications. A processor system consist of
hardware and software, and conﬁguration ﬁles that deﬁne the hardware set-up such as
computing resources available for processor core and memory system. Table 5.1 shows
an example conﬁguration. Benchmark applications are compiled to software binaries
using MiBench benchmark suite [177] as a case study. To estimate reliability, a memory
read and write access monitor is embedded into GEM5 simulator. To analyse system
energy consumption an activity-based power analysis tool McPAT [178] is used, which
uses the system conﬁguration to estimate chip area and static power consumption. It
uses activity statistics generated by GEM5 simulation to produce dynamic power con-
sumption. A python script is used to post-process GEM5 statistics to be compatible
with McPAT. For performance analysis, the built-in features of GEM5 have been used
to generate detailed performance statistics. This simulation set up runs on an Iridis
computer cluster so multiple simulations can run in parallel. A python script is used
to setup the analysis framework and initiate simulations. In this case study the de-
sign space consists of 24 conﬁgurations and 24 benchmark applications, which leads to
24×24 = 576 simulations running simultaneously. Each simulation generates reliability,
performance and energy consumption proﬁles for the corresponding conﬁguration and
application, which are used for joint optimisation. Each component of the framework is
discussed in detail in the rest of this section.
5.2.1 Hardware Conﬁguration Method
One of the inputs to the analysis framework (Figure 5.3) is the hardware system conﬁg-
uration. In this work, an ARM low power embedded processor is modeled using GEM5.
Table 5.1 shows the processor conﬁguration used in this work. As can be seen, it has two
integer adders, one integer multiplier and divider, two ﬂoating point ALUs, one load and
one store unit. It can fetch 3 instructions every clock cycle, and the issue and commit
widths are 8 instructions. There are 2 levels of caches: Level-1 consist of 2-way set asso-
ciative instruction and data caches with single CPU clock cycle access latency, the size
of both instruction cache and data cache are 32-KB; L2-cache is 8-way set associative
and has an access latency of 8ns, the size of L2-cache is 256-KB. The size of DRAM is
512-MB which has an access latency of 100ns. Hardware components are implemented
as modules written in C++. A Python interpreter is embedded in GEM5 simulator so
the conﬁguration of hardware components is set through Python scripts. This approachChapter 5 Modelling Framework to Optimise Memory System Reliability 105
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Figure 5.3: Proposed framework to analyse reliability, performance and energy
consumption
combines the ﬂexibility of Python scripting for conﬁguration with the performance of
C++ programs for execution. Figure 5.4 shows how the conﬁguration from Table 5.1
is implemented in GEM5 using a Python script. Figure 5.4.(a) shows the conﬁguration
of functional units in the processor core, as can be seen operation latency is deﬁned
here in order to model timing information. Figure 5.4.(b) shows the conﬁguration of
the cache memory, which includes access latency, block size, associativity and size. This
conﬁguration is used for demonstration for the analysis presented in Section 5.3.106 Chapter 5 Modelling Framework to Optimise Memory System Reliability
Table 5.1: System conﬁguration used in analysis
Conﬁguration Value
Processor Core
ALU
2 Integer Add/Sub
1 integer Mul/Div
2 ﬂoat point
Fetch/Decode Width 3/3 instructions/cycle
Issue/Commit Width 8/8 instructions/cycle
Memory Hierarchy
Instruction cache
2 ways, 1 cycle latency
Data cache
L2 cache 8 ways, 8-ns latency
DRAM 100-ns latency
//O3_ARM_v7a.py
class O3_ARM_v7a_Simple_Int(FUDesc):
opList = [ OpDesc(opClass='IntAlu', opLat=1) ]
count = 2 
class O3_ARM_v7a_Complex_Int(FUDesc):
opList = [ OpDesc(opClass='IntMult', opLat=3, issueLat=1),
OpDesc(opClass='IntDiv', opLat=12, issueLat=12),
OpDesc(opClass='IprAccess', opLat=3, issueLat=1) ]
count = 1 
class O3_ARM_v7a_FP(FUDesc):
opList = [ OpDesc(opClass='SimdAdd', opLat=4),
OpDesc(opClass='SimdAddAcc', opLat=4),
OpDesc(opClass='SimdAlu', opLat=4),
OpDesc(opClass='SimdCmp', opLat=4),
OpDesc(opClass='SimdCvt', opLat=3),
...............................
OpDesc(opClass='FloatMult', opLat=4) ]
count = 2
class O3_ARM_v7a_Load(FUDesc):
opList = [ OpDesc(opClass='MemRead',opLat=2) ]
count = 1 
class O3_ARM_v7a_Store(FUDesc):
opList = [OpDesc(opClass='MemWrite',opLat=2) ]
count = 1 
class O3_ARM_v7a_FUP(FUPool):
FUList = [O3_ARM_v7a_Simple_Int(),
O3_ARM_v7a_Complex_Int(),
O3_ARM_v7a_Load(), 
O3_ARM_v7a_Store(), 
O3_ARM_v7a_FP()]
//O3_ARM_v7a.py
class O3_ARM_v7a_ICache(BaseCache):
hit_latency = 1
response_latency = 1
block_size = 64
mshrs = 2
tgts_per_mshr = 8
size = '32kB' 
assoc = 2
is_top_level = 'true'
class O3_ARM_v7a_DCache(BaseCache):
hit_latency = 1
response_latency = 1
block_size = 64
mshrs = 6
tgts_per_mshr = 8
size = '32kB'
assoc = 2
write_buffers = 16
is_top_level = 'true'
class O3_ARM_v7aL2(BaseCache):
hit_latency = 8
response_latency = 8
block_size = 64
mshrs = 16
tgts_per_mshr = 8
size = '256kB'
assoc = 8
write_buffers = 8
prefetch_on_access = 'true'
prefetcher = StridePrefetcher(degree=8, latency = 1)
Integer 
Add/Sub
Integer 
Mul/Div
Floating 
point
Instruction 
cache
Data cache
L2 cache
(a) processor core (b) cache memory
Load/
Store
Functional 
units
Figure 5.4: Example Python script for GEM5 used to conﬁgure (a) processor
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5.2.2 Benchmark Applications
The second input required for the analysis framework (Figure 5.3) is one or more bench-
mark applications. The benchmark suite used in this work (Section 5.3) is Mibench,
which assembles a set of commercially representative embedded programs [177]. The
benchmark applications are written in C, and the Linaro GCC toolchain is used to cross
compile the benchmark applications to ARM program binary with optimisation level
3 [179]. As shown in Table 5.2, the benchmark applications are divided into 6 groups:
automotive, consumer, oﬃce, network, security and telecommunication.
1. Automotive category is intended to demonstrate the use of embedded processors
in control system: “basicmath” performs simple mathematical calculations. “bit-
count” tests the bit manipulation abilities of a processor by counting the number
of bits in integers. “qsort” sorts a large array of strings into ascending order us-
ing quick sort algorithm. “susan” is an image recognition package for recognising
corners and edges in MRI of the brain, it can also smooth an image.
2. Consumer benchmarks applications are intended for consumer devices such as scan-
ners and digital cameras: “jpeg” is a lossy image compression and decompression
program often used to view images embedded in documents. “lame” is an MP3
audio encoder with constant, average and variable bit-rate encoding. “typeset” is
a typesetting tool that often used in web browsers.
3. Oﬃce category is mainly text manipulation applications: “ispell” is a fast spelling
checker, it supports contextual spell checking and correction suggestions. “rsynth”
is a text-to-speech synthesis program. “stringsearch” is a string searching program
using a case insensitive comparison algorithm.
4. Network applications are used in network devices such as switches and routers:
“dijkstra” is a routing application that constructs a graph using adjacency matrix
and then calculates the shortest path between each node. “patricia” is used to
maintain a tree-like data structure for routers; it collapses sparse leaf nodes to
reduce the depth of the tree and therefore reduces traversal time.
5. Security category is intended for data encryption: “rijndael” is used for Advanced
Encryption Standard (AES) encryption and decryption. It is a block cipher with
key size upto 256-bits. “sha” is a secure hash algorithm often used in the secure
exchange of cryptographic keys.
6. Telecommunication category contains the applications used in wireless communi-
cation: “crc” is an error detection algorithm widely used to ensure data integrity
in transmission channels. “ﬀt” is a digital signal processing algorithm used to ﬁnd
the frequencies in a given signal. “adpcm” is a compression algorithm for Pulse108 Chapter 5 Modelling Framework to Optimise Memory System Reliability
Table 5.2: MiBench benchmarks [177]
Automotive Consumer Oﬃce Network Security Telecomm
basicmath djpeg ispell dijkstra rijndael enc crc
bitcount cjpeg rsynth patricia rijndael dec ﬀt
qsort lame stringsearch sha iﬀt
susan corners typeset cadpcm
susan edges dadpcm
susan smoothing gsm toast
Table 5.3: Benchmarks size
Benchmark Instructions Benchmark Instructions Benchmark Instructions
basicmath 2,600,804,178 lame 970,864,188 rijndael dec 437,332,579
bitcount 712,165,746 typeset 405,142,439 sha 116,047,916
qsort 323,236,108 ispell 736,368,473 crc 1,889,808,493
susan corners 22,414,640 rsynth 1,769,029,529 ﬀt 409,203,364
susan edges 61,108,467 stringsearch 4,242,318 iﬀt 223,879,382
susan smoothing 270,208,654 dijkstra 200,914,997 cadpcm 732,592,451
djpeg 21,833,323 patricia 591,388,089 dadpcm 526,377,589
cjpeg 95,590,130 rijndael enc 449,518,458 gsm toast 1,018,773,440
Code Modulation (PCM) with compression ration of 4 to 1. “gsm” is the standard
of voice encoding and decoding for mobile communication.
Table 5.3 shows the number of instructions simulated for each benchmark application,
which were extracted from the statistics generated by GEM5. Figure 5.5 shows the code
size (the size of cross-compiled program binary) and data size (the size of input ﬁles for
benchmark applications).
5.2.3 Reliability, Performance and Energy Proﬁling
In this chapter, the impact of soft errors on memory reliability is studied. Bit error
rate (BER) is deﬁned as the soft error rate for one storage node (bit) in a memory,
represented by symbol λbit. BER is decided by the fabrication process and inﬂuenced
by its operation environment. The error rates of unprotected memory can be roughly
estimated using the following equation [161]:
λmem = λbit × N (5.1)
where N is the size of the memory in bits. This gives the worst case memory system
failure rate estimation and over-engineering is normally used for safety-critical applica-
tions. This is based on the assumption that a system will fail if any storage node is
corrupted, which is not always true. This is because some memory cells are not usedChapter 5 Modelling Framework to Optimise Memory System Reliability 109
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Figure 5.5: Code and data size of MiBench benchmark applications (Memory
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during application runtime and even when data corruption occurs in the occupied mem-
ory cell, it may be overwritten. For example Figure 5.6 shows the data lifetime of one
byte of storage cells (8 bits). At time t0 data ‘x’ is written into the storage cells. At time
t1 a particle strike causes bit-ﬂip corrupting the stored data. At time t2 the corrupted
data ‘xe’ are from the storage cells and propagate to the processor core or other memory
components, which may lead to erroneous output. Therefore the data lifetime between
t0 and t2, which is vulnerable to corruption is referred to as Vulnerable Time (VT). At
time t3 data ‘y’ are written into the same storage cells and mask data corruption, so
data lifetime between t2 and t3 is not vulnerable to erroneous output. Therefore, data
lifetime of a memory component can be divided into vulnerable time and invulnerable
time. Total vulnerable time is calculated by summing up the vulnerable time of each
storage cell as shown in Figure 5.7. Equivalent vulnerable storage of an application is
calculated by:
N′ =
 
i
 
j
V Tij/Runtime (5.2)
where ’j’ represents the vulnerable time slice of one byte storage and ’i’ represents storage
nodes (Figure 5.7). Therefore more accurate estimation of memory reliability can be
expressed as:
λ′
mem = λbit × N′ (5.3)110 Chapter 5 Modelling Framework to Optimise Memory System Reliability
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Figure 5.6: Storage cells data lifetime
where λbit is the bit error rate of the storage node. ’N′’ is the vulnerable storage that
can be calculated through architectural simulation of a processor system.
Vulnerable storage is used to estimate the reliability of the memory system. The amount
of vulnerable storage varies across diﬀerent applications. In other words, reliability is
application-dependent. Architectural simulation is needed to accurately estimate the
memory system reliability for a target application. GEM5 can be conﬁgured to run
cycle accurate simulation, but does not generate reliability statistics directly. According
to Figure 5.7 and Equation 5.2, to calculate vulnerable storage N′, read and write
accesses on each storage unit (the basic storage unit for memory access is one byte)
needed to be monitored. Because GEM5 is an open source software, the source code of
the GEM5 simulator is modiﬁed to incorporate memory access monitoring for vulnerable
time collection, which will be discussed next.
Figure 5.8 shows the memory system architecture and read/write monitoring for analysing
the access information of each memory component and calculating the vulnerable stor-
age. There are read and write ports in each memory component; for the Instruction
Read Write Read Write
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cache (I-Cache), the read port is connected to processor core to fetch instructions and
write port is connected to the level-1 bus that ﬁlls the cache lines with instructions. the
data cache has both read and write ports connected to processor core to enable caching
of application data. Another set of read and write ports are connected to higher memory
hierarchy for read and write. L2-cache provides the buﬀer between DRAM and L1-cache,
therefore it has read and write ports connected to both level-1 and level-2 buses. The
ﬁnal level of memory hierarchy is DRAM which also has read and write ports connected
to the level-2 bus. The read and write ports are implemented as functions in the GEM5
simulator; therefore read and write monitors are a group of functions that are embedded
inside read and write ports to extract the address of memory cells accessed. Figure 5.9
shows the example code for the main memory access monitoring functions. Firstly, three
variables are created: “lstAccTime” is used to store the last access time for each memory
unit (1 byte of storage cells), “vulTime” is used to accumulate the vulnerable time slices
(Figure 5.7), and “vulStore” is used to store the vulnerable storage calculated using
Equation 5.2. Secondly, two monitoring functions are created: “writeTrace()” is used to
monitor write access, and “readTrace()” is used to monitor read access. At the end of
each access the monitor updates the last access time to the current time. If the access is
a write operation, any error is masked and no action is needed. If the access is a read,
the data are vulnerable to soft errors, and the vulnerable time (the diﬀerence between
current access time and last access time) is stored into accumulator “vulTime”. Lastly,
the memory access monitor functions are inserted into the memory access port. Simi-
larly, the example code for cache access monitoring is shown in Figure 5.10. Four cache
accesses are monitored: write, read, cache ﬁll and write back. Cache read and write
access from the CPU is monitored in function “satisfyCpuSideRequest()”, the cache ﬁll
is monitored in function “handleFill()” and the cache write back is monitored in function
“writebackBlk()”.
Performance statistics are generated by GEM5 directly, while power estimation is gen-
erated using McPAT to post process the dynamic activity produced by GEM5. McPAT
is a power, timing and area estimation tool for the architectural simulator and the block
diagram is shown in Figure 5.11. McPAT uses an XML-based interface to fetch in-
formation about hardware conﬁguration and dynamic activity from the architectural112 Chapter 5 Modelling Framework to Optimise Memory System Reliability
//abstract_mem.cc
void AbstractMemory::writeTrace(Addr addr, int size)
{
      for(int i=addr; i<addr+size; i++)
            lstAccTime[i] = curTick();
}
void AbstractMemory::readTrace(Addr addr, int size)
{
      for(int i=addr; i<addr+size; i++) {   
            vulTime += curTick() - lstAccTime[i];
            lstAccTime[i] = curTick();
      }   
}
void AbstractMemory::access(PacketPtr pkt)
{
      if  (pkt->cmd == MemCmd::SwapReq) {
             std::memcpy(&overwrite_val, pkt->getPtr<uint8_t>(), pkt->getSize());
             std::memcpy(pkt->getPtr<uint8_t>(), hostAddr, pkt->getSize());             
             std::memcpy(hostAddr, &overwrite_val, pkt->getSize());
             readTrace(pkt->getAddr(), pkt->getSize());             
             writeTrace(pkt->getAddr(), pkt->getSize());
      }
      else if (pkt->isRead()) {
             memcpy(pkt->getPtr<uint8_t>(), hostAddr, pkt->getSize());
             readTrace(pkt->getAddr(), pkt->getSize());
      }
      else if (pkt->isWrite()) {
             memcpy(hostAddr, pkt->getPtr<uint8_t>(), pkt->getSize());
             writeTrace(pkt->getAddr(), pkt->getSize());
      }
}
Function for
monitoring
write access 
Function for 
monitoring
read access 
Insert the 
monitoring 
functions in 
memory 
access ports
//abstract_mem.hh
class AbstractMemory : public MemObject
{
      std::map<int, Tick> lstAccTime;
      Stats::Scalar vulTime;
      Stats::Formula vulStore;
      void regStats()
      {
            vulStore = vulTime/simTicks;
      }
}
Variables for 
vulnerable time 
collection
Calculate 
vulnerable 
storage
Figure 5.9: Example code for main memory (DRAM) read and write monitoringChapter 5 Modelling Framework to Optimise Memory System Reliability 113
//cache_impl.hh
void Cache<TagStore>::writeTrace(Addr addr, int size)
{
      for(int i=addr; i<addr+size; i++)
            lstAccTime[i] = curTick();
}
void Cache<TagStore>::readTrace(Addr addr, int size)
{
      for(int i=addr; i<addr+size; i++) {   
            vulTime += curTick() - lstAccTime[i];
            lstAccTime[i] = curTick();
      }   
}
void Cache<TagStore>::satisfyCpuSideRequest(PacketPtr pkt, BlkType *blk)
{
      if  (pkt->cmd == MemCmd::SwapReq) {
             cmpAndSwap(blk, pkt);
             readTrace(blk->blkAddr|(pkt->getAddr()&(blk->size-1)),pkt->getSize());             
             writeTrace(blk->blkAddr|(pkt->getAddr()&(blk->size-1)),pkt->getSize());
      }
      else if (pkt->isRead()) {
             pkt->setDataFromBlock(blk->data, blkSize);
             readTrace(blk->blkAddr|(pkt->getAddr()&(blk->size-1)),pkt->getSize());
      }
      else if (pkt->isWrite()) {
             pkt->writeDataToBlock(blk->data, blkSize);
             blk->status |= BlkDirty;
             writeTrace(blk->blkAddr|(pkt->getAddr()&(blk->size-1)),pkt->getSize());
      }
}
typename Cache<TagStore>::BlkType*
Cache<TagStore>::handleFill(PacketPtr pkt, BlkType *blk)
{
      std::memcpy(blk->data, pkt->getPtr<uint8_t>(), blkSize);
      writeTrace(blk->blkAddr, blkSize);
      return blk;
}
PacketPtr
Cache<TagStore>::writebackBlk(BlkType *blk)
{
      std::memcpy(writeback->getPtr<uint8_t>(), blk->data, blkSize);
      writebackTrace(blk->blkAddr, blkSize);
}
Function for
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write access 
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read access 
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cache access 
ports
//cache.hh
class Cache : public BaseCache
{
      std::map<int, Tick> lstAccTime;
      Stats::Scalar vulTime;
      Stats::Formula vulStore;
      void regStats()
      {
            vulStore = vulTime/simTicks;
      }
}
Variables for 
vulnerable time 
collection
Calculate 
vulnerable 
storage
Figure 5.10: Example code for cache (L1 and L2) read and write monitoring114 Chapter 5 Modelling Framework to Optimise Memory System Reliability
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Figure 5.11: Block diagram of McPAT [178]
simulator. However, the output of GEM5 simulator is not in XML format, thus an
additional Python script is used to convert GEM5 statistics to XML format.
5.2.4 Modelling voltage and frequency scaling
Voltage and frequency scaling (VFS) is an eﬀective low-power design technique, which
is widely used in modern processors. Various high eﬃciency on-chip and oﬀ-chip volt-
age regulators are available to support multiple power domains with diﬀerent supply
voltages [180,181]. The TSMC low power 65nm technology library (used in test chip
implementation in Chapter 4) uses 1.2-V as the nominal supply voltage, so in this work,
it is assumed that the nominal supply voltage is 1.2-V which is reduced to 1-V, 0.85-V
and 0.75-V for voltage scaling and the design is at room temperature. Further scaling
of supply voltage may cause cache memory malfunction [38]; therefore 0.75-V is the
minimum supply voltage chosen for this work. With additional circuitry SRAMs can
be designed to operate under much lower supply voltage [182,183]. This is beyond the
scope of this work as only commercial standard cell library is considered. Table 5.4
shows corresponding processor core operating frequency, soft error rate, dynamic and
leakage power at each supply voltage point, where the value are normalised to nominal
supply voltage of 1.2-V. An empirical model based on the measurements from test chips
(Chapter 4) is used to estimate the relationship between delay and supply voltage. From
the test chip, Figure 5.12.(a) shows measurement results of normalised ring oscillator
frequency under supply voltage scaling, which is used to select clock frequencies at each
supply voltage point, as shown in Table 5.4. The impact of technology and voltage scal-
ing on soft error susceptibility has been studied [111,184], from which the corresponding
soft error rate for each operating voltage is calculated. McPAT is used to parse the
output of architectural simulation for power estimation [178], and the result generated
by McPAT is multiplied by the power scaling ratio from Table 5.4 to incorporate voltage
scaling. Dynamic power is calculated by using the following equation [185]:Chapter 5 Modelling Framework to Optimise Memory System Reliability 115
Table 5.4: Normalised voltage and frequency scaling table
1.2V 1V 0.85V 0.75V
Processor core clock [185] 1 0.5 0.25 0.125
Bit error rate [184] 1 1.7 2.56 3.34
Dynamic power [185] 1 0.347 0.126 0.049
Leakage power [74] 1 0.532 0.328 0.235
(a). Clock frequency scaling (b). Leakage power scaling
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Figure 5.12: (a) Measured clock frequency under supply voltage scaling for
65nm low-power technology library, (b) Measured leakage power under supply
voltage scaling for 65nm low-power technology library at room temperature.
Pdyn ∝ fCV 2 (5.4)
where f is switching activity, C is circuit capacitance and V is supply voltage. The
leakage power scaling ratio is technology-dependent [74]; therefore its calculation needs
an empirical model. Figure 5.12.(b) shows measurements from the same test chips
(Chapter 4) describing the relationship between leakage power and supply voltage, which
is used to determine the leakage power scaling ratio.
In this experiment (Section 5.3) the microprocessor (Figure 5.8) is divided into two power
domains as shown in Figure 5.13: Processor core and L1-cache including instruction
and data caches are located in power domain PD CORE, L2-cache is placed in power
domain PD SOC. DRAM is normally oﬀ-chip but placed in PD SOC for simplicity.
This is because the processor core and L1-cache are usually the most power-hungry
components [186], these are often located physically close to each other on the same die
and shared the same power domain to meet timing at the high speed processor clock
rate.
For comprehensive analysis, hundreds of simulations are needed. Architectural simu-
lation is slow; for example, it may take days to complete a single simulation. GEM5116 Chapter 5 Modelling Framework to Optimise Memory System Reliability
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Figure 5.13: Power domains
is not multi-threaded; however, multiple simulations can be executed in parallel to re-
duce overall simulation time. A Python script is used to run multiple simulations on
Southampton University’s Iridis computer cluster simultaneously.
5.3 Reliability, Performance and Power Analysis
Using the analysis framework developed in Section 5.2, the processors’ reliability, perfor-
mance and power can be analysed. This analysis is used to develop a cost eﬃcient and
reliable design methodology, which is described in Section 5.4. In this section, memory
system reliability is studied using error rate, which is calculated using the Bit Error
Rate (BER) of memory storage cells. BER (deﬁned in Section 5.2.3) varies between
10−7 to 10−12 depending on environment and fabrication process [152,155,160]. The
error rate shown in this section is expressed as a multiplication of vulnerable storage
(N′) and BER (λbit) as described in Equation 5.3. This is because the proposed analysis
framework is not limited to a speciﬁc fabrication process or environment.
Figure 5.14 shows the vulnerable storage of memory components measured across bench-
mark applications. It can be seen that the reliability of each memory component
varies with application. For the Instruction Cache (I-Cache), the highest error rate
is 1.9 × 105λbit in the case of “gsm toast”and the lowest error rate is 1.1 × 104λbit
in the case of “dadpcm”. For the Data Cache (D-Cache), the error rate ranges from
2.4 × 105λbit in the case of “susan smoothing” to 6,500λbit in the case of “bitcount”.
For the L2-cache, the highest error rate is 1.8 × 106λbit when running “patricia”, while
the lowest error rate is 3,000λbit when running “cadpcm”. Similarly for DRAM, the
error rate ranges from 2.3 × 107λbit in the case of “typeset” to 2.2 × 104λbit in the case
of “stringsearch”. Figure 5.15 compares the vulnerable storage of memory components.
The bar shows average error rate, and the error shows the range between minimum and
maximum error rate. The I-Cache has the lowest average and worst case error rate,Chapter 5 Modelling Framework to Optimise Memory System Reliability 117
while main memory (DRAM) has the highest average and worst case error rate. The
spread between the highest and the lowest error rate is around one order of magnitude
for L1-cache and about three orders of magnitude for L2-cache and DRAM. Comparing
worst case reliability, DRAM is the least reliable memory component with worst case
error rate of 2.3×107λbit, followed by L2-cache with worst case error rate of 1.8×106λbit.
This indicates that L2-cache and DRAM are more susceptible to failures in the presence
of soft errors. Furthermore, the reliability of the memory system varies with software
applications. Figure 5.16 shows the cumulative distribution of applications with diﬀer-
ent error rates. The x-axis shows the error rate normalised to worst case error rate,
and the y-axis shows the number of applications. In the case of the I-Cache, three ap-
plications have error rates within 90% of the worst case while most applications have
error rates much lower than the worst case. This spread is even greater for the D-Cache.
For the L2 cache, half of the applications experience less than 10% of worst case error
rate. For DRAM, 23 of applications experience less than 10% of worst case error rate.
For smaller memory sizes, such as L1-cache, the spread is more even because applica-
tions tend to utilise most of the memory space. For larger memory size such as L2
cache and DRAM, applications use only part of the memory space, and the error rate
is more related to the memory usage. Error rate changes signiﬁcantly with application
especially for larger memory such as L2 cache and DRAM. Blanket protection usually
provides over-protection in terms of chip area, performance and power consumption.
Cost eﬀective protection can be achieved through ﬁne grain protection by targeting the
most vulnerable components and most vulnerable applications, this will be discussed in
Section 5.4.
5.3.1 Impact of VFS on reliability, performance and energy
In a processor system, the highest level of performance is not required all the time, so
there are opportunities to save power and energy through VFS when the demand for
performance is reduced. Figure 5.17 shows the power distribution of the processor system
under nominal supply voltage of 1.2V. The power consumption of the processor core and
the L1-cache in power domain PD CORE (Figure 5.13) dominates the system power
consumption, with some variation across applications: the highest is 96% in the case of
“cadpcm” and the lowest is 77% in the case of “typeset”. Therefore applying voltage
and frequency scaling on just the processor core and L1-cache can achieve signiﬁcant
power and energy saving.
Figure 5.18 shows the power reduction when supply voltage is scaled from the nominal
supply voltage of 1.2V. When the supply voltage is 1V the power reduction ranges from
52% for “typeset” to 66% for “susan smoothing”. The average power reduction is 62%
across applications. Further scaling of the supply voltage to 0.85V gives more power
reduction of 85% on average, while the least saving is 75% from “typeset” and the118 Chapter 5 Modelling Framework to Optimise Memory System Reliability
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Figure 5.15: Average, minimum and maximum vulnerable storage of memory
components across applications.
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Figure 5.16: Distribution of memory component error rate for MiBench bench-
mark applications: (a) L1 Instruction Cache (I-Cache), (b) L1 Data Cache
(D-Cache), (c) L2 cache and (d) DRAM. The error rate is normalised to the
worst case error rate of each memory component.
most saving is 88% from “rijndael enc”. When the supply voltage is reduced to 0.75V,
only a small amount of power saving is observed which is 90% on average. For each
application, the eﬀectiveness of VFS on the processor core and L1-cache is aﬀected by
the power distribution of power domains shown in Figure 5.17; more power saving is
observed for the application where power consumption is dominated by the processor
core and L1-cache (PD CORE). Figure 5.19 shows the change of power distribution as
a result of VFS. It can be seen that the percentage of PD CORE power consumption
reduces with supply voltage. At 0.75V the percentage of PD CORE power consumption
is only 56% on average, further power reduction is limited by L2-cache and DRAM power120 Chapter 5 Modelling Framework to Optimise Memory System Reliability
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Figure 5.19: The processor core and L1-cache power consumption as a percent-
age of system power.
consumption.
The performance metric used in this work is Instructions Per Cycle (IPC), and higher
IPC means more work done in one clock cycle. It measures the relative performance or
eﬃciency of the processor core. The speed diﬀerence between L2-cache and L1-cache
aﬀects the performance of the processor core and creates a bottleneck for memory-
intensive applications. Lower processor core clock frequency reduces the diﬀerence in
L2-cache and L1-cache speed, which leads to higher IPC especially for applicationsChapter 5 Modelling Framework to Optimise Memory System Reliability 121
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Figure 5.20: The impact of VFS on performance measured with Instruction Per
Cycle (IPC).
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Figure 5.21: The L1-cache miss latency expressed as percentage of runtime
under VFS.
demanding higher L2 cache bandwidth. Figure 5.20 shows the impact of VFS on the
processor’s IPC. When the supply voltage is reduced from 1.2V to 0.75V and the core
clock frequency is reduced from 1GHz to 125MHz, IPC increases for applications such
as “djpeg”, “lame”, “typeset” and “ispell”. This is because the reduction in speed
diﬀerence between L2-cache and L1-cache reduces the penalty for L1-cache misses as
shown in Figure 5.21, where L1-cache miss latency is expressed as the percentage of
application runtime. Under nominal supply voltage of 1.2V, most applications have less
than 20% of L1-cache miss latency, while applications such as “djpeg”, “lame”, “typeset”
and “ispell” spend more than 40% of their time waiting for data due to L1-cache misses.
For the applications with high L1-cache miss latency, the processor core eﬃciency is
severely aﬀected, however the impact can be reduced by applying VFS on the processor
core and L1-cache, which in turn leads to the increase in processor core eﬃciency.
For an energy-constrained system, minimising energy consumption is an important de-
sign goal, while ensuring that the target performance has been met. Figure 5.22 shows
energy savings achieved through VFS. Energy consumption is the lowest under supply
voltage of 0.85V for all applications and the average energy saving is 50%. The supply122 Chapter 5 Modelling Framework to Optimise Memory System Reliability
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Figure 5.22: Energy reduction through VFS when compared with nominal sup-
ply voltage of 1.2V.
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Figure 5.23: The impact of voltage and frequency scaling on L1-cache reliability.
voltage for the second lowest energy consumption varies across applications. Computa-
tional intensive applications with high IPC (Figure 5.20) have lower energy consump-
tion at 0.75V than at 1V, such applications are “bitcout”, “susan smoothing”, “djpeg”,
“rijndael enc”, “rijndael dec”, “sha”, “cadpcm” and “dadpcm”. All the remaining ap-
plications have higher energy consumption at 0.75V than at 1V.
Voltage and frequency scaling is eﬀective in reducing power consumption and minimum
energy consumption is possible through careful selection of supply voltage. However,
reduced supply voltage also causes reliability problems as it lowers critical charge of the
memory storage. Figure 5.23 shows, using logarithmic scaling, that the error rate in
L1-cache increases across applications when the supply voltage is lowered, due to VFS
on Processor core and L1-cache. L1-cache resizing is proposed to mitigate the negative
impact of VFS on reliability, which is described in Section 5.4.
5.4 Cost Eﬀective Reliable Design Methodology
There are three important observations from Section 5.3:Chapter 5 Modelling Framework to Optimise Memory System Reliability 123
1. L1-cache has the lowest worst case error rate followed by L2-cache and DRAM has
the highest worst case error rate (Figure 5.15). This is because data are mainly
stored in a larger memory component, especially for applications with a bigger
data set.
2. The error rate varies signiﬁcantly with application depending on its memory access
pattern. The diﬀerence in error rate across applications is 2-3 orders of magnitude
in L2 cache and DRAM (Figure 5.14).
3. Voltage and frequency scaling can achieve signiﬁcant energy reduction but relia-
bility is also reduced due to reduction in critical charge of storage nodes.
These three observations are exploited to develop a cost-eﬀective reliable design method,
which is shown in Figure 5.24. The right hand side of the ﬁgure shows a conventional
design implementation ﬂow in three stages: ﬁrstly, in the design stage, the processor
architecture and system conﬁguration is based on speciﬁcations; secondly, in the imple-
mentation stage, the processor components are synthesised and integrated; and ﬁnally,
software programs are loaded into the hardware system for execution. The proposed
methodology is shown in the left hand side of this ﬁgure. The design of the processor
system and target software applications are inputs to this framework, which incorporates
reliability, performance and power analysis (RPPA) (Figure 5.3). The RPPA framework
generates worst case reliability metrics of memory components. For each memory com-
ponent, if the worst case reliability is lower than the requirement, hardware redundancy
is inserted during the synthesis stage. The RPPA framework also generates application
reliability, performance and power proﬁle (RPPP), which can be used for dynamic pro-
tection during runtime by enabling a protection circuit only when it is needed. This
section ﬁrst describes how cache resizing can be used to improve reliability and sec-
ondly, it shows a case study to demonstrate joint optimisation of energy, performance
and reliability.
5.4.1 Improve L1-cache Reliability through Resizing
In low power designs, the processor core and L1-cache are often subjected to voltage
and frequency scaling (Section 5.2.4), which reduces L1-cache reliability (Section 5.3.1).
ECC protection is a popular solution for improving memory reliability; however it is not
usually a chosen solution for L1-cache because the overhead of additional delay impacts
on the critical need for low latency. L1-cache resizing is proposed to reduce the error
rate under reduced supply voltage without signiﬁcant impact on performance and energy
consumption. Figure 5.25 shows how cache resizing reduces L1-cache error rate while
slightly increasing L2 cache error rate. Figure 5.25.(a) shows that the L1-cache error
rate is almost halved when reducing the cache size by half. For example when cache
size reduces from 32kB to 1kB, error rate reduces from 2.1×105λbit to 8000λbit at 1.2V124 Chapter 5 Modelling Framework to Optimise Memory System Reliability
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Figure 5.24: Cost eﬀective and reliable processor system design ﬂow.
and from 7.0 × 105λbit to 2.7 × 104λbit at 0.75V. Figure 5.25.(b) shows the increment
in L2 cache error rate is less than the reduction in L1-cache error rate, this is because
the storage cells of L1-cache under supply voltage scaling is less reliable than that of L2
cache and vulnerable data is moved from L1-cache to L2 cache. It can also be observed
that, even under nominal supply voltage settings, the increase in L2 cache error rate is
slightly less than the reduction in L1-cache error rate, which is explained next.
It was shown that memory error rate is proportional to the data vulnerable time (Equa-
tion 5.2 and Equation 5.3). Figure 5.26 shows the impacts of L1-cache resizing on data
vulnerable time in both L1-cache and L2 cache. In the context of cache memory, a
cache line marked as clean means the stored data has not been modiﬁed and a cache
line marked as dirty means the data has been modiﬁed by processor core. Figure 5.26.(a)
shows when data is clean, data vulnerable time is duplicated on both L1 and L2 cache.
When the cache line needs to be replaced, it simply evacuates the data from L1-cache.
Therefore L1-cache vulnerable time reduces and L2 cache vulnerable time stays the same.
Figure 5.26.(b) shows that in the case of dirty data, dirty cache line replacement triggers
a write-back, which moves the vulnerable time from L1-cache to L2 cache. Therefore
the reduction of L1-cache vulnerable time increases the vulnerable time of L2 cache.Chapter 5 Modelling Framework to Optimise Memory System Reliability 125
Figure 5.27 shows that L1-cache resizing has a signiﬁcant impact on performance under
nominal supply voltage (1.2V), but voltage and frequency scaling on the processor core
(including L1-cache) reduces the impact of L1-cache resizing on the processor core per-
formance. This is because the impact of L1-cache miss latency reduces with the supply
voltage as shown in Figure 5.21.
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Figure 5.25: L1-cache resizing impact on (a) L1-cache reliability and (b) L2
cache reliability.
Figure 5.28 shows the impact of L1-cache resizing on reliability, performance and energy
for diﬀerent benchmark application at 0.85V supply voltage, which is the most energy
eﬃcient operating voltage (Figure 5.22) in this simulation setup. L1-cache conﬁgurations
are chosen for demonstration purposes. Figure 5.28.(a) shows the the eﬀect of L1-
cache resizing on L1-cache reliability. When L1-cache size is reduced from 32kB to
8kB, there is up to 7x error rate reduction in the case of “patrica”, and the average
error reduction is 3x. When L1-cache size is reduced from 32kB to 1kB, the error rate
reduction is up to 100x in the case of “rijndael dec” and the average reduction in error
rate is 30x. Figure 5.28.(b) shows the eﬀect of L1-cache resizing on the performance
of the processor core. When L1-cache size is reduced from 32kB to 8kB there is some
reduction in performance for 13 applications; however 11 applications exhibit negligible
reduction in performance. When L1-cache size is reduced from 32kB to 1kB the impact126 Chapter 5 Modelling Framework to Optimise Memory System Reliability
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Figure 5.26: The impact of L1-cache resizing on vulnerable time.
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Figure 5.27: The impact of L1-cache resizing on performance.
on performance is higher, but for 5 applications this impact is still negligible. As can
be seen, 1kB of L1-cache is not suﬃcient and 8kB of L1-cache is a better choice for
most applications to maintain processor performance under reduced processor core clock
speed. The impact of L1-cache resizing on performance also depends on the supply
voltage. At 1.2V nominal supply voltage, the clock frequency of the processor core
is 1GHz, the L1-cache latency is 1ns and L2-cache latency is 8ns, and the processor
core needs to wait on average 8 clock cycles for each L1-cache miss. When the supply
voltage of a processor core (including L1-cache) is reduced to 0.85V, clock frequencyChapter 5 Modelling Framework to Optimise Memory System Reliability 127
of the processor core must be 250-MHz, the L1-cache latency increases to 4ns and L2-
cache latency stays at 8ns. Each L1-cache miss requires only two clock cycles. The
impact of L1-cache miss on performance is reduced so smaller cache size does not cause
signiﬁcant performance loss. Figure 5.28.(c) shows the eﬀect of L1-cache resizing on
energy consumption. When L1-cache size is reduced from 32kB to 8kB the impact on
energy consumption is small (up to 13%); this is because L1-cache resizing has little
impact on both performance and power consumption at 0.85V supply voltage. However
when the L1-cache size is reduced to 1kB, the energy consumption increases signiﬁcantly
(up to 60%). When voltage scaling is used on the processor core, L1-cache resizing has
little impact on performance and energy consumption for some applications. This is
because the penalty of L1-cache miss is relatively lower when the diﬀerence in speed
is reduced. At the same time reducing L1-cache size can increase its reliability and
mitigate the negative impact on reliability due to voltage scaling.
Figure 5.29 shows L1-cache resizing can be used together with voltage and frequency
scaling to reduce the energy consumption while maintaining reliability. Figure 5.29.(a)
shows energy consumption of a system when subjected to VFS and L1-cache resizing.
As observed earlier, VFS is eﬀective in reducing energy consumption for all applications.
When L1-cache resizing is used, energy consumption increases slightly; however when
combined with VFS, energy reduction is on average at about 50%. Figure 5.29.(b) shows
reliability of L1-cache under VFS and L1-cache resizing. VFS has a negative impact on
reliability of L1-cache, but with L1-cache resizing this reliability is restored for most
applications.
5.4.2 Energy Minimization through Dynamic ECC Protection and Cache
Resizing
This section demonstrates the beneﬁt of using the proposed methodology (dynamic
ECC protection and cache resizing) for reliability and performance-constrained designs
in terms of energy savings. It was shown in Section 5.3 that DRAM is the least reliable
memory component followed by L2 cache. Therefore we assume that the ECC code
used for DRAM is stronger than L2 cache. For demonstration purposes, DECTED
code with 50% energy overhead is used for DRAM and SECDEC code with 25% energy
overhead is used for L2 cache, the energy overhead is derived from Figure 5.1. L1-
cache is protected by resizing as discussed in Section 5.4.1. Figure 5.30 shows the
reliability and performance constrained energy optimisation algorithm by using dynamic
protection, cache resizing, voltage and frequency scaling. As can be seen the inputs are:
Reliability, Performance and Power Proﬁle (RPPP), Dynamic Timing Constrains (DTC)
and Dynamic Reliability Constrains (DRC). It is assumed that the dynamic timing
and reliability constraints does not exceed the design time constraints. The RPPP is
generated by the analysis framework (Figure 5.3) for each application under diﬀerent128 Chapter 5 Modelling Framework to Optimise Memory System Reliability
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reliability.
supply voltage and L1-cache size. Some example RPPP used in this case study are
shown in Figure 5.31. The algorithm begins by setting the supply voltage to 1.2V, and
checks whether the processor meets the timing constraint. The reliability of L1-cache is
checked next and L1-cache size is reduced until L1-cache passes the reliability constraint.
The example implementation of the optimisation algorithm is described in Appendix E.
Similarly, reliability of L2-cache and DRAM is checked against reliability constraints. If
it fails, dynamic ECC protection is enabled by setting L2EccEn = 1 and dramEccEn =
1 for L2 cache and DRAM respectively. The ECC energy cost is added to the overall
energy. If the energy cost is minimum, then the current conﬁguration is stored. Note
that at this point, processor timing constraint is checked again because cache resizing
may eﬀect processor performance. This is followed by reducing the supply voltage and
this process is repeated (line 2 to line 20) until the most energy eﬃcient operating point
is found. Figure 5.32 shows the example of joint optimisation for application “lame”.
Supply voltage and L1-cache size inﬂuences runtime (x-axis), L1-cache error rate (y-axis)130 Chapter 5 Modelling Framework to Optimise Memory System Reliability
Input: Reliability, Performance and Power proﬁle, Dynamic Timing Constrain (DTC),
Dynamic Reliability Constraint (DRC)
Output: Minimum Energy (minEnergy), Supply Voltage (vdd), L1-cache size (L1Size),
L2 ECC enable (L2EccEn), DRAM ECC enable (dramEccEn)
1: supply voltage = nominal supply voltage
2: while processor pass DTC check do
3: while L1-cache fails DRC check do
4: reduce L1-cache size
// Ensures L1-cache satisﬁes reliability constraint
5: end while
6: if L2 cache fails DRC check then
7: L2EccEn = 1
8: Energy = Energy + L2 cache ECC energy
9: end if
10: if DRAM fails DRC check then
11: dramEccEn = 1
12: Energy = Energy + DRAM ECC energy
13: end if
14: if Energy < minEnergy AND processor pass DTC check then
15: minEnergy = Energy
16: L1Size = current L1-cache size
17: vdd = current supply voltage
// Store the conﬁguration with minimum energy consumption while meeting
timing and reliability constraints
18: end if
19: reduce supply voltage
20: end while
21: return cSize, vdd, L2EccEn, dramEccEn
Figure 5.30: Reliability and performance constrained energy optimisation algo-
rithm.
and energy consumption (color coded). The rectangle deﬁnes the region of timing and
reliability constrains, the conﬁguration with the lowest energy consumption is selected
inside the constraints rectangle (darker color represents lower energy consumption).
The proposed methodology can optimise the power and energy consumption for a re-
liability constrained processor system. Lowering the supply voltage of processor core
and L1-cache reduces both the power consumption and reliability. L1-cache resizing
is proposed to mitigate the impact of VFS on L1-cache reliability and dynamic ECC
protection is used on L2-cache and DRAM to further reduce energy consumption. Ta-
ble 5.5 shows under the reliability constraint of 2.5×105λbit, the energy saving achieved
by using both L1-cache resizing and dynamic protection of L2-cache and DRAM. The
ﬁrst column shows the benchmark application; the second main column shows mini-
mum energy consumption under VFS and its corresponding supply voltage which was
limited by reliability constraints; the third main column shows the minimum energy
consumption under VFS when L1-cache resizing and dynamic ECC protection are usedChapter 5 Modelling Framework to Optimise Memory System Reliability 131
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Table 5.5: Energy saving by combining VFS, L1-cache resizing and dynamic
protection under memory components reliability constraint of 2.5×105λbit, the
constraint is chosen for demonstration purposes
VFS VFS, L1-cache resizing,
dynamic protection
Vdd Energy Vdd L1 ECC Energy
Application (V) (J) (V) (kB) L2 DRAM (J) saving
basicmath 0.85v 1.696 0.85v 32kB 0 0 1.568 7.5%
bitcount 0.85v 0.376 0.85v 1kB 0 0 0.342 9.0%
qsort 1.2v 0.292 0.85v 16kB 1 1 0.202 31.1%
susan corners 1.2v 0.020 0.85v 4kB 1 1 0.013 34.5%
susan edges 1v 0.039 0.85v 8kB 1 1 0.035 10.4%
susan smoothing 1.2v 0.229 0.85v 8kB 1 0 0.135 40.9%
djpeg 1v 0.015 0.85v 16kB 1 0 0.012 19.0%
cjpeg 0.85v 0.056 0.85v 32kB 1 1 0.056 0.0%
lame 1.2v 0.951 0.85v 16kB 1 1 0.648 31.9%
typeset 1.2v 0.421 0.85v 16kB 1 1 0.345 18.1%
dijkstra 1.2v 0.159 0.85v 8kB 1 0 0.111 30.4%
patricia 1.2v 0.596 0.85v 16kB 1 1 0.474 20.4%
ispell 1.2v 0.803 0.85v 16kB 1 1 0.606 24.6%
rsynth 1.2v 1.696 0.85v 8kB 1 1 1.252 26.2%
stringsearch 0.85v 0.003 0.85v 16kB 0 0 0.003 7.1%
rijndael enc 1v 0.281 0.85v 16kB 0 0 0.230 18.3%
rijndael dec 1v 0.271 0.85v 8kB 0 0 0.232 14.3%
sha 0.85v 0.063 0.85v 2kB 0 0 0.058 8.3%
crc 1v 1.580 1v 2kB 0 0 1.445 8.5%
ﬀt 1.2v 0.421 0.85v 16kB 1 1 0.311 26.2%
iﬀt 1.2v 0.232 0.85v 16kB 1 1 0.173 25.6%
cadpcm 0.85v 0.362 0.85v 4kB 0 0 0.332 8.1%
dadpcm 0.85v 0.259 0.85v 4kB 0 0 0.239 8.0%
gsm toast 1.2v 0.880 0.85v 16kB 0 0 0.588 33.2%
to improve the reliability of cache memory which allows the processor to operate un-
der a more energy eﬃcient supply voltage point; and the last column shows the energy
saving in percentage terms. For some applications, supply voltage scaling is limited by
the reliability constraints of L1-cache, which is shown in the second column. L1-cache
resizing mitigates the impact of VFS on reliability; thus for all applications the supply
voltage for minimum energy consumption can be used as shown in the fourth column.
The 6th and 7th columns show the enable signals for ECC protection of L2-cache and
DRAM: ‘1’ means enabling and ‘0’ means disabling protection. It shows that L2 cache
and DRAM ECC protection are only enabled in the applications where their reliabil-
ity is lower than 2.5 × 105λbit. Comparing to the processor system with only VFS,
the proposed methodology achieves energy saving for most applications under reliability
constraint. The average saving is 19% and the maximum saving is 40% .Chapter 5 Modelling Framework to Optimise Memory System Reliability 133
5.5 Concluding Remarks
The reliability of memory systems is critical for the correct operation of processors as
memory occupies most of the chip area, which is increasingly susceptible to soft errors as
transistor size scaling reduces critical charge and increases device density. Furthermore
low power techniques such as voltage and frequency scaling exacerbate the problems.
ECC protection requires hardware redundancy and consumes energy, and blanket protec-
tion can be costly especially for energy sensitive designs. Therefore accurate estimation
of memory reliability with targeted protection is needed.
This chapter demonstrates an analysis framework that supports co-optimisation of pro-
cessor’s performance, energy and reliability. Through the analysis of memory system
reliability, it was shown that the L1-cache is the most reliable memory component follow
by the L2 cache, and DRAM is the least reliable memory component. A cost eﬀective
reliable design methodology is proposed to help hardware redundancy insertion and dy-
namic ECC protection against soft error. The impact of voltage scaling on memory
system reliability has also been studied. L1-cache resizing was proposed to mitigate
the impact of voltage and frequency scaling on memory reliability, which itself has little
impact on performance and energy consumption under reduced supply voltage. A relia-
bility aware joint optimisation ﬂow utilizing both dynamic ECC protection and L1-cache
resizing has been proposed for energy minimisation. Finally, it has been demonstrated
through joint optimisation examples that, energy reduction can be achieved for most
applications in a reliability-constrained design.Chapter 6
Conclusion and Future Work
With technology scaling, leakage and dynamic power reduction techniques continue to
evolve as power minimization is an essential part of modern electronic system design.
Power gating and voltage scaling are two popular power reduction techniques, which
are eﬀective in reducing power consumption but exacerbate reliability problems. The
contributions presented in this thesis provided novel and cost eﬀective techniques to
improve the reliability of storage elements of modern low power electronic systems, in-
cluding processor registers and memory systems, which not only constitute up to 70%
of total silicon area but play a central role in reducing power consumption. These tech-
niques have been implemented using standard EDA tools and validated on commercial
low power processors. The contributions are summarised in the next section followed by
proposed future work.
6.1 Thesis Contributions
All the objectives of this thesis are listed in Chapter 2, Section 2.6. The ﬁrst objective
is achieved by studying register designs and technology:
1. An in-depth analysis of critical charge of ﬂip-ﬂop register storage node was given
in Chapter 2, Section 2.3. The eﬀect of supply voltage scaling on critical charge of
ﬂip-ﬂops in the presence of process variation was investigated through SPICE sim-
ulations using 45-nm CMOS technology with 0.9-V nominal supply voltage setting.
It was found that the critical charge of the ﬂip-ﬂops reduces with the reduction
in supply voltage and it further deteriorates due to the eﬀect of process varia-
tion. These results demonstrated that the critical charge of ﬂip-ﬂops is negatively
aﬀected not only because of reduction in supply voltage but also due to process
variation. Therefore supply voltage scaling and process variation can signiﬁcantly
increase transient error rate.
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2. Chapter 4, Section 4.1 presented an analysis based on measurement results from
a total of 82 test chips, which were used to characterise state integrity challenges
due to voltage and temperature variations, for the baseline silicon process and its
inherent variability. It was shown that even at 25◦C, the state integrity of ﬂip-
ﬂops is aﬀected by process variation leading to spread measurement of First Failure
Voltage (FFV), from 245-mV to 315-mV, with 79% of total dies exhibiting single
bit failure at FFV, while the rest showing multi-bit failure at FFV. Furthermore,
at elevated temperatures the variation is even more pronounced. It was found that
FFV increases by up to 30-mV with increase in temperature from 25◦C to 79◦C.
The eﬀect of process variation with geometry scaling has also been studied using
a 45-nm technology node through Monte-Carlo simulation; when compared with
65-nm technology, it was found that the overall distribution trend remained the
same, however the mean FFV moved to a higher voltage. An important observation
from these results was that using a ﬁxed state retention voltage across all dies is
sub-optimal because it fails to minimise the leakage power of all dies during sleep
mode.
The second objective is achieved by the following:
1. Chapter 3, Section 3.1 presented a technique to mitigate the impact of power
gating and supply voltage scaling on the reliability of embedded processors. The
proposed technique is eﬀective because it uses two methods of error recovery. The
ﬁrst method of error recovery is through hardware implementation of Hamming
code that is capable of 1-bit error correction per codeword; to recover multi-bit
(clustered) errors, it employs hardware implementation of CRC for error detection
and software state recovery to restore the last known good states of the design.
The proposed technique is low-cost because it reuses scan chains that are used
in manufacturing test and it is energy eﬃcient because it partitions scan chains
to minimise the time needed for state monitoring and recovery. It was shown
that the hardware-based Hamming error correction improved system reliability by
more than 2 order of magnitude compared to a design without error protection,
when considering maximum soft error rate observed at normal operating conditions
(<= 10?7 errors per bit-hour). The system failure rate increases signiﬁcantly at
higher bit error rate (> 10?7 errors per bit-hour) and in the case of clustered errors.
For such a high failure rate, a software state recovery method is used for eﬃcient
state recovery.
2. An important ﬁnding from the analysis in Chapter 4, Section 4.1 is that using
a ﬁxed state retention voltage across all dies is sub-optimal because it fails to
minimise the leakage power of all dies during sleep mode. To minimise leakage
power while ensuring state integrity, minimum retention voltage (MRV) of each
individual die should be characterised. Chapter 4 Section 4.2 presented an eﬀectiveChapter 6 Conclusion and Future Work 137
technique to improve the minimum retention power and state-integrity of voltage
scaled ﬂip-ﬂops under process, voltage and temperature variation. The proposed
technique consists of the following two steps. Firstly, a characterisation algorithm
is used to determine MRV of a given die, as it varies due to process variation.
The characterisation step of a die is an oﬄine process and is performed only once
per die. Secondly, a control ﬂow for error detection and single-bit error correction
is proposed, which relies on horizontal and vertical parity; whenever an error is
detected, it raises the characterised minimum retention voltage to reduce subse-
quent error possibility. The prototype of the proposed control ﬂow is implemented
in a host computer using a script written in Python, which provides voltage scal-
ing by controlling the test chip through an external power supply. Silicon results
show that at characterised MRV, the ﬂip-ﬂop state integrity is preserved, while
achieving up to 17.6% reduction in retention voltage across 82-dies.
3. The reliability of memory system hierarchy is critical for the correct operation of
processors as memory occupies most of the chip area, which is increasingly suscep-
tible to soft errors as transistor size scaling reduces critical charge and increases
device density. Furthermore, low power techniques such as voltage and frequency
scaling exacerbate the problem by reducing critical charge. ECC protection re-
quires hardware redundancy and consumes energy, and blanket protection can be
costly particularly for energy conscious designs. Therefore accurate estimation of
memory reliability with targeted protection is needed. Chapter 5 described an
architectural simulation-based framework, which enables joint analysis of reliabil-
ity, performance and energy consumption of embedded processor memory systems.
Through this analysis, a cost eﬀective reliable design methodology is proposed to
guide hardware redundancy insertion and dynamic ECC protection against soft
error. Level 1 cache resizing is proposed to mitigate the impact of voltage and
frequency scaling on reliability, which itself has little impact on performance and
energy consumption under reduced supply voltage. A joint ﬂow optimisation ap-
proach to reliability aware is proposed for energy minimization which utilizes both
dynamic ECC protection and L1 cache resizing. It is demonstrated through the
joint optimisation examples that energy reduction can be achieved for most appli-
cations in a reliability constrained design.
The third objective is achieved by the following:
1. The technique presented in Chapter 3, Section 3.1 was validated through two case
studies. The ﬁrst case study used FPGA implementation of a register-rich FIFO
design and it was shown that hardware based implementation of Hamming code is
capable of eﬀective multiple bit error detection and single bit error recovery. The
second case study implemented the complete solution (Hardware and Software
based recovery) applied to an industry standard embedded microprocessor ARM138 Chapter 6 Conclusion and Future Work
Cortex-M0, and it was validated on an FPGA and further synthesised using 65-nm
technology library and Synopsys EDA tool.
2. Using 65-nm test chip implementation, Chapter 4, Section 4.4 described two ex-
periments conducted to demonstrate improved state integrity of ﬂip-ﬂops with
aggressive supply voltage scaling that is possible through the technique presented
in Chapter 4, Section 4.2. The ﬁrst experiment demonstrates improved state in-
tegrity of ﬂip-ﬂops in “sleep state”, and the second experiment demonstrates the
eﬀect of aggressive supply voltage scaling on leakage power savings. Silicon results
show that at characterised MRV, the ﬂip-ﬂop state integrity is preserved, while
achieving up to 17.6% reduction in retention voltage across 82-dies.
The ﬁnal objective is achieved by the following:
1. The technique presented in Chapter 3, Section 3.1 can be incorporated into the
existing power gating and voltage scaling design synthesis ﬂow which was described
in Chapter 3, Sections 3.1.2 and 3.1.3.
2. The technique presented in Chapter 4, Section 4.2 can be incorporated in conven-
tional design synthesis ﬂow. Chapter 4, Section 4.2.3 described an additional step
needed to automate the insertion of horizontal and vertical parity logics
These three contributions presented in this thesis provide novel, relevant and cost-
eﬀective reliability solutions for diﬀerent types of storage elements that are widely used
in low power designs including register ﬁles and memory systems. The conclusions drawn
in this thesis are supported by extensive analysis using state-of-the-art EDA tools, in-
house software speciﬁcally developed to generate realistic data and workloads, FPGA
implementation of commercial low power embedded processors and measured results
from fabricated chip designs to meet the last objective of this thesis. It is hoped that
the low cost and eﬀective reliability solutions proposed in this thesis will make useful
contributions towards the development of future low-power design methods and EDA
tools.
6.2 Future Work Directions
Based on the research presented in this thesis, a number of directions for future studies
have been identiﬁed and are outlined in the following:Chapter 6 Conclusion and Future Work 139
6.2.1 Improving Reliability of Power Management Hardware
In Chapter 3, the concept of on-chip reuse is introduced to provide resilience to energy-
eﬃcient embedded processors at low-cost (area, energy) and with little impact on func-
tional performance. Further research could be conducted to investigate and develop a
low-cost, on-line soft-error monitoring and correction method and its associated imple-
mentation circuitry for power management hardware. Power controllers, state retention
registers and isolation cells are more vulnerable to soft errors than other power manage-
ment hardware and therefore more emphasis will be given to these power management
components. Currently, there are no reported on-line soft-error monitoring and cor-
rection methods for power management hardware; making it impossible to isolate and
correct errors and leaving them vulnerable during operation. Special consideration will
be given to the concept of on-chip reuse to reduce the implementation cost (area and
energy) of on-line soft error monitoring. A good starting point to achieve this is reusing
the circuitry of built-in self-test (traditionally used for permanent manufacturing defects
testing) consisting of pattern generators and comparators for on-line test error-detection.
In this way it may be possible to lower the implementation cost of protecting the power
management hardware from soft errors. For error correction, the use of error correction
codes and software state recovery will be investigated, thereby providing an eﬀective
and low-cost on-line monitoring and correction method. The contributions described in
Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 of this thesis will be the starting point for this work.
6.2.2 Reliability Enhancement of Multi-core Processors through
Hardware-Software Co-design
Balancing trade-oﬀs between performance, energy consumption and reliability is essen-
tial for embedded processors. In Chapter 5, a joint optimisation technique was proposed
to minimise energy consumption while meeting reliability constraint for a single-core
embedded processor. For multi-core embedded processors, energy minimization can be
achieved through careful scheduling, whilst reliability can be improved through mon-
itoring and targeted protection. By combining scheduling, reliability monitoring and
targeted protection, further energy reduction can be achieved within the performance
and reliability constraints. Analysis framework for multi-core processors similar to the
one reported in Chapter 5 is required for hardware-software design space exploration
and investigating various scheduling algorithms and reliability monitoring techniques.
This thesis focused on improving reliability of processors against transient errors. Per-
manent faults due to various ageing eﬀects as shown in Figure 6.1 can cause digital
circuits to malfunction prematurely. In addition to soft errors, further research could be
conducted to develop techniques for predicting and detecting faults occurrence due to
ageing eﬀect with the aim of slowing down the ageing process; as an example, placing140 Chapter 6 Conclusion and Future Work
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Figure 6.1: Various Aging Eﬀects
processor cores in recovery mode when they are not in use and balancing work-loads
across various processor cores. To achieve this, statistical analysis, similar to the one
reported in Chapter 5 Section 5.3 is required to understand the work-load distribution
and low cost circuitry or design techniques that are required for work-load balancing.Appendix A
Low Power Embedded Processors
This appendix gives an overview of the ARM Cortex-M0 microprocessor used in Chap-
ter 3 and 4. In Chapter 3, it was used as a case study to validate the proposed state
monitoring and recovery technique. In Chapter 4, it was implemented in test chips to
provide state monitoring for PVT aware state protection techniques. The content of
this section is gathered from the ARM Cortex-M0 Technical Reference Manual [187].
Embedded processors are designed to perform some speciﬁc functions and it is embed-
ded in a integrated system that often includes electronics and mechanical parts. Low
power and high energy eﬃciency are the key design parameters for embedded proces-
sors. In lower power embedded processors, processors can be powered oﬀ when it is
idle. ARM Cortex-M0 (CM0) is a modern energy-eﬃcient ARM microprocessor, which
is used in many low power embedded applications such as medical devices, e-metering,
power and motor control [150]. The processor uses Thumb-2 instruction set, which is
the extension of 16-bit Thumb instruction by adding some 32-bit instructions to achieve
balance between code density and performance. It achieve energy eﬃciency while im-
prove performance over 8-bit micro-controllers, the throughput is 3x better than the
Texas Instruments MSP430 and 2x better than the Microchip PIC24 [188].
Figure A.1 shows the block diagram of CM0 processor [187]. The essential units of
the processor are processor core, Nested Vector Interrupt Controller (NVIC) and bus
matrix. The processor core is based on the ARMv6-MTM architecture with 3 stages
pipeline including instruction fetch, instruction decode and excution. The processor core
consist of a register bank, a ALU, a datapath and control logics. In the register bank,
there are 12 general purpose registers, a stack pointer, a link register and a program
counter. In addition, there are special purpose registers: program status register contains
the programs information in terms of application, interrupt and execution. Control
registers controls the stack used when processor is in thread mode. The ALU is made
of integer adder and optional single cycle hardware multiplier (without it multiplication
is done using software emulation). The NVIC can be conﬁgured to handle upto 32
interrupt requests with conﬁgurable priority system, in addition to a non-maskable NMI
interrupt. The purpose of NMI interrupt controller is to handle nested interrupts and
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Figure A.2: ARM Cortex-M0 based embedded processor system block diagram.
ensure the correct excutions of Interrupt Searvice Routines (ISR). In this work, this
interrupt controller is used to handle the wake-up request (Chatper 3 Section 3.3) and
error detection event (Chatper 4 Section 4.2.2). CM0 uses Von Neumann architecture,
therefore the bus matrix has a uniﬁed 32-bit bus for both instruction and data. The bus
interface uses Advanced Microcontroller Bus Architecture AHB-Lite speciﬁcation.
Figure A.2 shows the example implementation a lower power embedded processor system
based on the ARM Cortex-M0 processor. The processor core is connected to both ROM
and SRAM controller through the AHB-Lite bus. In lower power embedded processors
system, processor core can be powered oﬀ when it is idle. The power controller and
interrupt controller are used to control the power cycles of the processor core. The
General Purpose Input and Output (GPIO) and the Universal Asynchronous Receiver
and Transmitter (UART) are connected to processor core through the APB bus to
provide communication to workstation.Appendix B
Embedded Processor Power
Domain Description
This appendix describes the power domain arrangement for Cortex-M0 low power em-
bedded processor implementation in Chapter 3, whose graphical representation is shown
in Chapter 3, Figure 3.19. The power domain is described in universal power format
(UPF). Three power domains are created: TOP PD, CORE PD and SMRB PD. Pro-
cessor core is located in CORE PD, which can be power down during sleep mode. State
Monitoring and Recovery Block (SMRB) is located in SMRB PD, which is only powered
when encoding before sleep mode and decoding after sleep mode. The rest of processor
system is placed in TOP PD that is kept always-on. The UPF description is divided
into the following parts:
1. Power Domains: creates power domains.
2. Power Supply Nets: creates power supply nets.
3. Assign Primary Power Supply Nets to Power Domains.
4. Power Switches: creates power switches and connecting them to supply rails and
control signals.
5. Isolation Strategy: creates signal isolations across power domains to prevent the
prorogation of ﬂoating signals from the power downed block.
6. State Retention: Instructs synthesis tool to create state retention enabled ﬂip-ﬂops,
and connecting them to state preserving supply rails and control signals
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#--------------------------------------------------------------
# System Power Domain Description Using UPF
#--------------------------------------------------------------
# Part 1: Power Domains
create_power_domain TOP_PD
create_power_domain CORE_PD -elements {MINISWIFT}
create_power_domain SMRB_PD -elements {SMRB}
# Part 2: Power Supply Nets
create_supply_port PAD_VDD
create_supply_net VDD -domain TOP_PD
create_supply_net VDD -domain CORE_PD -reuse
connect_supply_net VDD -ports PAD_VDD
create_supply_port PAD_VSS
create_supply_net VSS -domain TOP_PD
create_supply_net VSS -domain CORE_PD -reuse
connect_supply_net VSS -ports PAD_VSS
create_supply_net CORE_VDD -domain CORE_PD
create_supply_net SMRB_VDD -domain SMRB_PD
# Part 3: Assign Primary Power Supply Nets to Power Domains
set_domain_supply_net TOP_PD \
-primary_power_net VDD \
-primary_ground_net VSS
set_domain_supply_net CORE_PD \
-primary_power_net CORE_VDD \
-primary_ground_net VSS
set_domain_supply_net SMRB_PD \
-primary_power_net SMRB_VDD \
-primary_ground_net VSS
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create_power_switch core_switch -domain CORE_PD \
-input_supply_port {VDD VDD} \
-output_supply_port {CORE_VDD CORE_VDD} \
-control_port {power pg_ctrl/core_power} \
-on_state {on_state VDD {core_power}} \
-off_state {off_state {!core_power}}
create_power_switch smrb_switch -domain SMRB_PD \
-input_supply_port {VDD VDD} \
-output_supply_port {SMRB_VDD SMRB_VDD} \
-control_port {power pg_ctrl/smrb_power} \
-on_state {on_state VDD {smrb_power}} \
-off_state {off_state {!smrb_power}}
# Part 5: Isolation Strategy
set_isolation core_iso -domain CORE_PD \
-isolation_power_net VDD \
-isolation_ground_net VSS \
-clamp_value 0 \
-applies_to outputs
set_isolation_control core_iso -domain CORE_PD \
-isolation_signal pg_ctrl/core_nclamp \
-isolation_sense low \
-location self
set_isolation smrb_iso -domain SMRB_PD \
-isolation_power_net VDD \
-isolation_ground_net VSS \
-clamp_value 0 \
-applies_to outputs
set_isolation_control smrb_iso -domain SMRB_PD \
-isolation_signal pg_ctrl/smrb_nclamp \
-isolation_sense low \
-location self
# Part 6: State Retention
set_retention core_ret -domain CORE_PD \146 Appendix B Embedded Processor Power Domain Description
-retention_power_net VDD \
-retention_ground_net VSS
set_retention_control core_ret -domain CORE_PD \
-save_signal {pg_ctrl/core_retain high} \
-restore_signal {pg_ctrl/core_retain low}
set_retention smrb_ret -domain SMRB_PD \
-retention_power_net VDD \
-retention_ground_net VSS
set_retention_control smrb_ret -domain SMRB_PD \
-save_signal {pg_ctrl/smrb_retain high} \
-restore_signal {pg_ctrl/smrb_retain low}Appendix C
Firmware For Software Recovery
This appendix describes the software recovery ﬁrmware used in Chapter 3, Section ??.
There are two main functions: Function save state() is used to save architectural states
before going to sleep mode, and Function restore state() is used to restore the original
architectural states if state corruption is detected during sleep mode. The test function
main() is an inﬁnite loop with the following steps:
1. Processor operates in normal functional mode.
2. Before going to sleep, save architectural states.
3. Function WFI() puts processor into sleep mode and waiting for interrupts.
4. CRC is used to check the state integrity of the processor upon receiving an interrupt
and before waking up the processor.
5. If errors are detected, reset the processor invoking initiation function Reset Handler().
6. Fuction Reset Handler() ﬁrst checks what caused the reset. If the reason is state
corruption, it calls function restore state() to restore architectural states.
Step 4 is carried out in hardware, which is not shown in this appendix.
//--------------------------------------------------------------
// Processor architectural states saving and restoring firmware
//--------------------------------------------------------------
//main function
int main(){
while(1){
//do some thing ...........
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//save architectural states into memory before going to sleep
save_state();
__WFI(); //put processor into sleep and waiting for interrupt
}
}
//function for saving the status and control registers of processor core
void save_state(void){
save_reg[0x0] = NVIC->ISER[0];
save_reg[0x1] = NVIC->ISPR[0];
save_reg[0x2] = NVIC->IP[0];
save_reg[0x3] = NVIC->IP[1];
save_reg[0x4] = NVIC->IP[2];
save_reg[0x5] = NVIC->IP[3];
save_reg[0x6] = SCB->ICSR;
save_reg[0x7] = SCB->AIRCR;
save_reg[0x8] = SCB->SCR;
save_reg[0x9] = SCB->CCR;
save_reg[0xa] = SCB->SHP[0];
save_reg[0xb] = SCB->SHP[1];
save_reg[0xc] = SysTick->CTRL;
save_reg[0xd] = SysTick->LOAD;
save_reg[0xe] = SysTick->VAL;
save_regfile(&save_reg[0xf]);
}
// assembly function for saving register file
// register r0 stores the input parameter of the function
__ASM void save_regfile(uint32_t *preg){
//save r1-r3
STM r0!,{r1-r3}
//get r4 from stack
LDR r4,[sp,#0x0]
//save r4-r7
STM r0!,{r4-r7}
//save r8-r12, primask, control
//the storing instruction can only access r0-r7
//other registers value needs to be moved to r1-r7 first
MOV r1,r8
MOV r2,r9
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MOV r4,r11
MOV r5,r12
MRS r6,primask
MRS r7,control
STM r0!,{r1-r7}
MRS r1,psr
MRS r2,psp
MRS r3,msp
//get link register value from the stack and keep in r4
//the link register stored the current value of the this function,
//the previous link register was moved to stack
LDR r4,[sp,#0x4]
STM r0!,{r1-r4}
//restore r1-r7
MOVS r1,#0x48
SUBS r0,r0,r1
LDM r0!,{r1-r7}
BX lr
}
//restor states if the reset is caused by error event
void Reset_Handler(void)
{
if(STAT_REG->ERR_DETECT_HALFWORD != 0x0000){
increase_stack(8);
restore_state();
}
__main();
}
__ASM void increase_stack(uint32_t offset){
MRS r1,msp
ADDS r1,r0
MSR msp,r1
BX lr
}
//function to restore private registers of processor core
void restore_state(void){
NVIC->I
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NVIC->ISPR[0] = save_reg[0x1];
NVIC->IP[0] = save_reg[0x2];
NVIC->IP[1] = save_reg[0x3];
NVIC->IP[2] = save_reg[0x4];
NVIC->IP[3] = save_reg[0x5];
SCB->ICSR = save_reg[0x6];
SCB->AIRCR = save_reg[0x7];
SCB->SCR = save_reg[0x8];
SCB->CCR = save_reg[0x9];
SCB->SHP[0] = save_reg[0xa];
SCB->SHP[1] = save_reg[0xb];
SysTick->CTRL = save_reg[0xc];
SysTick->LOAD = save_reg[0xd];
SysTick->VAL = save_reg[0xe];
restore_regfile(&save_reg[0xf]);
STAT_REG->ERR_DETECT_HALFWORD = 0x0000;
}
//assembly function to restore register file
__ASM void restore_regfile(uint32_t *preg){
//restore r8-r12,primask,control
//instruction can only access r0-r7,
//so other registers values are load into r1-r7 first
MOVS r1,#0x1c
ADDS r0,r0,r1
LDM r0!,{r1-r7}
MOV r8,r1
MOV r9,r2
MOV r10,r3
MOV r11,r4
MOV r12,r5
MSR primask,r6
MSR control,r7
//restore psr,psp,msp,lr
LDM r0!,{r1-r4}
//move stack information to recovered stack top
//get the value of original r4 and keep in r6
MOVS r5,#0x48
SUBS r0,r0,r5
LDR r6,[r5,#0xc]
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MOVS r7,#0x2
ADDS r4,r4,r7
MSR psr,r1
MSR psp,r2
//restore main stack pointer
MSR msp,r3
//save r4 and modified lr in restored stack
STR r6,[sp,#0x0]
STR r4,[sp,#0x4]
//restore r1-r7
LDM r0!,{r1-r7}
BX lr
}Appendix D
HSPICE Monte-Carlo Simulation
This appendix describes the HSPICE scripts for Monte-Carlo simulation searching bound-
ary condition of 1-to-0 bit-ﬂip. This was used to generate the simulation results presented
in Chapter 4 Figure 4.4.(b) for First Failure Voltage (FFV) analysis. Figure 4.4.(c) was
generated using a similar script, the only diﬀerence is in standard cell library. The
change needed to simulate 0-to-1 bit-ﬂip is marked in the script. The scripts is divided
into the following parts:
1. Set supply voltage, retention voltage and retention time.
2. Instruct HSPICE to use Gaussian distribution for Monte-Carlo simulation.
3. Use HSPICE optimisation tool to search the boundary condition where a ﬂip-ﬂop
can barely retain its state.
4. Run transient Monte-Carlo simulation with 8192x82=671744 iterations emulating
8192 ﬂip-ﬂops in 82 chips.
5. Create stimulus to store 1 into ﬂip-ﬂop and switch between supply voltage and
retention voltage
6. Modify original standard cell description to enable the variation of transistor pa-
rameters.
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*--------------------------------------------------------------
* HSPICE Monte-Carlo simulation for searching
* First Failure Voltage (FFV) of 1-to-0 bit-flip
*--------------------------------------------------------------
*Setting parameters
*Part 1: Set supply voltage, retention voltage and retention time
.PARAM Supply=1.2
.PARAM RetSupply= Opt1 (0, 0, ’Supply*0.9’)
.PARAM RetTime=300us
.PARAM RunTime=’RetTime+10us’
.PARAM rt=10P
.PARAM ft=10P
*Part 2: Instruct HSPICE to use Gaussian distribution
* for Monte-Carlo simulation
*these parameters will be used in standard cell library
*to emulate transistor process variation
.PARAM monte_l=AGAUSS(0,7.2n,3)
.PARAM monte_vth0=AGAUSS(0,0.023,3)
.PARAM monte_u=AGAUSS(1,0.63,3)
.PARAM monte_tox=AGAUSS(0,0.06n,3)
*Part 3: Use HSPICE optimisation tool to search the boundary
* condition where a flip-flop can barely retain its state
.Model OptMod OPT METHOD=PassFail
.Meas Tran Tprop Trig v(VDD) Val=Supply Rise=1 TD=10ns
+ Targ v(Q) Val=Supply Rise=1
.Model OptMod OPT METHOD=PassFail
.Meas Tran Tprop Trig v(VDD) Val=Supply Rise=1 TD=10ns
+ Targ v(Q) Val=Supply Rise=1
.Option NoMod AutoStop
.Option Seed=random
*Part 4: Run transient Monte-Carlo simulation with 8192x82=671744
* iterations emulating 8192 flip-flops in 82 chips
.TRAN 0.1n RunTime Sweep Optimise=Opt1 Results=Tprop
+ Model=Optmod Monte=671744
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*transistor models
.lib ’/home/syang/work/HSPICE/lib/CLN65LP_2d5_lk_v1d3.l’ TT
*65lp spice subckt files
.INCLUDE ’/home/syang/work/HSPICE/lib/MDFFHQ_X1_A8TR_monte.sp’
*Part 5: Create stimulus to store 1 into flip-flop and
* switch between supply voltage and retention voltage
VDD VDD 0 PWL (0 Supply 3ns Supply ’3ns+ft’ RetSupply ’3ns+ft+RetTime’
+ RetSupply ’3ns+ft+RetTime+rt’ Supply)
VCK CK 0 PWL (0 0 1ns 0 ’1ns+rt’ Supply ’2ns+rt’ Supply ’2ns+rt+ft’ 0)
*store ‘1’ to flip-flop
VD0 D0 0 PWL (0 Supply 1.5ns Supply ’1.5ns+ft’ 0)
*++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
*change required for 0-to-1 bit-flip experiment
*store ‘0’ to flip-flop
*VD0 D0 0 PWL (0 0 3ns 0 ’3ns+ft’ RetSupply ’3ns+ft+RetTime’ RetSupply
*+ ’3ns+ft+RetTime+rt’ Supply)
*++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Cload Q 0 0.01p
*Device under test
XMDFF Q VDD VDD 0 0 CK D0 0 0 MDFFHQ_X1_A8TR
.END
*-----------------------------------------------------------------------
* Part of standard cell HSPICE description file MDFFHQ_X1_A8TR_monte.sp
* modified for Monte-Carlo simulation
*-----------------------------------------------------------------------
*Part 6: Modify original standard cell description
* to enable the variation of transistor parameters
MMX_T0 BM:F129 C:F130 M:F131 VPW nch_hvt ad=0.038125p as=0.03433p
+ nrd=0.027322 nrs=0.021673 pd=0.6875u ps=0.526786u sa=0.883822u
+ sb=0.313568u sca=16.1064 scb=0.017629 scc=0.001687 w=0.25u
+ l=’0.060168u+monte_l’ delvt0=monte_vth0 mulu0=monte_u deltox=monte_tox
MMX_T1 M:F205 CN:F206 BM:F207 VNW pch_hvt ad=0.102p as=0.066764p
+ nrd=0.175 nrs=0.103299 pd=1.42u ps=1.25182u sa=0.2u sb=0.160823u156 Appendix D HSPICE Monte-Carlo Simulation
+ sca=10.0365 scb=0.010112 scc=0.000839 w=0.51u
+ l=’0.060022u+monte_l’ delvt0=monte_vth0 mulu0=monte_u deltox=monte_tox
MXI12/MXNA1 VSS:F139 S:F138 XI12/N1:F137 VPW nch_hvt ad=0.024p
+ as=0.010125p nrd=0.541667 nrs=36.1636 pd=0.62u ps=0.285u
+ sa=1.81441u sb=0.16u sca=17.6981 scb=0.020292 scc=0.001923 w=0.157222u
+ l=’0.060053u+monte_l’ delvt0=monte_vth0 mulu0=monte_u deltox=monte_tox
MXI12/MXNOE BM:F133 CN:F134 XI12/N1:F135 VPW nch_hvt ad=0.022875p
+ as=0.010125p nrd=0.006148 nrs=36.1636 pd=0.4125u ps=0.285u
+ sa=1.59323u sb=0.355u sca=17.6854 scb=0.020292 scc=0.001923 w=0.150085u
+ l=’0.06u+monte_l’ delvt0=monte_vth0 mulu0=monte_u deltox=monte_tox
MXI12/MXPA1 VDD:F215 S:F214 XI12/P1:F213 VNW pch_hvt ad=0.0255p
+ as=0.01275p nrd=0.509804 nrs=27.2919 pd=0.64u ps=0.32u sa=0.79u sb=0.17u
+ sca=4.73771 scb=0.003293 scc=2.5e-05 w=0.153294u
+ l=’0.06u+monte_l’ delvt0=monte_vth0 mulu0=monte_u deltox=monte_tox
MXI12/MXPOEN BM:F209 C:F210 XI12/P1:F211 VNW pch_hvt ad=0.019636p
+ as=0.01275p nrd=0.00434 nrs=27.2919 pd=0.368182u ps=0.32u sa=0.56u
+ sb=0.4u sca=4.71936 scb=0.003293 scc=2.5e-05 w=0.15u
+ l=’0.06u+monte_l’ delvt0=monte_vth0 mulu0=monte_u deltox=monte_tox
MX_G2/MXNA1 S:F145 BM:F146 VSS:F147 VPW nch_hvt ad=0.02625p as=0.015886p
+ nrd=0.028571 nrs=0.01073 pd=0.65u ps=0.354545u sa=0.175u
+ sb=0.43u sca=11.0038 scb=0.013065 scc=0.000623 w=0.151381u
+ l=’0.06u+monte_l’ delvt0=monte_vth0 mulu0=monte_u deltox=monte_tox
MX_G2/MXPA1 S:F217 BM:F218 VDD:F219 VNW pch_hvt ad=0.02625p as=0.022821p
+ nrd=0.028571 nrs=0.004401 pd=0.65u ps=0.391071u sa=0.175u
+ sb=0.195258u sca=20.7887 scb=0.022682 scc=0.00261 w=0.155118u
+ l=’0.06u+monte_l’ delvt0=monte_vth0 mulu0=monte_u deltox=monte_toxAppendix E
Example Script for Joint
Optimisation
This appendix describes the example script of joint optimisation algorithm written in
Python, which was used to minimise energy consumption under performance and re-
liability constraints for processor memory system. The corresponding algorithm was
described in Chapter 3 Figure 5.30. The script is divided into the following parts:
1. Fetch Reliability, Power and Performance Proﬁles (RPPP) from pre-characterised
optimisation table.
2. Filter RPPP by performance and reliability constraints.
3. looking for a RPPP with minimum energy.
#--------------------------------------------------------
# Joint optimisation script written in Python
#--------------------------------------------------------
def joinOpt():
infile = open(’joinOptTable.dat’, ’rb’)
joinOptTable = pickle.load(infile)
infile.close()
l2EccCost = 1.25
memEccCost = 1.5
maxErrRate = 260000
maxRuntime = ’inf’
maxErrRate = maxErrRateFloor
for app in benchmarks:
maxErrRate = maxErrRateFloor
minEnergy = float(’inf’)
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minPower = float(’inf’)
minEnergyNoResize = float(’inf’)
minPowerNoResize = float(’inf’)
for vol in voltages:
for csize in caches:
#Part 1: Fetch RPPP
pwrCore = joinOptTable[app][vol][csize][’pwrCore’]
pwrL2 = joinOptTable[app][vol][csize][’pwrL2’]
pwrMem = joinOptTable[app][vol][csize][’pwrMem’]
l1SER = joinOptTable[app][vol][csize][’l1SER’]
l1iSER = joinOptTable[app][vol][csize][’l1iSER’]
l1dSER = joinOptTable[app][vol][csize][’l1dSER’]
l2SER = joinOptTable[app][vol][csize][’l2SER’]
memSER = joinOptTable[app][vol][csize][’memSER’]
runtime = joinOptTable[app][vol][csize][’runtime’]
power = pwrCore + pwrL2 + pwrMem
energy = power * runtime
#Part 2: Filter RPPP by performance and reliability constraints
if (runtime <= maxRuntime ):
if (l1iSER <= maxErrRate and l1dSER <= maxErrRate):
if (l2SER > maxErrRate):
pwrL2Prot = pwrL2*l2EccCost
l2Prot = 1
else:
pwrL2Prot = pwrL2
l2Prot = 0
if (memSER > maxErrRate):
pwrMemProt = pwrMem*memEccCost
memProt = 1
else:
pwrMemProt = pwrMem
memProt = 0
power = pwrCore + pwrL2Prot + pwrMemProt
energy = power * runtime
#Part 3: looking for a RPPP with minimum energy
if energy < minEnergy:
minEnergy = energy
appConfVol = vol
appConfCsize = csize
appConfL2Prot = l2Prot
appConfMemProt = memProtReferences
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